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by 
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This dissertation studies the interrelationship between fiscal policy and 
institutions (property right protection and economic freedom, in particular) in affecting 
economic growth. The vast literature on economic growth examines institutions and 
fiscal policy as separate determinants of economic growth, and has not established a 
theoretical basis or empirical link on the interaction between them. This dissertation 
takes a unique approach to the growth literature by studying a channel that institutions 
affect growth – the fiscal policy channel.  
Among the first ones who incorporate economic institutions into a growth 
model with fiscal policy, I construct a theoretical framework in Chapter 2 to illustrate 
the role of property rights protection in determining the growth impact of government 
spending. The analysis is based on the standard Solow growth model with some 
modifications where security of property rights is modeled to affect the so-called 
“effective aggregate capital level”, a new concept introduced in the dissertation. It is 
shown that the impact of government investment on the steady-state output level and 
the output growth rate depends on the level of property rights protection. Moreover, 
increase in security of property rights can either enhance or reduce the growth impact 
of government investment, depending on the relationship between private and public 
saving of a country. This theoretical framework provides a basis for testing the 
hypothesis about the determining role of institutions on the growth impact of fiscal 
policy. 
In Chapter 3, I test the hypothesis on the interrelationship between fiscal policy 
and institutions in affecting growth by employing the framework presented in Chapter 
2 but extending the concept of institutions to a broader scope – economic freedom. 
Using a sample of 72 countries over the period of 1990 through 2015 in interactive 
growth regression models, and the economic freedom index of the Heritage 
Foundation, I find that is the level of economic freedom has a significant impact on 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy on economic growth. Public investment in 
infrastructure can enhance long-term growth better in countries with less degree of 
freedom. Meanwhile, public consumption does not benefit growth but its adverse 
impact is mitigated if a country enjoys greater economic freedom. Furthermore, the 
determining role of institutions in emerging countries is more prominent than that in 
 
advanced economies which are pretty homogenous in economic development and have 
already been at a high level of economic freedom.   
Chapter 4 extends the scope of this study by investigating institutional 
determinants of the short-term impact of fiscal policy – fiscal multipliers – with a 
three-step regression procedure for a sample of 72 countries from 1960 through 2015. 
I find significant and positive correlations between fiscal multipliers and economic 
institutions but weak evidence on the direct impact of political institutions on the 
multipliers. Countries with political stability, higher economic freedom, more 
efficiently regulatory system, and less corruption have greater government expenditure 
multipliers. The role of institutions is not the same to different components of fiscal 
stimulus. Institutional characteristics can explain variations in public consumption 
multipliers better than variations in public investment multiplier across countries. The 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal policy and institutions are considered as important determinants of economic 
growth. However, the growth literature usually examines them as separate 
determinants and has not established a theoretical basis on the interaction between 
them in affecting economic growth. In fact, the same policy may produce different 
results in countries with different institutional settings. In other words, institutional 
characteristics can determine the efficacy of fiscal policy across countries. This strand 
of literature is important but still underdeveloped.  
A vast literature on fiscal policy and economic growth has been developed for decades. 
The neoclassical growth theory (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) accompanied with 
enormous empirical studies (Bond, Leblebicioǧlu, & Schiantarelli, 2010; Islam, 1995; 
Jones, 1995; Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992) has provided evidences on the role of 
capital and technological accumulation process on economic growth. In this approach, 
economic growth is exogenous and countries are richer because they have better 
technology and greater savings for investment, government policy has a minor effect 
on long-term growth. The subsequent endogenous growth theory introduces policy 
variables as determinants of growth. In this approach, fiscal policy can enhance growth 
when a government increases productive spending such as expenditure on education 
(Lucas, 1988), infrastructure (Barro, 1990), and research and development (Romer, 
1990), which directly affects productivity and capital accumulation. On the other hand, 
non-productive spending such as subsidies to some industry or public sector wage 
payment can be harmful to growth by reducing incentives to invest in accumulated 
production factors from private sector (Gupta, Clements, Baldacci, & Mulas-
Granados, 2005). From empirical perspective, evidence on the relationship between 
fiscal policy and growth are mixed due to the use of different samples and different 
measures of fiscal policy (Bergh & Henrekson, 2011).   
Recently developed literature, which is regarded as the modern approach to economic 
growth, gives rise to institutional factors in explaining why countries are rich or poor 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008; Fuchs-
Schündeln & Hassan, 2016; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). It asserts 
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that the dynamics of capital and technological process illustrate the mechanics of 
growth but shed no light on why some countries accumulate more capital for 
investment, acquire better technology and become richer or growing faster than the 
others do. This approach emphasizes the importance of political and economic 
institutions, which have been long established and not easily changed over one night. 
Institutions define rules, regulations and policies which directly shape behavior of 
economic agents in investment, production and consumption (North, 1987, 1991). 
Institutions originate from historical, demographic and geographic factors and appear 
to persist overtime. Countries differ in economic development because of those 
almost-stable institutional characteristics. This strand of research is valuable to explain 
cross-country variations in economic growth but still far to obtain realistic policy 
recommendations because institutions can slowly be changed or replaced and it seems 
impossible to change the origins of institutional differences (Dixit, 2007).              
The links between two strands of the existing literature has in fact become a fruitful 
research area in recent years. Empirical studies of the interrelationship between 
institutions, fiscal policy and economic growth demonstrate some interesting findings. 
It confirms institutions, such as constraints on politicians and political system, are 
underlying causes of economic performance and shape macroeconomic policies 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, & Thaicharoen, 2003; Afonso, Agnello, & Furceri, 
2010; Fatás & Mihov, 2003, 2013; Keefer & Knack, 2007). It also reports that the 
effects of fiscal policy on productivity, capital accumulation and economic growth 
much depend on institutional quality (Afonso & Jalles, 2011; Cavallo & Daude, 2011; 
Morozumi & Veiga, 2016). The general conclusion from empirical analyses is “good” 
institutions, e.g. low corruption, more checks and balances, low risk of expropriation, 
government accountability, support (reduce) the positive (negative) impacts of fiscal 
policy on growth.  
Surprisingly, the existing literature on institutional economics, bridging the traditional 
and modern approach to economic growth, has not satisfactorily documented the link 
between economic freedom and fiscal policy in affecting economic performance. 
Since the first economic freedom index was introduced in Gwartney, Lawson, and 
Block (1996), it seems no doubt on the contribution to economic development of the 
institutions that ensure property rights and freedom of choice and exchange (Hall & 
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Lawson, 2014). However, economic freedom is usually studied independently to fiscal 
policy (Dawson, 2003; De Haan & Sturm, 2000; Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu, 2006; 
Justesen, 2008; Williamson & Mathers, 2011). Afonso and Jalles (2011) are among 
very few authors who take into account the interaction between fiscal policy and 
institutions in determining economic growth. Nevertheless, their study considers fiscal 
policy in terms of government size and disperses the analysis with so many measures 
of institutions (political institutions) but excludes economic freedom. Certainly, the 
impact of public investment in infrastructure is not their central interest. Similar 
approach is employed by Farhadi, Islam, and Moslehi (2015) but the focus is on the 
interaction between economic freedom and natural resource rents, neither public 
investment nor consumption. Cavallo and Daude (2011) take into account the effect of 
public investment on private investment but use political risk rating, rather than 
economic freedom, as a measure of institutions. Obviously, there exists a gap in the 
literature about the interaction between economic institutions and fiscal policy, 
especially economic freedom and public investment in infrastructure, in affecting 
long-term growth. Moreover, studies on the interaction between fiscal policy and 
institutions are limited to empirical analysis and lack a theoretical framework to 
support the argument on this interaction. This dissertation aims to fill this gap.    
According to the conventional view, economic freedom or better institutions are 
beneficial to economic development because “a free society releases the energies and 
abilities of people to pursue their own objectives” (Friedman & Friedman, 1990, p. 
148). However, in reality, when considering the growth impact of government policy 
in different institutional settings, the conclusion is not straightforward. Many 
investment projects which seem conducive to economic growth face strong opposition 
in more economically free countries. For example, in mid-January 2018, French Prime 
Minister Edouard Philippe had to announce an abandon of construction of the Notre-
Dame-des-Landes airport in western France after years of opposition and even violent 
protests. The airport plan was initiated in the 1960s and expected to promote economic 
development in the Loire-Atlantique region. However, this project had been delaying 
for decades because of strong opposition from environmental activists, anti-capitalists 
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as well as local farmers. It has finally come to a dead end (Reuters, 17 January 2018; 
The Guardian, 17 January 2018)1.  
Thai government also had to suspend the Krabi power plant project in February 2017 
under a protest pressure of local people and domestic news organizations. Thailand is 
among some developing countries with above-average degree of economic freedom. 
The Krabi plant was expected to meet the growing demand for electricity in southern 
Thailand and to reduce the country’s dependence on natural gas. However, local 
people and fishermen argued that the plant would cause serious air pollution by firing 
coal and take away their way of life by developing coastal area for coal imports. Thai 
Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha was reluctant to announce a review on 
environmental- and health-impact assessments on this plant to calm the people down. 
This decision would have the plant delayed for one year or more (Thai PBS, 3 February 
2018; The Nation, 28 January 2018)2.   
China in contrast is well known with successful infrastructure investment and rapid 
economic growth but enjoys low level of freedom. The Beijing–Shanghai high-speed 
railway costing US$ 34.7 billion with maximum speed of 380 km/h stretching over 
1,318 kilometers was constructed and completed within only 3 years, from 2008 to 
2011 (Business Insider, 20 June 2016; Railway Technology, n.d.)3. Three Gorges Dam 
on Yangtze River, the world’s largest dam with construction cost of US$ 27.6 billion, 
started to operate in 2012 after 17 years of construction even though it had been heavily 
criticized inside the country and from abroad for its tremendous damaging impacts on 
environment and culture (Scientific American, 25 March 2008; Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, n.d.)4. Government investment in China seems to be successful and the 
country has actually achieved remarkable growth rates during the past decades. The 
aforementioned examples as well as what we may observe in our real life question the 




2 Full article can be found on http://englishnews.thaipbs.or.th/coal-fired-power-plant-projects-krabi-
thepa-put-off-3-years/ and http://www.nationmultimedia.com/detail/national/30337304  
3 Full article can be found on https://www.businessinsider.com/giant-chinese-infrastructure-projects-
that-are-reshaping-the-world-2016-6 and https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/beijing/ 
4 Full article can be found on https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/chinas-three-gorges-dam-
disaster/ and https://www.britannica.com/topic/Three-Gorges-Dam 
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conventional argument that greater economic freedom is always good to the economy 
if one takes into account the effectiveness of fiscal policy.  
It could be argued that the same amount of money invested in infrastructure may not 
result in the same effect on growth in different countries. But why not the same effect? 
The obvious answer should be “because countries differ”. But what differences across 
countries make a difference in the infrastructure investment efficiency: history, 
geography, society, culture, politics, demography, macro-economic conditions or 
anything else? In this dissertation, I hypothesize that it is economic institutions that 
shape the effect of fiscal policy on the economy.    
Existing literature documents that productive government spending such as investment 
in infrastructure is beneficial to economic growth because it is an input in the private 
production function and affects capital accumulation (Barro, 1990; Easterly & Rebelo, 
1993; Romero-Ávila & Strauch, 2008; Zagler & Dürnecker, 2003). Nevertheless, in 
an economically free society, growth-enhancing projects may become less effective as 
meeting with fierce resistance from the people whose property rights are strictly 
protected by law as the case of France and Thailand. Even there is no opposition, 
decision and implementation of those projects may take longer time for a thoroughly 
fair discussion and consensus countrywide. On the other hand, ignorance of the rule of 
law and restricted competition seem to make government investment more effective 
as the case of China. From another aspect, in countries where property rights are less 
secured and the enforcement of law is ineffective, the private sector becomes inactive, 
public investment turns out to be the primary source of investment and an important 
engine for growth. Therefore, it is plausible to believe that how public spending affects 
growth depends on institutional characteristics of a country: the more freedom, the less 
efficient use of public goods and the lower effectiveness of government investment 
projects, and vice versa.  
One may ask whether this relationship remains the same if government raises spending 
on goods and services, or government consumption, instead of investment in physical 
assets. By definition, government consumption includes goods and services purchased 
by general government. They can be consumed by individual households, such as 
public education and healthcare, or can be used for maintaining government 
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operations, such as Congress and Parliaments, and society as a whole, such as national 
defense and environmental protection. In contrast to public investment, government 
consumption does not obtain a global consensus on its growth impact because different 
components of consumption expenditure may have different impacts on growth. 
However, numerous studies usually find a negative relationship between government 
consumption and growth (Afonso & Furceri, 2010; Bergh & Henrekson, 2011; Fölster 
& Henrekson, 2001; Grier & Tullock, 1989; Landau, 1983; Romero-Ávila & Strauch, 
2008). It is argued that the bigger expenditure of the government, the more deviation 
from government’s fundamental functions as a growth engine. When governments put 
many resources in some activities which can be done more efficiently by the private 
sector, it becomes a hurdle for growth. Growth-reducing effects can also come from 
increases in government consumption expenditure, for example defense spending, 
which reduce spending on other growth-enhancing expenditure categories such as 
investment in infrastructure.  
The mechanism that economic institutions affect the effectiveness of government 
consumption could be as similar as in the case of government investment. Given the 
fact that government expenditure, regardless of investment or consumption, needs to 
be discussed, approved and implemented through a more complicated regulatory 
process in a more freedom country, adverse impacts of government expenditure on 
growth would be softened. Therefore, it is plausible to believe that the greater freedom, 
the lower the negative effect of government consumption.    
The described interdependence between institutions and economic outcome of 
government policy induce some important and interesting questions about the growth 
impacts of fiscal policy. Is it true that impact of fiscal policy on growth in a country 
depends on its institutional characteristics? Comparing an economically free country 
with a restricted one, whose government investment can enhance growth better? Does 
economic freedom have the same influence on growth impact of different types of 
public spending? Does the interrelationship of fiscal policy and economic freedom in 
determining growth differ with level of economic development, e.g. between emerging 
countries and developed economies? Which dimensions of economic freedom matter 
to the effectiveness of fiscal policy? Chapter 2 and 3 of this dissertation attempt to 
answer those questions from both theoretical and empirical perspective. 
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Since the aftermath of the global financial crisis 2008-2009, as monetary policy 
became less effective in stimulating the economy, the role of fiscal policy in 
dampening negative effects of business cycles has been impressively highlighted 
through tremendous fiscal stimulus packages embraced by many countries. The 
renewed interest in the short-term impact of fiscal policy has triggered a growing 
literature on fiscal multiplier but no consensus has been reached (Batini, Eyraud, Forni, 
& Weber, 2014; Caldara & Kamps, 2017; Hebous, 2011; Leeper, Traum, & Walker, 
2017). Fiscal multipliers might be best described as “a function of country 
characteristics and the state of the economy, in addition to the type of fiscal instrument 
used” (Brinca, Holter, Krusell, & Malafry, 2016, p. 53). 
Studying the short-term impact of fiscal policy, much public and academic discussion 
has been devoted to the role of macroeconomic characteristics in determining the size 
of fiscal multipliers (Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2012; DeLong & Summers, 2012; 
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, & Végh, 2013) but little connects the multipliers to the more 
fundamental factors such as institutions. In fact, institutions play an important role in 
any policy efficacy because they shape behavior of all agents in the society by 
determining transaction and production costs (North, 1991). Surprisingly, the existing 
literature has not much to say about the determining role of institutions in short-term 
impacts of fiscal policy. Batini, Eyraud, and Weber (2014) and Spilimbergo, Schindler, 
and Symansky (2009) are among very few authors mentioning the role of institutions 
in determining the size of fiscal multipliers but give no empirical evidence. Moreover, 
the prevailing literature on short-term impact of fiscal policy across both emerging and 
advanced economies is thin due to an overweighed focus on developed countries since 
the 2008-2009 Great Recession. Chapter 4 of this dissertation aims to fill this void.  
This dissertation investigates impacts of fiscal policy on economic growth as well as 
on stimulating output in short-term across institutional settings. Motivated by the 
diversity of institutions, public investment in infrastructure and economic growth 
around the world, chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework on analyzing the role of 
economic institution – property rights protection – in the growth impact of fiscal 
policy. Chapter 3 conducts an empirical study to test the hypothesis on this relation 
using a broader measure of property rights protection – economic freedom. Chapter 4 
extends the literature by examining the role of institutions in determining the short-
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term effect of government expenditure using a wide range of economic and political 
institution indicators. After the theoretical and empirical analyses, chapter 5 draws 
some conclusions, policy implications, limitations and potential extensions for future 
research.       
More specifically, in chapter 2, I construct a theoretical framework to study the 
interaction between property rights protection and public investment in affecting 
growth based on the Solow growth model. The main contribution of this chapter is the 
extension of the standard Solow model by (i) introducing both public and private sector 
in the production function and (ii) incorporating property rights protection as a 
determinant of the distribution of capital stock between private sector and public sector 
in the production process or the supply side of the economy. This model shows that 
impact of government investment on the steady-state output level and the output 
growth rate depends on the level of property rights protection. Moreover, increase in 
security of property rights can either enhance or reduce the growth impact of 
government investment, depending on the relationship between private and public 
saving of a country. This theoretical framework provides a basis for testing the 
hypothesis about the determining role of institutions in the growth impact of fiscal 
policy which is the primary content of chapter 3 and extended in chapter 4 with the 
short-term effect context. 
Chapter 3 tests whether there is an interaction between economic institutions and fiscal 
policy in affecting growth. This chapter contributes to the empirical growth literature 
in different ways. First, it analyzes a large set of 72 countries across different levels of 
economic development over a period from 1990 to 2015, using two alternative 
measures of economic freedom and two components of government spending. Second, 
by separating public spending into government investment and consumption, it offers 
a more comprehensive analysis on public expenditure components in different 
institutional settings. Third, the nonlinear effect of government spending on economic 
growth is investigated by both cross section and panel data approaches. Furthermore, 
the possible reverse causality, heterogeneity, as well as omitted variables are addressed 
with a series of robustness checks, including the recently developed panel data 
techniques. The empirical findings in this chapter confirm that it is economic freedom 
that determines the effect of fiscal policy on economic growth. Public investment in 
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infrastructure can enhance long-term growth better in countries with less degree of 
freedom. Meanwhile, public consumption does not benefit growth but its adverse 
impact is mitigated if a country is more economically free. Furthermore, the 
determining role of institutions in emerging countries is more prominent than that in 
advanced economies which are pretty homogenous in economic development and have 
already been at a high level of economic freedom.   
Chapter 4 investigates institutional determinants of the short-term impact of fiscal 
policy – fiscal multiplier – by employing a three-step regression procedure for a 
sample of 72 countries (the same countries as in chapter 3) from 1960 through 2015. 
Its contribution to the literature on fiscal multiplier is twofold. First, the multipliers for 
a large sample of countries across different levels of development are estimated, 
helping shed more light on the untold story about the effectiveness of fiscal policy in 
the less developed world whose literature is thin. Second, it extends the existing 
literature on determinants of fiscal multipliers by providing empirical evidence on the 
relationship between the multiplier and institutional characteristics across countries. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical study connecting institutions 
with fiscal multipliers using a large set of countries. The main finding in this chapter 
is the significant and positive correlations between fiscal multipliers and economic 
institutions but weak evidence on the direct relationship between political institutions 
and the multipliers. Countries with political stability, higher economic freedom, more 
efficiently regulatory system and less corruption have greater government expenditure 
multipliers. Furthermore, the role of institutions is not the same to different 
components of fiscal stimulus. Institutional characteristics can explain variations in 
public consumption multipliers better than variations in public investment multipliers 
across countries. The size of fiscal multipliers also depends on legal origin and level 




CHAPTER 2. GOVERNMENT SPENDING, PROPERTY RIGHTS 
PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AN 
AUGMENTED SOLOW GROWTH MODEL 
2.1. Introduction 
The factors we have listed (innovation, economies of scale, education, capital 
accumulation, etc.) are not causes of growth; they are growth. 
North and Thomas (1973, p. 2)  
The modern approach to economic growth pioneered by the Nobel Laureate Douglas 
C. North typically distinguishes the “proximate” from the “fundamental” causes of 
growth. The former refers to factors in the production function such as physical and 
human capital, technological progress whereas the later implies the incentive structure 
which determines the investment in the production factors and resource allocation. 
Economic activities are based on incentives; and institutions, which are formal rules, 
informal constraints and the way they are enforced, create incentive mechanisms for 
agents in the economy (North, 1987).  
Property rights, the right to use or transfer a good or asset for consumption, income 
generation, and/or contracting with other parties, are an important component of the 
institutional complex of an economy. Property rights can affect economic activity 
through at least four mechanisms: (i) expropriation risk that one faces in obtaining 
fruits of his/her efforts; (ii) unproductive costs that one incurs to defend his/her 
property; (iii) gain from trade or asset’s mobility, and (iv) facilitating other 
transactions (Besley & Ghatak, 2010). An enormous literature also emphasizes the 
effect of property rights protection on corporate research and development (R&D) 
investment, an engine for long-term economic growth, from theory such as Acemoglu 
and Akcigit (2012); Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001); Besley (1995) to 
empirics such as Gould and Gruben (1996); Lin, Lin, and Song (2010); Zhao (2006) 
among many others. 
Property rights are not exogenous but driven by economic and political forces in which 
government plays a crucial role. Effective states provide more security of property 
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rights to households and firms while ineffective states do not give sufficient resources 
to protect the rights. Not only shaping the institutional quality such as contract 
enforcement and property rights protection governments also implement public 
policies such as expenditure programs, transfers or taxation to reallocate resources and 
influence private sector’s decision on investment and production. Economic outcome 
of the interaction between government policy and the shaped institutions characterizes 
whether a government is either benevolent (offering a “helping hand” to the private 
sector by providing necessary government services, e.g. police, law enforcement, 
infrastructure, basic education and R&D), or predatory (placing a “grabbing hand” to 
extract rents from the private sector, e.g. excessively distortionary taxation, red tapes, 
corruption) (Lin et al., 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1998).  
In order to examine the interaction between government spending and property rights 
protection in determining economic performance, this chapter presents a simple model 
based on the Solow growth model (Solow, 1956) but accounts for the other two 
important determinants of long-term economic growth: government capital spending 
and property rights protection. In the Solow model, the economy is simply 
characterized by a single-good, neoclassical production with two factors, capital and 
labor. The steady-state per-capita income is determined by the rate of saving, the 
population growth and the technological progress, which are exogenously given. 
Therefore, countries achieve different steady state levels of income per capita because 
they differ in terms of saving rates, population growth rates and technological 
advancement. I extend the Solow model by (i) distinguishing two types of capital – 
private and public – and (ii) accounting for the effect of property rights protection on 
the substitution between private capital and public capital in a neoclassical production 
function.     
As well-known in macroeconomics, in the short run, aggregate economic variables, 
such as output, employment, consumption and investment, fluctuate across business 
cycles. However, in the long run, “the great ratios”, such as output per worker (Y/L) 
and capital per worker (K/L), grow at almost constant rates and the income shares of 
capital (MPK*K/Y) and labor (MPL*L/Y) remain almost constant5. I inherit those 
5 MPK = marginal product of capital; MPL = marginal product of labor; Y=output; K=capital; L=labor. 
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facts in my model and assume that both private and public capital evolve over time 
with the same path. The definition of the steady state is also the same as in the Solow 
model. Although the Solow model may be too simple to explain the complicated 
interactions among agents in the economy, it is powerful enough to provide some 
insights about how the macro-economy works, especially for our simple purpose of 
investigating the interrelationship between institutions and government spending in 
affecting economic growth for empirical testing. 
This study is related to two classes of growth models: fiscal policy-economic growth 
and institutions-economic growth. The relationship between fiscal policy and 
economic growth has been intensively studied in the growth literature. In the 
neoclassical growth models, including the exogenous growth models of Solow (1956), 
Swan (1956) and the optimal growth models of Cass (1965), Diamond (1965) and 
Koopmans (1963), economic growth in the steady state depends only on exogenous 
factors – population growth and technological processes – fiscal policy can affect the 
level of output, not the steady state growth rate. However, the endogenous growth 
models give rise to the contribution of fiscal policy, especially government spending, 
in explaining economic growth. Barro (1990) introduces the concept of productive 
public spending as a direct input of private production function. He proves that 
productive government spending can have growth-enhancing effect but overspending 
becomes damaging to growth. Lucas (1988) emphasizes the importance of human 
capital as the main source of growth; therefore, government investment in education 
can facilitate the human capital accumulation process and enhance growth. Romer 
(1990) focuses on the role of R&D by proposing a model where economic growth is 
motivated by technological changes which are featured as a non-rival, partially 
excludable good. Consequently, there is room for government policy to promote 
growth by investment in basic R&D. Zagler and Dürnecker (2003) excellently 
synchronize the impact of different fiscal policy instruments in an endogenous growth 
framework. Their analysis distinguishes various channels that fiscal policy can affect 
growth, remarkably highlighting the positive impact of education expenditure and 
increases in infrastructure investment on the growth rate.  
Accounting for institutions or property rights protection in growth models has also 
attracted numerous researchers in the past decades. Among institutional economists 
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Kwan and Lai (2003) use the R&D based growth model of Romer (1990) to study the 
impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) on the development of new intermediate 
goods. They confirm that an optimal degree of protection exists in a transitional 
dynamic framework because of the trade-off between current consumption loss and 
growth rate gain in the future as IPR is strengthened. Eicher and García-Peñalosa 
(2008) take a different approach by endogenizing the degree of IPR from the private 
sector perspective and come up with multiple equilibrium result. Acemoglu and 
Akcigit (2012) examine the interaction between IPR and competition where IPR is 
modeled as a state dependent variable. The authors offer a dynamic incentive effect 
where providing more protection to the greater R&D leaders relative to the lower R&D 
leaders will not only give more incentives to the technological advanced firms but also 
encourage the lower ones to invest more in R&D to reduce the technological gap and 
benefit from greater protection.    
In general, most of the economic growth models separate property rights protection or 
institutions from fiscal policy in affecting growth. Different from other authors, who 
usually assume property rights protection (or institutions in general) as part of 
technology level in the neoclassical models (Mankiw et al., 1992) or as a determinant 
of private investment in R&D in the endogenous growth models (Kwan and Lai 
(2003), I assume that property rights protection affects the distribution of capital stock 
between private and public sector in a neoclassical framework. Modeling the 
institutional factor and government spending in this way allows analyzing the 
interaction between the security of property rights and government spending, which 
has never been attempted in the growth literature.    
2.2. Model setup 
2.2.1. The economy 
As in the Solow model, the economy in this model is closed and characterized by a 
social planner who dictatorially allocates all resources in the economy. One good is 
produced with two factors of production, capital and labor. The good can be consumed 
immediately or saved in terms of capital for the next period. Labor is supplied 
inelastically by households and used together with the (accumulated) capital to 




The production function6 is given by 
!" = $(&", (") (2.1) 
where ! is output, & is total capital stock, ( is total labor, * indexes (continuous) time. 
The technology $ in (2.1) is assumed to be neoclassical by satisfying the normal 
properties of (i) constant return to scale, (ii) positive and diminishing marginal product 
of each input factor, and (iii) Inada conditions. These conditions are expressed as 
follows 
(i) $(+&, +() = +$(&, (),			∀+ > 0;  
(ii)  0102 > 0,
031
023 < 0, for 5 ∈ {&, (};  
(iii)lim
2→=
>0102? = ∞ , lim2→! >
01
02? = 0, for 5 ∈ {&, (} 
2.2.3. The role of property rights protection 
The key and innovative element of this model is the incorporation of property rights 
protection into the capital accumulation of the production function under a so-called 
“effective capital”.  The formulation of “the effective capital” in the model is 
motivated by the observation that government expenditures in countries like China has 
been very effective, as demonstrated by its speedy construction of large scale 
infrastructure such as its express train system and modern airports etc. in recent years. 
It has been argued that a main reason for the effectiveness of such government projects 
in China is due to the weak property rights protection of private property such as 
houses and land. Under the current law in China, land belongs to the state and only 
local governments have the authority to requisition land from farmers (Su & Tao, 
2017). Given a lack of market for land ownership and the lawfully sole power to 
expropriate land of the government, the Chinese government can acquire land cheaply 
from farmers, carry out infrastructure construction, and achieve a rapid urban 
                                                 
6 I abstract from technological progress since it does not change the conclusions but makes the 
presentation less convenient. 
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expansion process (Ding, 2004; Lai, Peng, Li, & Lin, 2014). The model in my thesis 
was trying to capture this phenomenon where weak property right protection (smaller 
theta in my model) facilitates the operation of government projects. In contrast, in 
countries that has stronger property right protection (larger theta), government is more 
constrained in implementing its projects that contravene private property rights. This 
seems to be the case in other countries, for example, France and Thailand. In January 
2018, the French government had to announce an abandon of construction of the 
Notre-Dame-des-Landes airport after more fifty years of strong opposition from 
environmental activists, anti-capitalists as well as local farmers (Reuters, 17 January 
2018; The Guardian, 17 January 2018). Similarly, the Thai government decided to 
suspend the Krabi power plant project in Thailand in February 2017 under a protest 
pressure of local people and domestic news organizations (Thai PBS, 3 February 2018; 
The Nation, 28 January 2018). In short, the formulation of the effective capital in my 
model is motivated by the above contrasting observations and aims to capture the 
conflict that increased effectiveness of private investments necessarily requires greater 
property right protection, which in turns lowers the effectiveness of the private capital. 
Thus, the symmetric effect of theta in my model is a reflection of the above think. 
In order to capture the described relationship between property rights protection, 
private and public capital, total capital of the economy is modeled as 
&" = "&"# + (1 − ")&"' (2.2) 
where &# and &'  represent private capital and government (or public) capital, 
respectively. The parameter " ∈ (0,1) captures the extent of property rights protection 
where the higher value means stronger protection. Especially in this setting, " can also 
be interpreted as the productivity of private capital and (1 − ") as the productivity of 
public capital, given the fact that the productivity or efficiency of private capital and 
public capital depends on how strongly or weakly property rights are protected as 
described above. 
Alternatively, we can think the aggregate capital stock & as a weighted average capital 
of private and public sector where the weight is the extent to which private property is 
protected from expropriation risk. In this model, & is called the effective aggregate 
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capital, the total capital of the economy formed under the security of property rights, 
which is different from the normal capital stock in the Solow or other growth models 
that do not account for property rights protection. 
In fact, the way property rights protection affects capital accumulation in the 
production function in this model reflects the commonly accepted idea in institutional 
economics. As North (1987) reasons, institutions such as property rights serve as an 
incentive structure shaping the productive activities for economic growth of a society. 
The incentive mechanism is straightforward: no one chooses to create innovation or 
invest in capital and technology if their property is not protected or contractual 
transactions are not effectively enforced or the rates of return from those productivity-
raising activities are less than piracy. The importance of property rights protection in 
economic growth and development is also argued both theoretically and empirically 
by Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012); Acemoglu and Johnson (2005); Besley (1995); 
Gould and Gruben (1996); Lin et al. (2010); Schneider (2005) among many others. 
The parameter " in this model is influenced by many factors such as the technology 
level, talents or human capital, the length and breadth of the patent protected, and law 
enforcement. To make things simple, I assume that " is exogenously given. I also 
abstract from the two extreme cases where " = 0 (there is no property rights 
protection, or all the private properties are expropriated by the government; therefore, 
only public capital presents in the production function along with total labor in the 
economy) and " = 1 (there is no risk of expropriation at all). In reality, it is plausible 
to assume that " should take some value between 0 and 1. Some economies like the 
United States, France and/or Hong Kong represents the ones with " close to 1 while 
countries like Venezuela, Russia and/or China represents those with " close to 07. 
It is worth mentioning that this is not the only way to account for property rights 
protection, or more general, economic institutions, in a growth model. Mankiw et al. 
(1992) assume institutions together with other factors such as climate and resource 
endowments as part of the technology level in the Cobb-Douglass production function 
when they augment the standard Solow growth model with human capital 




accumulation. Investigating the impact of IPR protection on economic growth and 
arguing for the existence of an optimal protection level, Kwan and Lai (2003) model 
IPR protection as a determinant of the imitation process where the stronger protection 
increases the cost of imitation and reduces the number of goods available to be imitated 
in an endogenous growth model. Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) regard IPR as a state 
dependent policy variable whose strength depends on the technological gap between 
leading firms and the followers. Different from other authors, I assume property rights 
protection as a determinant of the distribution of capital stock between private and 
public sector. Modeling the institutional factor in this way allows analyzing the 
interaction between the security of property rights and government spending in 
subsequent steps. 
Another important feature of this model is the assumption about the exogeneity of 
government investment in the public capital accumulation. In fact, various potential 
factors can determine the level of government investment and in turn public capital 
stock. They could be economic factors (such as the state of the economy, public debt 
level, government revenue), demographic factors (such as urbanization, population, 
dependency ratio), or institutions (such as property rights, decision making procedure, 
current party in office, democracy). However, in this simple model, government 
investment is assumed to be exogenous so that the balanced growth path of the Solow 
model can be applied straightforward. Relaxing this assumption will be discussed after 
the main analysis has been obtained.      
Defining (# as the stock of private capital per worker, (# = &#/(, ('  as the stock of 
public capital per worker, (' = &'/(, and * as the level of output per worker, * =
!/(, the production function is rewritten in an intensive (or per capita) form as follows 
*" = $ >+,-, , 1? = $("("
# + (1 − ")("', 1) = .(("#, ("').  (2.3) 
where .	also satisfies the similar properties of neoclassical technology as $ does. More 
specifically,  
(i) .(+(#, +(') = +.((#, ('),			∀+ > 0;  
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(ii) 0/02 > 0,
03/
023 < 0, for 5 ∈ {(
#, ('};  
(iii)lim
2→=
>0/02? = ∞ , lim2→! >
0/
02? = 0, for 5 ∈ {(
#, ('}. 
2.2.4. Resource constraint 
In each period, the social planner takes part of the output for public spending. The rest 
of the output is uniformly allocated across households who in turn save a fraction of 
the output for future use and consume the leftover. Alternatively, we can think that the 
total output is divided into three parts, government spending, 0'  (for public capital 
accumulation), private saving, 0# (for private capital accumulation), and private 
consumption, 1. The resource constraint is expressed as follows 
1" + 0"' + 0"# = !" (2.4)    
or in per-capita terms: 
2" + 3"' + 3"# = *" (2.5)    
where 2" = 1"/(", 3"' = 0"'/(", 3"# = 0"#/(".   
Denoting 4'  as a constant fraction of output taken by the public sector for spending 
(or investing in public capital), 4# as a constant fraction of output taken by the private 
sector for private investment, the resource constraint (2.5) becomes 
2" + 4'*" + 4#*" = *"  (2.6)    
2.2.5. Aggregate dynamics 
Suppose the population grows at a constant rate 5 ≥ 0 and both private capital and 
public capital depreciate at a constant rate 7 ∈ (0,1) over time. The law of motion for 
labor is expressed as 
-8 ,
-,
= 5 (2.7) 
and the law of motion for the stock of private and public capital is expressed as 
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&8"# = 0"# − 7&"# (2.8) 
&8"' = 0"' − 7&"'  (2.9) 
where (8 = 9(/9* and &8 = 9&/9*. 
Equivalently, the evolution of (# and ('  is governed by8 
(8 "# = 3"# − (7 + 5)("# = 4#*" − (7 + 5)("# (2.10) 
(8 "' = 3"' − (7 + 5)("' = 4'*" − (7 + 5)("'  (2.11) 
The expression (2.10) and (2.11) are typical Solow growth equations but accounting 
for two types of capital. They tell us that (private and public) capital grows over time 
simply because a fraction of output is saved (for investment) and enough to cover the 
“effective” worn out capital (the depreciation plus additional capital required for an 
increase in population). If the saving from public and private sector is lower than the 
“effective depreciation” (7 + 5), both types of capital declines over time and so does 
the per-capita output because the per-capita output is a function of the per-capita 
capital stock as shown in (2.3).     
2.3. Interaction between government spending and property rights 
protection in affecting growth  
2.3.1. The steady state 
In the steady state {(#∗, ('∗} of the economy where per-capita capital stock is constant, 
(2.10) and (2.11) have a solution at which {("#, ("'} converges to {(#∗, ('∗}, ∀* > 0 if 





                                                 















Dividing both side of (2.8) and (2.9) by (". Substituting +
8
- = (8 + (
-8
- into (8) and (9) and collecting 
terms, we have (2.10) and (2.11).  
9 Here I abstract from the trivial solution {(# = 0, (' = 0} at which capital, output and consumption 







where *∗ is the stead-state per-capita output, or *∗ = .((#∗, ('∗).  
For a better illustration of the analysis, I take the Cobb-Douglas production function 
in the following form: 
 !" = &"F("DGF = ("&"# + (1 − ")&"')F(DGF, H ∈ (0,1)  (2.14) 
or in the intensive form: 
*" = ("("# + (1 − ")("')F  (2.15) 








#∗ + (1 − ")('∗)F (2.17) 
equivalently, 





  (2.18) 





  (2.19)  
2.3.2. Comparative static analysis 
Substituting (2.18) and (2.19) into the production function (2.15), the 
expression of steady-state per-capita output is as follows: 


















OPM  (2.21) 
In order to understand the impact of government investment on the level of income per 
capita, as well as the impact of property rights protection on the effectiveness of 
government investment, I take partial derivative of * in (2.21) with respect to  4' , 0U
∗
0;E 
, and then take partial derivative of 0U
∗
0;E with respect to ", 
03U∗
































The expression (2.22) shows that an increase in government investment is associated 
with an increase in the steady state income per capita. However, the impact of 
government investment on income per capita is a function of the property rights 
protection parameter " (and other parameters, such as the depreciation rate 7, 
population growth rate 5, saving rates of private sector 4# and public sector 4' , and 
the income share of total capital H).  
The expression (2.23) tells us that a rise in " can either increase or decrease the positive 
impact of government investment on the steady state output per capita. In other words, 
property rights protection has a positive impact on the efficacy of government 
investment if the right hand side of (2.23) is greater than zero and a negative impact if 
the right hand side of (2.23) is less than zero.  
The aforementioned result is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 (the role of property rights protection in the level effect of 
government investment): In the augmented Solow growth model where the effective 
aggregate capital stock is defined as (2.2), stronger property rights protection makes 
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government investment more beneficial to per capita output if and only if 4# > \4' , 
where \ = F(DGK)F(ZGK)GD.  
Proof of proposition 1: follows immediately from (2.23) where 
03U∗



































> D=>?  
⟺ (1 − ") >ZFGDDGF ? >
;<G;E
K;<>(DGK);E? > 1  
⟺ (1 − ")(2H − 1)(4# − 4') > (1 − H)("4# + (1 − ")4')  
⟺ (2H − 1 − H")4# − H(1 − ")4' > 0  
⟺ (2H − 1 − H")4# > H(1 − ")4'  
⟺ F(ZGK)GDF(DGK) >
;E
;< > 0, for all {4
#, 4'} ∈ (0,1) and (4# + 4') ≤ 1 
or  
4# > F(DGK)F(ZGK)GD 4
' (2.25) 




0;E0K < 0 iff 4
# < F(DGK)F(ZGK)GD 4




2.3.3. Transitional dynamics 
The aforementioned analysis explains how property rights protection can change the 
impact of government investment on the level of income per capita but is silent to the 
growth rate of income per capita. In fact, in this Solow-type model, the distance from 
the steady state of the economy determines the growth rate of the economy. When the 
economy is further away from the steady state, the growth is fast. When the economy 
approaches the steady state, the growth is slow, and there is no growth when the 
economy is at the steady state. I investigate the interaction between government 
investment and property rights protection in affecting the per-capita output growth 
using the speed of convergence to the steady state. I first derive a convergence equation 
using a Taylor approximation, then solve for the resulted first order differential 
equation to achieve a growth equation. The whole procedure is expressed as follows.     
Using the Cobb-Douglass production function in (2.15):  
*" = ("F = ("("# + (1 − ")("')F, H ∈ (0,1)   
The evolution of the stock of total capital over time is  
(8 " = "(8 "# + (1 − ")(8 "' = "`4#*" − (7 + 5)("#a + (1 − ")`4'*" − (7 + 5)("'a
 (2.27) 
Equivalently, 
(8 " = *"`"4# + (1 − ")4'a − (7 + 5)`"("# + (1 − ")("'a (2.28) 
The change of output per capita over time is  
*8" = H*"
MPO
M (8 " = H b*"
3MPO
M ("4# + (1 − ")4') − (7 + 5)*"c (2.29) 





M ("4# + (1 − ")4') − (7 + 5)c (2.30) 







M ef	U,("4# + (1 − ")4') − (7 + 5)T = .(ln *") (2.31) 
Approximating .(ln *") around the steady state (log-linearization). A Taylor 
expansion of (2.31) is given as 
.(ln *")|(efU,ief	U∗) ≈ .(ln	*∗) + (ln	*" − ln	*∗).ef	U,k (ln	*∗)   (2.32) 
Where 
• .(ln	*∗) = H S*∗
MPO
M ("4# + (1 − ")4') − (7 + 5)T (2.33) 
• .efU,k (ln *∗) = (H − 1)d
MPO
M efU
∗("4# + (1 − ")4') = (H − 1)*∗
MPO
M ("4# +
(1 − ")4') (2.34) 




M ("4# + (1 − ")4') = (7 + 5) (2.35) 




= (ln *∗ − ln *")(7 + 5)(1 − H) (2.36) 
Defining l = (7 + 5)(1 − H), (2.36) is rewritten as 
@ef(U,)
@" = l`ln(*
∗) − ln	(*")a  (2.37) 
It turns out that (2.37) is the usual convergence equation in the standard Solow growth 
model where l is called the convergence rate at any time * that the economy deviates 
from its steady state10. (2.37) is equivalent to 
                                                 





= @ef(U,)@" = l`ln(*
∗) − ln	(*")a = −l ln(*") + l ln(*∗) (2.38) 
The equation (2.38) is a first order differential equation in the form of 
@m,
@" = nℎ" + p  (2.39) 
where ℎ" = ln	(*"), n = −l, p = l ln(*∗). 
The solution for (2.39) is  
ℎ" = ℎq + ℎr  
where ℎq = sdt" ,  ℎr = − ut , with n ≠ 0 and an arbitrary scalar s.  
Given an initial condition ℎ=, the solution for (2.39) is  
ℎ" = >ℎ= + ut? d
t" − ut  (2.40) 
Substituting ℎ" = ln(*") , ℎ= = ln(*=) , n = −l, p = l ln(*∗) into (2.40), we have 
the solution for (2.38): 
ln(*") = J1 − dGw"L ln(*∗) + dGw"ln(*=) (2.41)   
or 
ln(*") − ln(*=) = J1 − dGw"L ln(*∗) − (1 − dGw")ln(*=) (2.42)   
In fact, (2.41) and (2.42) are the growth equations derived similarly by Mankiw et al. 
(1992) and Islam (1995). Those authors also apply the definition of convergence rate 
similar to this study but include human capital rather than public capital in their 
production function.   
Substituting the steady state per-capita output *∗ from (2.21) into the growth equation 
(2.42), we obtain the expression of per-capita output growth rate between time * and 
initial time 0 as 
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ln >U,Ux? = J1 − d
Gw"L FDGF `ln("4
# + (1 − ")4') − ln(7 + 5)a − (1 − dGw")ln(*=)
 (2.43) 
Similar to the analysis on the level of output per capita at the steady state, in order to 
study the interaction between government investment and property rights protection in 
affecting economic growth, we take partial derivative of the growth rate expressed in 
(2.43) with respect to 4' , 
0Sef>y,yx?T
0;E , and then take partial derivative of  
0Sef>y,yx?T
0;E   with 
respect to ", 
03Sef>y,yx?T




DGF J1 − d
Gw"L DGKK;<>(DGK);E > 0, for	all	{4










  (2.45) 
As we can see in (2.44), government investment is beneficial to economic growth 
because its marginal effect is greater than zero. However, the magnitude of this effect 
depends on the parameter " or how strongly property rights are protected (and depends 
on other parameters including 4#, 4', H, ", 7, 5, l).  
The expression (2.45) in turn shows that a rise in the property rights protection can 
either increase or decrease economic growth between two periods, depending on the 
relationship between private and public saving rates. This result is summarized in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 2 (the role of property rights protection in the growth effect of 
government investment during transitional period): In the augmented Solow 
growth model where the effective aggregate capital stock is defined as (2.2), stronger 
property rights protection makes government investment more effective in enhancing 
growth if and only if  4# < KD>K 4
'  . 
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Proof of proposition 2: follows immediately from (2.45) where  
03Sef>y,yx?T
0;E0K > 0 iff  
F




> 0  (2.46) 
⟺ "4' − (1 + ")4# > 0  (2.47) 




0;E0K < 0 iff 4
# > KD>K 4
'   (2.49) 
! 
2.4. From theory to practice 
The Solow growth model augmented with public capital and property rights protection 
presented above proposes an indirect channel through which institutions can affect 
economic growth of a country. In this channel, property rights protection, or better 
institutional quality, encourages the private sector to accumulate more capital but may 
restrict the extent of government intervention, i.e. public investment, into the 
production process through its impact on the distribution of capital stock between 
private sector and public sector. As a result, when private property is strongly secured, 
greater public investment may not always accompany with higher economic growth. 
The empirical study in the next chapters 3 and 4 aims to validate this argument. 
Nevertheless, before any statistical texting, it is important to discuss how to measure 
the degree of property rights protection or its broader scope, economic institutional 
quality, for empirical analysis.  
On the measurement issue, property rights protection or economic institutions in the 
model are abstract concepts rather than quantitative variables. In reality, they are 
usually measured or proxied by not one but many indicators. Among a few 
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organizations focusing on comparing the degree of property rights protection across 
countries, the Property Rights Alliance introduced their International Property Rights 
Index (IPRI) at the first time in 2007 covering 69 countries. This annual index has 
covered a larger number of countries over years and reached 125 countries in their 
2018 report.  Accordingly, property rights protection is broadly defined with three 
pillars – legal and political environment, physical property rights, and intellectual 
property rights – whose data is collected from different sources, such as the survey 
data of the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum and the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and Doing Business Report11. Due 
to its short time dimension, this index has not been widely used in academic research 
but can provide some insight into the state of property rights protection among 
countries.   
The Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute also provide their own measure of 
property rights protection. Different from the Property Rights Alliance, their property 
rights protection is one out of many dimensions of a so-called economic freedom. 
According to the Heritage Foundation, their measure of property rights protection 
captures five aspects: physical property rights, intellectual property rights, strength of 
investor protection, risk of expropriation, and quality of land administration12. In 
contrast, the Fraser Institute constructs a component index named “legal system and 
property rights” which assesses how effectively the protective functions of the 
government is performed13. Similar to the Property Rights Alliance, both organizations 
use external data sources to compile their measure of property rights. Due to their 
longer time series as well as a larger number of countries covered, both indices are 
commonly used in academic research on economic growth and institutions. Chapter 3 
and 4 also follow this practice by employing data from both organizations.        
When property rights are extended into a broader concept, i.e. economic institutions, 
more indicators are available to measure them. One of the most popular indicators is 
the index of economic freedom from the Heritage Foundation. This annual index was 
first calculated and released in 1995 and capture four freedom aspects: rule of law (of 
                                                 
11 Details on this index can be found on http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/  
12 Details on this index can be found on https://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology#rule-of-law  
13 Details on this index can be found on https://www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom/approach. 
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which property rights protection is part), government size, regulatory efficiency, and 
open markets. Its value ranges from 0 to 100 with the higher value indicating more 
freedom. The Fraser Institute is also famous with their index of economic freedom 
measuring the extent to which (i) institutions and policies of a country support the 
(primary) protective function of government, and (ii) individuals are free to make 
economic choices, e.g. trading and cooperating. The index takes value from 0 to 10 
where greater value corresponding to higher freedom and was calculated every five 
years from 1970 to 2000. Its frequency has become annual since 2000.  
The World Bank also captures different aspects of economic institutions with their 
wide range of indicators. Among them, government effectiveness captures perceptions 
of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests14. The 
availability of such a wide range of indicators measuring economic institutions is 
important and facilitates empirical parts of the proposed model which is conducted in 
the subsequent chapters.   
2.5. Some conclusive remarks  
This chapter provides a theoretical argument on the interaction between government 
investment, property rights protection and economic growth based on a Solow-type 
model with centralized allocations. The primary assumption in the model is that the 
security of property rights decides the substitution between private and public capital 
                                                 
14 Details on this data set can be found on http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home. Chapter 4 
also provides explanation and description on those economic indicators.  
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as an input of the production function. The analysis concludes that productive 
government expenditure, which is assumed to behave similarly to private investment, 
is beneficial to both the level and the growth rate of output per capita. Nevertheless, 
the level and the growth effects of government investment depend on the degree of 
property rights protection. This model shows that increasing protection of property 
rights can either dampen or strengthen the effectiveness of government investment. 
This relationship in turn depends on the relationship between private and public saving 
(investment) rates.  
Regarding the level of output per capita in the steady state, when the private saving 
excesses some degree as stated in proposition 1, a stronger property rights protection 
can make government investment more effective. We can infer this effect as a usually 
observed positive spillover of the public sector in which the enhancement of economic 
institutions can make an incremental public investment more valuable to the economy 
while also makes the private sector accumulate more capital for the production 
process. As a result, the economy can achieve a higher level of steady-state per-capita 
output given an increase in government investment and property rights protection. On 
the contrary, if the private saving is lower than the specified level, a greater property 
rights protection makes government investment less effective in promoting the steady-
state per-capita income. In this case, the steady-state per-capita income is certainly less 
than the previous case. This result is not far from what the standard Solow model 
implies: countries with lower saving rates also obtain a lower level of output per capita 
in the steady state.    
The interpretation of the results regarding the growth rate of the economy in a 
transitional process is straightforward. Public investment (e.g. infrastructure 
investment) promotes economic growth as shown in (2.44). However, that positive 
effect in turn changes with the strength of property rights protection. An improvement 
in ensuring property rights accompanies with a higher enhancing growth effect of 
government investment when the private saving is lower than a certain degree as stated 
in proposition 2. On the contrary, a stronger protection lessens the effectiveness of 
public investment if the private saving is higher than that degree. Intuitively, the 
private sector is the engine for growth in the economy where private saving 
(investment) is high. In this economy, given a better protection from the risk of 
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expropriation, the private capital accumulation is more strongly promoted; at the same 
time, public capital becomes relatively less important to growth. Therefore, raising 
property rights protection in the economy where private sector plays a prominent role 
lowers the growth effect of government investment.  
It is worth noting that the aforementioned conclusions are based on some critical 
assumptions which do not always hold in reality. As mentioned in the model setup, 
government investment and public capital accumulation are assumed to be exogenous. 
However, they could be affected by institutions such as property rights protection. It 
would be interesting to relax the assumption on the exogeneity of government 
investment by allowing it to be a function of property rights. In this case, there would 
be an additional term reflecting the impact of property rights on government 
investment in equation 2.23 and 2.45. As a result, any change in property rights will 
change not only the level of government investment but also the effectiveness of 
government investment in boosting economic growth. Although this interesting 
extension is not the focus in this Solow-type model, it is important for future research.     
Two important issues relating to the practical aspect of this model is the measurement 
of property rights protection and the empirical testing for the prediction of the model. 
First, as explained in section 2.4 and being described in more details in chapter 3 and 
4, property rights protection is a theoretical concept and its strength can be captured or 
measured by using various indicators in practice. Second, in terms of empirical testing, 
the results from this augmented Solow model recommend that public investment in 
infrastructure promotes economic growth but that effect varies with the degree of 
property rights protection. The hypothesis about the dependency of the growth effect 
of government investment on the strength of property rights security is tested in the 
next chapters by using a mixed set of emerging, developing and developed countries. 
I also extend the implication of this analysis to a broader concept of property rights by 
using a measure of economic freedom in chapter 3 and more indicators of economic 
institutions in chapter 4 where the effectiveness of government spending in the short-
term rather than long-term is investigated. The empirical results in the next chapters in 
fact support the prediction from this model: the effect of government spending on 
promoting economic growth depends on the economic institutions that a country 
possesses.    
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CHAPTER 3. FISCAL POLICY, ECONOMIC FREEDOM, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
3.1. Introduction 
The modern approach to the growth literature considers institutions as fundamental 
causes of economic growth and usually argues that better institutions are associated 
with greater economic growth. The conclusion is, however, not straightforward when 
accounting for the role of fiscal policy in promoting growth. In countries with better 
institutional quality such as strong property rights protection, effective law 
enforcement, and transparent government, public investment may become less 
effective in enhancing growth due to a strong opposition from their citizens, a 
complicated decision making process, or because the private sector outperforms the 
public sector in promoting growth. On the contrary, government spending in a better 
institutional quality country may have greater growth enhancing effect because they 
need to be carefully planned and implemented under a strict governance process. The 
theoretical framework in chapter 2 offers an argument on the interdependency between 
fiscal policy and institutions in affecting economic growth in which greater security of 
property rights can either increase or decrease the growth impact of public investment 
expenditure. To get an exact answer of the role of institutions in determining the 
growth impact of fiscal policy remains to be the duty of empirical research.     
Whereas it is plausible to believe that how fiscal policy affect the economy depends 
on the institutional settings of a country, the prevailing literature on the nexus between 
fiscal policy, institutions and economic growth is thin. Some empirical studies confirm 
institutions, such as constraints on politicians and political system, are underlying 
causes of economic performance and shape macroeconomic policies (Acemoglu et al., 
2003; Afonso et al., 2010; Fatás & Mihov, 2003, 2013; Keefer & Knack, 2007). It also 
reports that the effects of fiscal policy on productivity, capital accumulation and 
economic growth much depend on institutional quality (Afonso & Jalles, 2011; 
Cavallo & Daude, 2011; Morozumi & Veiga, 2016). The general conclusion from 
empirical analyses is “good” institutions, e.g. low corruption, more checks and 
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balances, low risk of expropriation, government accountability, support (reduce) the 
positive (negative) impacts of fiscal policy on growth. However, the existing literature 
on institutional economics has not satisfactorily documented the link between 
economic freedom and government spending in affecting economic performance.  
Since the first economic freedom index was introduced in Gwartney et al. (1996), it 
seems no doubt on the contribution to economic development of the institutions that 
ensure property rights and freedom of choice and exchange (Hall & Lawson, 2014). 
However, economic freedom is usually studied independently to fiscal policy 
(Dawson, 2003; De Haan & Sturm, 2000; Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu, 2006; 
Justesen, 2008; Williamson & Mathers, 2011). Afonso and Jalles (2011) are among 
very few authors who take into account the interaction between fiscal policy and 
institutions in determining economic growth. Nevertheless, their study considers fiscal 
policy in terms of government size and disperses the analysis with so many measures 
of institutions (political institutions) but excludes economic freedom. Certainly, the 
impact of public investment in infrastructure is not their central interest. Similar 
approach is employed by Farhadi et al. (2015) but the focus is on the interaction 
between economic freedom and natural resource rents, neither public investment nor 
consumption. Cavallo and Daude (2011) take into account the effect of public 
investment on private investment but use political risk rating, rather than economic 
freedom, as a measure of institutions. Obviously, there exists a gap in the growth 
literature about the interaction between economic institutions and fiscal policy, 
especially economic freedom and public investment in infrastructure, in affecting 
long-term growth.  
This chapter investigates how economic freedom and public spending interact in 
affecting economic growth. I analyze a large set of 72 countries across different levels 
of economic development over a period from 1990 to 2015, using two alternative 
measures of economic freedom and two components of government spending. 
Employing alternative measures of economic freedom, one from the Fraser Institute 
and one from the Heritage Foundation, can help increase robustness of the analysis. 
On the other hand, focusing on the expenditure side of fiscal policy can make my 
results easily compared with other studies in this field. By separating public spending 
into government investment and consumption, I offer a more comprehensive analysis 
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on public expenditure components in different institutional settings. In this chapter, 
the nonlinear effect of government spending on economic growth is examined using 
both cross section and panel data approaches. The possible reverse causality, 
heterogeneity, as well as omitted variables are also addressed with a series of 
robustness checks, including the recently developed panel data techniques.      
Bridging the gap in literature, this study suggests that the effect of fiscal policy on 
economic growth depends on how economically free a country is. Public investment 
can enhance long-term growth better in countries with less degree of economic 
freedom. Meanwhile, public consumption does not benefit growth but its adverse 
impacts are mitigated if countries enjoy greater economic freedom. However, the 
relationship between government consumption and freedom in affecting growth is 
relatively weak compared to the case of public investment. By separating data into two 
sub-samples, I find that the determining role of institutions in emerging markets is 
more prominent than that in advanced economies which are pretty homogenous in 
economic development and have already been at a high level of economic freedom. 
Regarding components of economic freedom, the empirical results also highlight the 
individual importance of property rights and business freedom in the growth impact of 
public investment. None of a single component of freedom but economic freedom as 
a whole does matter to the effect of public consumption.      
I conduct robustness checks by using both cross-section and panel data approaches. In 
the cross section framework, the findings about the interrelationship between 
economic freedom and public investment, economic freedom and government 
consumption remain consistent throughout various regressions. In a panel data 
approach, the determining role of economic freedom in the growth impacts of 
government investment is confirmed with the pooled OLS and fixed effects estimators. 
I obtain insignificant results with the Arellano-Bond system generalized method of 
moment (GMM) estimator although the coefficients of interest still appear with 
expected signs. Robustness checks with the panel data approach do not provide clear 
evidence on the interrelationship between economic freedom and government 
consumption. The GMM estimators draw an attention that my results may suffer 
reverse causality. On the other hand, the sample time span is quite short and the 
creating a panel of five-year averaged data may still suffers the business cycle 
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property, which does not imply the same meaning about the relationship between fiscal 
policy, institutions and long-term economic growth as in the cross section approach. 
Nevertheless, most of the specification checks lend support to the hypothesis that how 
fiscal policy affects economic growth depends on how economically free a country 
enjoys. The results challenge the view that better institutional quality increases the 
effectiveness of government policy as contended by Cavallo and Daude (2011) and 
Morozumi and Veiga (2016) among others. To the best of my knowledge, this is 
among very few empirical studies which investigate the interrelationship between 
economic freedom and different instruments of fiscal policy in affecting growth, and 
explicitly contrast emerging countries with advanced economies.     
This chapter is constructed as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on fiscal policy and 
institutions in affecting economic growth in both classical and modern approach. 
Section 3 presents some research questions and hypotheses to be tested in this chapter. 
Section 4 describes the methodology, variables and data sources. Main results are 
provided in section 5 while section 6 conducts some robustness checks. The 
interpretation of results is discussed in section 7. Section 8 concludes and proposes 
some policy implications.     
3.2. Literature review 
3.2.1. Fiscal policy and economic growth  
Fiscal policy is an intervention tool of government to influence the economy. For 
macroeconomic stabilization purpose in the short run, government may use fiscal 
policy to dampen economic fluctuations. Expansionary fiscal policy is conducted 
through increases in public spending and/or lowering taxes to stimulate the economy. 
On the contrary, contractionary fiscal policy with spending cuts and/or tax rises can be 
done to fight against soaring inflation or to get economic activity back to a healthy 
level. In the long run, fiscal policy aims at boosting sustainable economic growth, 
reducing poverty, promoting equality and social welfare. By providing public goods 
such as infrastructure and education or facilitating a better working environment for 
private sector such as a secured society and property rights protection, government can 
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improve the productivity of the private sector, promote capital accumulation and 
induce a greater growth (IMF, 2009).  
The “big” government, on the other hand, brings some undesirable outcomes. When 
the government size grows too large, it tends to deviate from its fundamental functions 
as a growth engine. Government may use abundant resources unwisely and compete 
unfairly with the private sector, which operates based on profit maximization and 
hence uses all resources in the most efficient way. Increases in government spending 
financed by budget deficit or debt can be harmful to long-term growth due to the long-
run interest burden and the threat of rising interest rate which discourages private 
investment. Running budget balance by financing public spending with distortionary 
taxes may reduce the private rate of returns and result in lower capital accumulation 
which also damages long-term growth.                    
Economic theory provides two main approaches on analyzing the impact of 
government expenditure on economic growth. In the neoclassical growth models, 
including the exogenous growth models of Solow (1956), Swan (1956) and the optimal 
growth models of Cass (1965), Diamond (1965) and Koopmans (1963), economic 
growth in the steady state depends only on exogenous factors – population growth and 
technological processes – fiscal policy can affect the level of output only, not the 
steady state growth rate. In this approach, government spending financed by 
distortionary tax has detrimental effects or at best no impact on growth. However, the 
evolution of the endogenous growth models gives rise to the contribution of fiscal 
policy, especially government spending, in explaining growth rate differences across 
countries.  
In his seminal paper on the interaction between fiscal policy and economic growth in 
an endogenous growth model, Barro (1990) introduces the concept of productive 
public spending to be a direct input of private production function. Barro argues some 
public services such as infrastructure, national defense and basic education can serve 
as separate production inputs because private inputs are not their close substitutes. He 
proves that productive government spending can have growth-enhancing effect. 
However, the effect may have an inverted U-shape, meaning that overspending 
becomes damaging to growth. It happens when the flat-rate tax to finance government 
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expenditure excesses the marginal productivity of public spending. His influential 
research makes a breaking point in the growth theory and opens a new path to study 
impacts of public policies on economic growth.         
Other theoretical studies within the endogenous growth framework also provide 
various mechanisms to explain growth rate differences across countries. Lucas (1988) 
emphasizes the importance of human capital as the main source of growth. For this 
reason, investment into education can facilitate the human capital accumulation 
process and enhance growth. Romer (1990) focuses on the role of research and 
development by proposing a model where economic growth is motivated by 
technological change which is featured as a non-rival, partially excludable good. 
Consequently, there is room for government policy to promote growth by investment 
in basic research and development. Zagler and Dürnecker (2003) excellently 
synchronize the impact of different fiscal policy instruments in an endogenous growth 
framework. Their analysis distinguishes various channels that fiscal policy can affect 
growth, remarkably highlighting the positive impact of education expenditure and 
increases in infrastructure investment on the growth rate. On the revenue side of fiscal 
policy, they investigate different types of taxes whose overall impact on growth is the 
difference between distortionary effects of the tax and growth-promoting effects of the 
government spending.   
Empirical studies on the relationship between government size, composition of 
government expenditure and economic growth depict a colorful picture but no clear-
cut conclusion. While some papers propose a negative effect of government spending 
on growth (Afonso & Furceri, 2010; Fölster & Henrekson, 2001; Grier & Tullock, 
1989; Landau, 1983; Romero-Ávila & Strauch, 2008), others give evidence on a 
positive relationship (Devarajan, Swaroop, & Zou, 1996; Ram, 1986; Wu, Tang, & 
Lin, 2010). Nevertheless, several authors warn about the non-robust results in that 
relationship (Levine & Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, & Miller, 2004) and 
also find some non-linear effect of government spending (Asimakopoulos & Karavias, 
2016; Chen, Yao, Hu, & Lin, 2017). Bergh and Henrekson (2011) summarize 
empirical evidence and interpretations on the relationship between government size 
and economic growth and conclude that government size is usually found negatively 
correlated with long-term growth in most of the studies.      
38 
 
Among early works proving the harm of government expenditure on growth Landau 
(1983) uses data on 104 countries over the period 1961-1976 and finds that an increase 
in the share of government consumption in GDP significantly reduces the growth rate 
of per capita GDP. Grier and Tullock (1989) employ a sample of 24 OECD countries 
and 89 other countries with five-year averaged data over the period 1950-1981 and 
conclude that the growth of government consumption to GDP is statistically significant 
and negative to real GDP growth in OECD, Africa and the America, but positive in 
Asia. Fölster and Henrekson (2001) are interested in rich countries over the period 
1970-1995. They find a robust negative effect of total government expenditure on 
growth in a panel data regression but insignificant result in a cross-section framework.  
Some studies explicitly examine the effect of different components of government 
expenditure on economic growth. Empirical analysis of Aschauer (1989) on the U.S. 
data indicates the infrastructure investment of government significantly improves 
productivity and growth while military capital is insignificant to productivity. Barro 
(1991) does not obtain statistical significance of public investment but negative 
relationship between government consumption and economic growth in a cross-
section regression of 98 countries from 1960 to 1985. Similar results are also revealed 
by Afonso and Furceri (2010) who study OECD and EU countries during the period 
1970 through 2004 using a panel data approach. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) argue that 
measures of fiscal instruments are strongly correlated with the level of development 
and therefore it poses difficulties in separating growth impacts of fiscal policy and 
conditional convergence effect. Nevertheless, their study gives a robust positive 
correlation between real per-capita GDP growth and government investment in 
transport and communication with a cross-section sample of approximate 100 
countries during the period 1970-1988 and a panel data sample of 28 countries during 
the period 1870-1988. With a different method, Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008) 
employ a distributed lag model for 15 EU countries over the period 1960-2001 and 
assert that government consumption is detrimental to growth while public investment 
exposes a positive effect. Gupta et al. (2005) suggest that public spending on wage 
lowers output growth while spending on capital and non-wage has a growth-fostering 
effect with empirical evidence on 39 low-income countries from 1990 to 2000. In 
general, these studies find a significant, negative effect of government consumption or 
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total government expenditure and a positive effect of government investment on 
economic growth.   
On the contrary, there exists empirical evidence on the positive relationship between 
government spending and economic growth. Ram (1986) argues that a greater 
government size can be treated as an engine to boost economic growth because 
government can harmonize private versus social interest conflicts, protect a country 
from foreign threats, offer productive investment and optimally reallocate resources 
for society. Using both cross-section and time-series analysis for a sample of 115 
countries from 1960 through 1980, he finds that total government expenditure has 
positive impact on growth. Devarajan et al. (1996) investigate the composition effect 
of public expenditure on per capita growth rate of 43 developing countries from 1970 
through 1990 by controlling for total government expenditure in their regression 
models. They show that current government expenditure positively affects growth 
while productive expenditure items such as education, infrastructure, and health has 
negative or insignificant impact. The result implies that productive expenditures have 
become unproductive because developing countries have allocated too much spending 
on capital but reduced spending on some current items which actually enhance growth. 
Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) document that public current spending – measured by 
operation and maintenance expenditure – and public capital spending – measured by 
health and education expenditure – has positive and negative impacts, respectively, on 
growth by using a panel data sample of 15 developed countries over 1972 through 
1999. In a more recent study Wu et al. (2010) conduct analysis on 182 countries from 
1950 to 2004 and report that government spending is good for growth. That effect 
appears obviously in developed and mid-income countries but insignificantly in low-
income ones. Their possible explanation is based on discrepancies in institutional 
quality and corruption among the country groups where low-income-country 
governments fail to provide growth-enhancing services but the others succeed.       
The robustness of the growth effect of fiscal policy in empirical studies is, however, 
questionable. Levine and Renelt (1992) contend that the statistically significant 
relationship between economic growth and a variety of institutional, political and 
policy indicators in the existing studies cannot be held if some set of conditioning 
variables in the regression change. They use the Extreme Bounds Analysis to conduct 
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a sensitivity test and find that only the positive correlation between per capita GDP 
growth and investment to GDP and the positive correlation between investment to 
GDP and foreign trade to GDP are robust. Their pessimistic result is criticized by Sala-
i-Martin et al. (2004) who comment that Levine and Renelt find almost no variables 
robust to economic growth because their test is too strong. Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) 
establish a significant and robust correlation between 18 out of 67 explanatory 
variables and economic growth by employing the Bayesian Averaging of Classical 
Estimates approach. None of measures of government expenditure appears among that 
18-variable list. This is also a confirmation of the findings in Sala-i-Martin (1997).  
Recent studies examine the non-linear effect of fiscal policy on growth. Chen and Lee 
(2005) employ a threshold model with quarterly data from 1979 to 2003 to detect the 
optimal size for Taiwanese government. Given three measures of government size, 
namely total government expenditure to GDP, government investment to GDP and 
government consumption to GDP, they find statistical evidence on a threshold effect 
which implies that excessive government spending reduces growth. Asimakopoulos 
and Karavias (2016) also utilize a threshold model but in a dynamic setting for a panel 
data sample of 129 countries during the period 1980-2009. They report a non-linear 
effect of total government expenditure on economic growth with different thresholds 
for the full sample, the developed countries and developing countries. Chen et al. 
(2017) apply a panel smoothing transitional regression approach for 65 countries over 
the period 1991-2014 and obtain an optimal level for government investment and for 
government debt as well. These recent findings coincide with the theoretical argument 
on optimal government size proposed by Barro (1990). 
In general, the outcomes of increases in government spending across countries seem 
diverse in empirical studies. The obvious reason is that studies use different samples 
of countries, different time span, and even different explanatory variables in the 
regression. Other highlighted reasons could be countries are heterogeneous in various 
aspects, e.g. macro-economic conditions and the efficiency of public resource use, and 
some factors affecting both fiscal policy and economic growth, e.g. geographic 
endowments, economic and political institutions, are not taken into account in the 
standard growth regression. Therefore, it gives strong motivation for empirical 
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research to include institutional factors in the standard growth regression to gain more 
insights into the relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth.          
3.2.2. Institutions and economic growth  
Modern growth theory distinguishes between proximate causes and fundamental 
causes of economic development. Accordingly, the dynamics of (physical and human) 
capital and technological process are approximate causes of growth, meaning that they 
explain how economic growth evolves, but cannot explain why some countries 
accumulate more capital for investment, acquire better technology and become richer 
or grow faster than the others do. To understand the development discrepancies across 
countries, therefore, requires a new approach to uncover underlying causes of growth. 
The institutional and social factors are considered as fundamental reasons that affect 
the capital accumulation process and technological changes in a country and can 
explain the cross-country variations in economic growth more satisfactorily 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2005; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008; Fuchs-
Schündeln & Hassan, 2016). 
North (1987, 1991) analyzes the conception of institutions and their role in economic 
development. Institutions are defined as “the rules and informal constraints of the 
political units that shape economic performance in the economies of the world” (North, 
1987, p. 15) or “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and 
social interaction” (North, 1991, p. 97). He regards institutions as the rules of game 
and organizations as the players whose behavior is the result of interaction between 
their own mental models and the incentive structure imposed by the formal and 
informal institutions. The incentive mechanism is straightforward: no one chooses to 
create innovation or invest in capital and technology if their property is not protected 
or contractual transactions are not effectively enforced or the rates of return from those 
productivity-raising activities are less than piracy. From an economic perspective, 
positive institutions reduce transaction and production costs and give incentive to the 
players to learn and acquire knowledge, innovate, take more risk and induce creative 
activities, which in consequence lead to better economic outcomes. North argues that 
differences in the economic performance lie on the ground of institutions and 
institutional evolutions.         
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Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) describe a framework to 
analyze how institutions induce economic growth and development in a more 
systematic way. The framework distinguishes three institutional concepts: economic 
institutions, political institutions, and political power. Property rights protection, 
corruption and entry barriers are instances of economic institutions. Government form, 
such as democracy versus dictatorship, and constraints on executives are examples of 
political institutions. Political power can be de jure, meaning the power coming from 
the political institutions, or de facto, meaning the actual power of some groups coming 
from their ability to affect other groups or the society. The authors argue that economic 
institutions determine economic performance and resource distribution in the society. 
Economic institutions are chosen by the group who has political power. Eventually, 
political institutions and resource distribution are state variables determining the 
distribution of political power and the choice of economic institutions. The schematic 
representation of their framework is shown as follows: 
 
Recent theoretical studies incorporate institutional factors in a more rigorous 
framework to analyze the cause of economic development. Castro, Clementi, and 
MacDonald (2009) employ a two-period, two-sector overlapping generations model to 
illustrate the reallocation effect of skills among sectors induced by changes in legal 
institutions and subsequently leading to different investment rates, income and total 
factor productivity. Aldashev and Zanarone (2017) build a model of a self-enforcement 
state where the ruler tends to carry out expropriation with coercive power rather than 
enforce principal-agent contracts, and thereby results in a persistently low production. 
Aguirre (2017) analyzes the link between private-contract enforceability, financial 
frictions and economic growth using a growth model with endogenous incomplete 
markets. Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2017) develop a model with endogenous 
technological change and reward structures imposed on entrepreneurs to explain the 
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asymmetric growth over the world given heterogeneous institutions and technological 
levels across countries.          
The relationship between different aspects of institution and economic growth is also 
empirically investigated. With a cross-section regression of 98 countries over the 
period 1960-1985, Barro (1991) detects the role of political instability in economic 
growth by using the number of coups and revolutions as well as political assassinations 
and finds a significant, negative relationship. He interprets the result such that the 
instability of political condition has adverse impacts on property rights and thereby 
lowers investment and growth. However, Knack and Keefer (1995) criticize that 
Barro’s measures reflect only partial variations in property rights across countries. 
Instead they employ a wide set of institutional indicators provided by private 
international organizations and confirm the crucial role of institutions supporting 
property rights in both investment and economic growth. Mauro (1995) presents a 
robust result on the harm of corruption to investment and economic growth while Aidt 
(2009) finds corruption is strongly negative to a measure of sustainable development 
– per capita genuine wealth growth rate – but weakly negative to real per capita GDP 
growth rate. Barro (1996) reveals a nonlinear effect of political freedom where a 
further increase in democracy reduces growth if a moderate level of political freedom 
has been achieved. Yet the meta-analysis conducted by Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu 
(2008) rejects the direct impact of democracy on economic growth but recognizes the 
positive indirect impact through other determinants of growth such as human capital, 
inflation, economic freedom and political stability. Easterly and Levine (2003) 
ascertain only institutions possess a significant impact on economic development 
while geographic endowments only affect income level indirectly through their 
influence on institutions. Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) 
emphasize the role of human capital rather than institutions as the primary source of 
growth as they find measures of institutions become insignificant when adding 
together with a measure of human capital. The authors claim that institutions are a 
choice set and evolve due to economic prosperity and human capital accumulation.   
Conceptually, it is widely recognized that good institutions are associated with higher 
economic growth and development. However, the most arguably empirical issue in 
this modern approach of economic growth is whether that association implies 
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causality. It is not so clear whether countries afford better institutions because they are 
rich, or better institutions help increase their wealth as proved by Glaeser et al. (2004) 
among others. Therefore, empiricists attempt to identify an exogenous source of 
institutional differences among societies to find a causal effect, or in other words to 
convince that their instrumental variables (IV) used are valid to obtain a causality 
conclusion.   
Hall and Jones (1999) argue that current institutions are determined by Western 
European influence, which established during the sixteenth through nineteenth 
century, and therefore use geographic characteristics and languages as instruments for 
social infrastructure – “the institutions and government policies that determine the 
economic environment within which individuals accumulate skills, and firms 
accumulate capital and produce output” (p.84). With that IV approach, their results 
show social infrastructure is the underlying determinant of cross-country variations in 
output per worker.  
The history of economic development is also exploited by Acemoglu et al. (2001) in 
their influential paper to produce an IV for institutions in affecting economic 
performance. Their IV comes from the idea that Europeans in the colonization period 
chose to live and create good institutions, such as strong property rights protection and 
constraints on government expropriation, in countries with favorable environment for 
their settlement but adopted “extractive states” in those with unfavorable conditions 
for settling. Because institutions persist over time, the past institutions determine the 
current ones. Therefore, the mortality rates of early European settlers in the colonies 
between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries become an IV for current 
institutions. They find that institutional quality instrumented by the “exogenous” 
mortality rates significantly affects economic outcomes. Based on this approach, 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) test for the joint determination of institutions, 
geography and trade integration on income across 72 countries. The authors conclude 
that only institutions have direct impacts on economic development, the other two 
factors indirectly affect real GDP per capita through its impacts on institution quality. 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) discern two aspects of good institutions promoting 
economic growth: “contracting institutions” that support private contracts and 
“property rights institutions” that constrain the expropriation from government. Using 
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colonial settler mortality and population density in 1500 to be IV for property rights 
institutions, and legal origin as IV for contracting institutions, they document that 
property rights institutions are more prominent than contracting institutions in 
affecting long-term economic growth. The argument about influence of the colonial 
settlers on institutions and thereby current economic development is also reinforced 
by Iyer (2010), Easterly and Levine (2016) and Bennett, Faria, Gwartney, and Morales 
(2017) among others.        
The IV approach in estimating institutional impact on economic growth, however, 
suffers some critiques. Albouy (2012) raises suspicion on the reliability and 
comparability of the IV used by Acemoglu et al. (2001) because the settler mortality 
rates are not calculated comparably across countries and appear to be weak instrument 
for expropriation risk. Deaton (2010) further criticizes the (quasi-)natural experiments 
or IV approach in economic development studies by differentiating “externality” 
versus “exogeneity”. He contends that the IV used in empirical development research 
is external rather than exogenous because it is almost impossible to prove that the IV 
has no influence on the dependent variable except through its effects on the 
endogenous variable of interest. This argument was actually confirmed by Glaeser et 
al. (2004) who oppose the causal link between the IV – the colonial settler mortality – 
and institutional quality in explaining current economic performance given by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001). The authors show that IV is more correlated with their measure 
of human capital than with measures of institutional quality and propose another 
mechanism: when the Europeans settled in colonies, they brought much of their human 
capital to the colonies, rather than their institutions, and it is human capital 
accumulation that is the primary source of growth. Dixit (2007) also criticizes the IV 
approach in development economics which “is supported more by the intuitive appeal 
of the stories told than by the statistical significance of the tests performed” (p.137).  
Among various dimensions of institutions, economic freedom has recently become a 
focus of interest in institutional economics. The concept of economic freedom was 
popularized by Gwartney et al. (1996) with the first report of economic freedom index 
since 1975 for the world. Accordingly,  
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The central elements of economic freedom are personal choice, protection of 
private property, and freedom of exchange [...]. In an economically free society, 
the fundamental function of government is the protection of private property and 
the enforcement of contracts. When a government fails to protect private 
property, takes property itself without full compensation, or establishes 
restrictions that limit voluntary exchange, it violates the economic freedom of its 
citizens  
(Gwartney et al., 1996, p. 12). 
Economic freedom is distinguished from political freedom and civil liberties. Political 
liberty refers the procedures of electing government officials and deciding political 
issues, where adult citizens can freely take part in the political process, elections are 
fairly conducted, and there is no restriction on the participation of alternative parties 
in the political system. Civil freedom deals with whether individuals are free to gather, 
communicate their views, and have fair trials without worry of being retaliated. 
Although the three freedom concepts are closely related in characterizing how a 
society works, they need not always compromise. Some countries may allow a high 
level of political and civil freedom but impose a large number of constraints on market 
access or excessively increase government size, which necessarily violate the principle 
of economic freedom.       
Research on economic freedom seems to achieve a broad consensus on its positive 
association with economic growth (Hall & Lawson, 2014). The common argument is 
that countries enjoying a high degree of economic freedom are those where property 
rights are strongly protected, law is efficiently enforced, transactions are voluntarily 
carried out, markets are perfect and individuals have equal opportunity to pursue their 
own dreams. In the economically free societies, transaction costs are low, 
entrepreneurial activities are greatly encouraged, more incentive for economic agents 
to invest in physical and human capital as well as to choose the best technologies; they 
all consequently lead to the more efficient allocation and use of resources and  greater 
economic prosperity. Empirical studies find that economic freedom affects growth 
either directly by enhancing factor productivity (Farhadi et al., 2015; Faria & 
Montesinos, 2009; Williamson & Mathers, 2011) or indirectly through accumulated 
factors (Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Dawson, 1998; Feldmann, 2017).  
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Based on the neoclassical framework of Mankiw et al. (1992), Dawson (1998) takes 
two approaches – cross section and panel data regression – for more than 80 countries 
from 1975 to 1990 and proclaims the beneficial role of three types of freedom – 
economic, political and civil freedom – to economic growth and development. His 
study discloses that economic freedom affects growth both directly through its impact 
on total factor productivity and indirectly through its impacts on investment while 
political and civil freedom has only indirect impacts. The positive and statistically 
significant effect of economic freedom on income level and growth is also reported by 
Faria and Montesinos (2009) with the IV approach where economic freedom is 
instrumented by legal origin, settler mortality rates and population density in 1950, 
latitude, ethno linguistic fractionalization. Williamson and Mathers (2011) regard 
economic freedom and culture as a form of formal institutions and informal 
institutions, respectively. Their empirical analysis shows that compared to culture, 
economic freedom is more important to economic prosperity. Moreover, both 
economic freedom and culture simultaneously affect growth but appear to be 
substitutes rather than complements, meaning that with the presence of economic 
freedom the impact of informal institutions – culture – on growth become weaker. 
Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) instead present evidence on the indirect impact of 
economic freedom on growth through its impact on foreign direct investment inflows 
whilst Feldmann (2017) reports the indirect effects of economic freedom on growth 
through its effects on human capital.    
De Haan and Sturm (2000) test for the robustness of the relationship between 
economic freedom and economic growth in the cross-country regression with two 
methods – the EBA as in Levine and Renelt (1992) and the sensitivity analysis as in 
Sala-i-Martin (1997) – for 80 countries with the same period as in Dawson (1998). 
They use the indicators of economic freedom from both the Heritage Foundation and 
the Fraser Institute. Their results reveal that increases in economic freedom, rather than 
the level of freedom, boost economic growth. The robustness of direct and indirect 
effects of economic freedom on growth is also investigated by Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu (2006) with the meta-analysis method summarized by Stanley (2001).    
Not only the overall level but also different aspects of economic freedom are taken 
into account in empirical research. Carlsson and Lundström (2002) find that although 
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in general, economic freedom promotes economic growth, not all dimensions of 
economic freedom have the same effects. Dawson (2003) proves that the overall level 
of freedom, not the changes in freedom, Granger-causes economic growth and 
underlies the causal relationship between two areas of economic freedom – property 
rights and free markets – and growth. A similar study on causality and components of 
economic freedom is also conducted by Justesen (2008).    
3.2.3. Fiscal policy, institutions and economic growth: a nexus  
A numerous literature has been built for decades to provide a deep understanding about 
impacts of fiscal policy and institutional factors on economic growth; however, the 
interrelationship among them had not been a focus of attention until the seminal papers 
of Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Fatás and Mihov (2003). While the impact of fiscal 
policy on economic growth remains to be controversial from the classical approach of 
the growth literature, the modern approach tends to deny the underlying cause of 
government policies to economic performance. Those supporting this approach 
usually claim it is institutional factors that shape government policies and lead to 
economic outcomes. More specifically, government in countries with less government 
accountability or weak governance has greater incentive for rent-seeking and 
consequently, tends to extract rents from their citizens by increasing taxes and public 
expenditure (Keefer & Knack, 2007). Historical and institutional factors are argued to 
be the causes of discretionary fiscal policy and poor macroeconomic performance  
(Cuberes & Mountford, 2012).  
Among prominent supporters of the modern growth literature, Acemoglu et al. (2003) 
explore the link between government policies, institutions and economic volatility 
with the instrumentation strategy based on the work of Acemoglu et al. (2001). The 
authors show that macroeconomic policies are not fundamental causes of economic 
outcomes but symptoms of institutional differences. Countries that have weak 
institutions, e.g. lack of constraints on politicians, appear to adopt distortionary 
policies, e.g. irresponsible government spending, high inflation rates and overvalued 
exchange rates, and experience greater economic volatility, more severe crises and 
lower growth rate. In their regressions with the presence of institutional variable, 
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policy variables become insignificant or weakly affect economic performance while 
institutions remain consistently significant.  
In line with this argument but more focusing on fiscal policy, Fatás and Mihov (2003) 
set up the channel describing how institutions and fiscal policy affect economic 
growth: (i) political institutions determine the aggressiveness of fiscal policy, (ii) 
volatility (or the aggressiveness) of fiscal policy drives output volatility, and (iii) 
increases in output volatility reduce output growth. Using a sample of 91 countries 
over the period 1960 through 2000, they conclude the harm to economic growth caused 
by aggressive discretionary fiscal policy can be mitigated by institutional arrangements 
such as checks and balances. The importance of political institutions to fiscal policy 
volatility and subsequently to economic growth is once again confirmed in Fatás and 
Mihov (2013) with an instrumentation approach. Different from Acemoglu et al. 
(2003), Fatás and Mihov (2013) find political institutions insignificant in the growth 
regression with the presence of policy volatility. Therefore, the authors ascertain that 
political institutions do not affect economic growth directly but indirectly through their 
impact on policy volatility.         
Several studies do not explicitly distinguish whether fiscal policy and/or institutions 
are fundamental causes of economic growth but look at their joint determination role 
in the growth regression. Bergh and Karlsson (2010) reason that big governments tend 
to promote economic freedom and globalization to restrict the impeding effect of large 
welfare states on economic growth, hence, the inclusion of freedom and globalization 
in the growth regression is necessary. With a panel of 29 rich countries from 1970 to 
2005 and the Bayesian averaging of classical estimate (BACE) method, they find a 
negative association between growth and government size when government size is 
measured by tax to GDP. However, when government size is measured by government 
expenditure to GDP, the relationship is not robust. Moreover, both globalization and 
economic freedom play no role in explaining the variation in economic growth.   
Also focusing on government size and economic performance but Afonso and Jalles 
(2011) take a slightly different approach. They include interactions between various 
measures of government size and various measures of institutions in the growth 
regression. With a panel data for 108 countries from 1970 to 2008, the authors obtain 
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negative coefficients on government consumption and on the interaction terms while 
the coefficients on (good) institutional variables are positive. The straightforward 
interpretation of their results is that countries with higher institutional quality have 
lower negative effects of government size on economic growth. However, their study 
concerns neither public investment as a fiscal policy variable nor economic freedom 
as an institutional variable. Similar approach is employed by Farhadi et al. (2015) but 
the focus is on the interaction between natural resource rents and economic freedom 
with a panel of 99 countries from 1970 through 2010. Their results indicate that the 
“resource curse” – meaning natural resource-rich countries usually appear to face 
growth failure rather than growth success – can be avoided if countries enjoy higher 
economic freedom.  
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) also use an interaction regression but to identify the 
impacts of public spending on the health status (mortality rate) and education (primary 
education attainment) under different levels of governance for a sample of 91 
developed and developing countries. Index of corruption and quality of bureaucracy 
are employed as measures of governance. They report that in countries with good 
quality of governance, increases in public spending can reduce child mortality and 
raise education attainment.         
Morozumi and Veiga (2016) consider the impacts of government accountability on the 
effectiveness of government spending as a growth-enhancing policy. Taking a variety 
of proxies for accountability (e.g. constraints on executives, degree of democracy, 
voice and accountability index) for 80 countries from 1970 to 2010, they obtain a 
significant role of accountability in the growth impacts of public capital spending, but 
insignificant in case of current spending. Their explanation is such that under low 
accountability, officeholders may attempt to extract rents by favoring some private 
enterprises in granting public investment projects or by raising project size regardless 
to quality or necessity of the investment. Accountability does not have a key role in 
the effects of current spending because the nature of current spending is explicit 
entitlements and therefore remains little room for discretion and efficiency loss.  
Giving a special interest in the relationship between public and private investment, 
Cavallo and Daude (2011) use a sample of 116 developing countries over the period 
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1980-2006 and political risk rating as a measure of institutions. As other studies on the 
role of institutions in the effectiveness of fiscal policy, they employ an interactive 
linear regression model in a dynamic framework. Their results suggest in general, 
public investment crowds out private investment in developing countries. However, 
the better institutional quality can dampen that negative effect and even create a 
reverse.  
Although the growth literature, both traditional and modern approach, is huge, there is 
not much to say about the interaction between government spending, economic 
freedom and economic growth. Two strands of the literature tend to study the impact 
of fiscal policy on growth, the impact of institutions on growth separately. Therefore, 
they depict only part of a complete picture. Some recent studies attempt to link 
government spending, institutions and economic growth together but none of them 
examines the role of economic freedom in the efficiency of public investment and 
public consumption. This study aims to fill this gap.     
3.3. Research questions and hypotheses 
Contributing to the prevailing literature on fiscal policy, institutions and economic 
growth, this chapter aims to find empirical evidence on the interrelationship between 
economic freedom and fiscal policy in affecting growth. More specifically, I seek the 
answers to the following research questions.  
(1). Does the growth effect of public investment depend on institutional 
characteristics of a country?  
(2). Do economic institutions have the same influence on growth impact of 
different types of public spending, i.e. public investment versus public 
consumption?  
(3). Does the interrelationship of government spending and economic 
freedom in determining growth differ with levels of economic 
development, i.e. between emerging and advanced economies?  
(4). Which dimensions of economic freedom matter to the growth impact 
of fiscal policy?  
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The main hypotheses to be tested in this chapter are as follows.   
Hypothesis 3.1. The growth effect of public investment depend on the level of economic 
freedom of a country.  
Government investment in infrastructure can boost economic growth. However, 
government investment becomes less effective in promoting growth when countries 
are more economically free. This is because countries have better institutional quality 
such as strong property rights protection, effective enforcement of contracts, and 
transparent government also face a strong opposition from their citizens, a complicated 
decision making process, and the private sector in those countries plays more 
important (active) role than the public sector in production process or supply side of 
the economy. As a result, the contribution to growth of public investment becomes less 
in more economically free countries.  
Hypothesis 3.2. Different types of public spending have different effect on growth and 
the influence of institutions on that effect varies as well.  
While government investment is beneficial to long-term economic growth, increases 
in government consumption may not be good to growth because of the unfair 
competition between private and public sector in providing goods and services to the 
economy. Given the fact that government expenditure, either investment or 
consumption, needs to be discussed, approved and implemented through a more 
complicated regulatory process in a more freedom country, adverse impacts of 
government expenditure on growth would be softened. Therefore, it is plausible to 
believe that the greater freedom, the lower the negative effect of government 
consumption.    
Hypothesis 3.3. The interrelationship of government spending and economic freedom 
in determining growth differs with levels of economic development.  
Compared to advanced economies, emerging and developing countries are more 
heterogeneous in terms of economic development and institutional quality. Therefore, 
the interaction between government spending and economic freedom in determining 
growth should differ between two groups of countries.  
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Hypothesis 3.4. Security of property rights is a crucial dimension of economic freedom 
that determines the growth impact of fiscal policy.  
In fact, property rights protection is an important component of economic freedom. As 
presented in chapter 2, property rights protection affects the distribution of capital 
stock between private and public sector and the growth enhancing effect of 
government investment. Therefore, it should be significant when this hypothesis is 
tested. 
3.4. Methodology and data description 
3.4.1. Empirical model 
I investigate the role of economic freedom in determining the impact of fiscal policy 
on economic growth by undertaking a linear interactive growth regression model for a 
cross-country sample. Notwithstanding its simplicity, this model has a beauty of 
straightforward interpretation and can easily be estimated by the standard OLS method 
(with classical econometric assumptions). All the research questions turn out to be 
answered simply through this model. The empirical model is as follows: 
Δ*} = p= + pD$} + pZ~} + p$}. ~} + Å′É + Ñ} (3.1) 
where Δ* is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita (log difference of real GDP 
per capita between current time and initial point of time), $ is an indicator of economic 
freedom, ~ is a measure of fiscal policy (either government investment or government 
consumption expenditure), Å is a vector of control variables, Ñ is disturbance term and 
3 indexes country (explanation of all concerning variables is carefully presented in 
section 3.4.2).  
In equation (3.1), pZ and p are the coefficients of interest. The statistical significance 
different from zero of p is evidence of the interdependence of fiscal policy and 
economic freedom in determining economic growth. Because two types of government 
spending, investment and consumption, are examined one by one using (3.1), there are 
some possibilities of the sign of the corresponding coefficients. If pZ is greater than 
zero, the positive sign of p indicates that economic freedom (or better institutional 
quality) promotes the effectiveness of fiscal policy in enhancing growth. On contrary, 
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the negative sign of p shows that economic freedom makes fiscal policy less effective. 
If pZ is less than zero, the positive sign of p means the destructive impact of 
government policy on growth is softened at higher level of economic freedom. When 
both pZ and  p are negative, the higher freedom, the more detrimental the fiscal policy 
is to growth. In case p is not statistically different from zero, we may conclude that 
impacts of fiscal policy on growth are independent to the level of economic freedom. 
In other words, the opposite signs between pZ and p mean economic freedom softens 
the effect of fiscal policy whereas the same signs mean economic freedom strengthens 
the fiscal policy’s effect15. Overall, the total effect on economic growth of a unit 
increase in fiscal policy instrument is  
∆Üáàâ"m
∆' = pZ + p$ (3.2) 
This model might be considered as a variant of the growth regression model of Barro 
(1991, 1996). It can also be compared with the one developed by Mankiw et al. (1992), 
then modified and extended by other authors in terms of cross-section as well as panel 
data analysis (Bond et al., 2010; Easton & Walker, 1997; Islam, 1995). In the seminal 
work of  Mankiw et al. (1992), economic growth depends on initial income and other 
determinants of the steady state income level consisting of population growth and 
human and physical capital accumulation. Easton and Walker (1997) and Dawson 
(1998) introduce economic freedom into the neoclassical framework of Mankiw et al. 
(1992) to capture the differences in production technologies across countries. I inherit 
their approach but proceed in the spirit of endogenous growth framework by adding a 
policy variable in the model. If economic growth is exogenous and macro-economic 
policies are irrelevant, we should find the coefficients on fiscal policy variable (pZ and 
p) insignificant. Otherwise, it will establish ground for fiscal policy implementation 
in promoting long-term economic growth.  
My identification strategy lies on the main assumption that other (unobserved) 
determinants of real per capita GDP growth are uncorrelated with both fiscal policy 
                                                 
15 The explanation of p can also be made similarly by analyzing the sign of pD instead of pZ if one 
studies the determining role of fiscal policy on the impact of freedom on growth. However, our primary 
interest is the impacts of fiscal policy on growth given different level of institutional quality. I therefore 
focus on pZ and p.     
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and institutional variables. Of course, this assumption is vulnerable to several critiques 
that comparable studies on fiscal policy, institutions and economic growth encounter. 
A potential issue leading to the biasedness and inconsistency in my OLS estimators is 
both government spending and economic freedom are endogeneous. The expected 
correlations may occur because governments in countries experiencing advancement 
in economic performance have more resources for their expenditure programs and 
greater incentive to take some institutional reforms. Trouble may appear due to 
misspecification, such as omitted variables if there exist some unobserved factors 
driving economic growth, government spending decision and institutions all together, 
or heterogeneity when countries differ in productivity and capital accumulation. I 
acknowledge those identification issues in my estimation and try to minimize the bias. 
In the baseline analysis conducted in section 5, assuming explanatory variables are 
exogenous, I use White-heteroskedasticiy-consistent covariance matrix to achieve 
standard errors of coefficients in equation (3.1). The assumption of exogeneity is 
relaxed in section 6 with various specifications, the employment of alternative 
measures of some explanatory variables, lagged values of fiscal policy and economic 
freedom as well as some panel data estimators. I prefer those robustness checks to the 
standard IV approach because it is almost impossible to find valid instruments for 
fiscal policy and institution variables in my growth regression model. Even there may 
exist some instruments, the interaction between endogenous variables make 
identification and interpretation more troublesome with that multiple endogeneity 
problem.             
3.4.2. Variable and data description 
I use annual data for a sample of 72 countries over the period 1990 – 2015 to test the 
hypothesis about the interaction between economic freedom and fiscal policy in 
affecting growth. The full sample is divided into emerging countries and advanced 
countries based on IMF classification (see appendix 3.1)16.  
In my baseline model, Å includes conventional growth determinants as in Mankiw et 
al. (1992): initial level of income per capita (Income_1996), initial physical capital 
                                                 




(Initial investment), initial human capital (Initial schooling), and the growth rate of 
population (Population growth). I use log of GDP per capita at the beginning of period 
as a measure of initial level of income. The ratio of real investment to real GDP and 
the years of schooling of males aged 25 and above are used as proxies for physical 
capital and human capital, respectively. Beside these primary determinants of growth, 
other two control variables (Openness and Inflation) are taken into account. In order 
to capture the spillover effect of international trade on growth (Chang, Kaltani, & 
Loayza, 2009; Edwards, 1998; Frankel & Romer, 1999; Yanikkaya, 2003), I include 
trade openness (ratio of real exports and real imports to real GDP) in my growth 
regression. Because fiscal policy and monetary policy are crucial tools for a 
government to intervene in the economy and they may be correlated (Davig & Leeper, 
2011; Dixit & Lambertini, 2003; Galí & Monacelli, 2008), I add inflation (measured 
by annual changes in GDP deflator) to capture this relationship.  
In my estimation, economic growth (Growth), Δ* in model (3.1), is log difference of 
real GDP per capita between 2015 and 1996. Initial physical capital and human capital 
are calculated as the average over 1990 through 1995 while initial income per capita 
which takes the value in 1996. Other variables (population growth, trade openness, and 
inflation) are averaged over 1996 through 2015. Data on human capital are from Barro-
Lee dataset (Barro & Lee, 2013; Lee & Lee, 2016). Other macroeconomic variables 
are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of World Bank (WB). The real 
values are data in constant 2010 U.S. dollars.    
Freedom variable, $, in equation (3.1) is the annual economic freedom index provided 
by the Heritage Foundation. This index was first calculated and released in 199517. Its 
value ranges from 0 to 100 with the higher value indicating more freedom. The index 
consists of ten components grouped into four freedom aspects: rule of law (including 
property rights and government integrity), government size (including government 
spending and tax burden), regulatory efficiency (including business freedom, labor 
freedom and monetary freedom), open markets (including trade freedom, investment 
                                                 
17 Other studies use economic freedom indexes provided by the Fraser Institute because of their longer 
time span. I use economic freedom from Heritage Foundation instead so that our results can be contrast 
with them in terms of different indicators of freedom. I make a trade-off between time dimension and 
number of countries and choose the period 1990 – 2015 for our sample to maximize both dimensions. 
In robustness checks, I also use the freedom indexes from the Fraser Institute.  
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freedom, and financial freedom). Except labor freedom, annual data on the other 
freedom components are fully available for period 1995 – 2015. I use the aggregate 
freedom index (in logarithm form) to estimate equation (3.1). It is worth noting that 
government size component of the aggregate freedom index is highly correlated with 
a measure of fiscal policy, government consumption expenditure. In the second part 
of section 5, some components (excluding government size) of the index instead of the 
aggregate index are used in the interactive model.  
In terms of government policy, ~, I use government investment as a measure of fiscal 
policy. Government investment is the ratio of real general government investment to 
real GDP taken from the newly released Investment and Capital Stock database (ICSD) 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Government investment is defined as public 
spending on social infrastructure (such as schools and hospitals) and economic 
infrastructure (such as roads and airports) and calculated using gross fixed capital 
formation of general government18. Because different types of government spending 
may have different implication on growth, another measure of ~, government 
consumption, is also employed in this study. Government consumption is the ratio of 
real government consumption to real GDP taken from WDI of WB. It includes all 
government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including 
compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense 
and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of 
government capital formation.          
For sensitivity and robustness analysis, other control variables suggested by the 
existing growth literature are included. As in Fatás and Mihov (2013), Gallup, Sachs, 
and Mellinger (1999), Lavergne, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) and Williamson and 
Mathers (2011), I add country size (Area, measured by logarithm of country area) and 
a dummy for tropical region (Tropical) to capture the impact of geography on 
economic policy choices and economic growth. I also use dummies for British legal 
origin (British legal origin, referring to common law) and for French legal origin 
(French legal origin, referring to civil law) to control for the effect of legal origin in 
                                                 
18 For detailed description of public investment, see 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/publicinvestment/data/info122216.pdf   
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shaping economic institutions and outcomes (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 2003). Fiscal policy variables are usually correlated one another because 
governments with higher tax revenue tend to spend more (Easterly & Rebelo, 1993). 
On the other hand, government can finance their spending either by running a balanced 
budget or by issuing more debt which may crowd out private investment19 and reduce 
economic growth in the long run (Chudik, Mohaddes, Pesaran, & Raissi, 2017; 
Reinhart, Reinhart, & Rogoff, 2012). Therefore, it is implausible to assume that 
government increases or decrease spending but keeps other fiscal variables unchanged. 
I control for these effects by adding ratios of government revenue to GDP 
(Government revenue) and public debt to GDP (Government debt) in robustness 
checks.  Data on geography and legal origin are taken from Easterly and Sewadeh 
(2001), government debt from the Historical Public Debt Database (HPDD) of IMF, 
and government revenue from WDI of WB.          
3.5. Empirical results 
3.5.1. The importance of economic freedom in determining the growth effect of 
government investment 
I start the analysis with a simple observation about the relationship between 
government expenditure and economic growth. Figure 3.1 shows a correlation between 
government investment and economic growth which is also exhibited in column 1 of 
table 3.1. The relationship is as expected as in the growth literature: government 
investment in physical assets is a catalyst for economic growth. The unconditional 
correlation is positive at 5% significance level, implying that, on average, if public 
investment (to GDP) increases by 1% per year, growth rate of real GDP per capita can 
be raised by 0.21% per year.  
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the relationship between government investment and per 
capita output growth for emerging economies and advanced economies. It seems there 
is no obvious difference between two country groups. However, the scatter plot of 
emerging countries is more diffuse than that of advanced economies, meaning that 
                                                 
19 Some channels of crowding-out effect of fiscal policy with debt financing in the growth literature 
include: (i) when a government finances their spending by issuing debt, it makes interest rate go up and 
results in a drop in investment due to expensive financing cost; (ii) public debt burden brings worries 
about raising tax in the future which will lower the rate of return for private sector’s investment projects.     
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developed countries share similar growth rate as well as investment rate whereas 
developing ones do not. During twenty years since 1996, the advanced group achieves 
only 1.6% growth per year, much less than emerging markets whose growth excesses 
2.8% although average public investment to GDP of both groups are not very much 
different, approximately 4.2% in advanced economies versus 4.8% in emerging 
countries (see appendix 3.3 for variable statistics).  
The growth-enhancing impact of government capital expenditure keeps consistent 
when adding economic freedom and other primary determinants of growth. In the 
baseline model without interaction term (column 3 of table 3.1), the partial correlation 
between public investment and growth increases a bit in size, from 0.21 to 0.245, and 
gets better significance level, from 5% to 1%. Controlling for monetary and trade 
policy as in column 5 does not change the story but improves the model’s goodness-
of-fit. Nevertheless, government capital expenditure is more crucial to emerging 
countries in promoting growth. Holding other factors constant, one percentage point 
of GDP increase in government investment is statistically significantly associated with 
0.273% increase in growth rate of developing countries but only 0.046% in developed 
countries (column 7 versus 9). Moreover, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
government investment has no long-term growth influence in advanced economies at 
all conventional levels of significance although its coefficient is still positive.  
Figure 3.3 and 3.4 reveal an interesting story about the relationship between freedom 
and growth. When all countries in the sample are pooled together and other 
determinants of growth are ignored, countries with greater economic freedom seem to 
experience lower growth rate as shown in figure 3.3. The bivariate correlation between 
freedom and growth in column 2 of table 3.1 is negative but insignificant. Figure 3.4, 
however, depicts a clearer picture on this relationship. The slopes of regressing growth 
on freedom for both emerging and advanced economies are positive, meaning that 
better institutions do benefit growth as predicted in the modern growth literature. The 
unconditional correlation between economic freedom and growth for all countries 
without considering any other factors as in figure 3.3 is therefore misleading.  
In fact, the negative unconditional coefficient of economic freedom occurs because 
freedom correlates other determinants of growth (see appendix 3.4 for variable 
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correlation). The best candidate is the GDP per capita. Advanced economies 
characterized by higher income level also enjoy better institutions such as greater 
freedom. Their average freedom index is 72 compared to only 59 of emerging 
countries. Economic freedom also correlates human capital accumulation given the 
fact that people in high freedom countries have more chance to choose their education 
program and level (Feldmann, 2017). In addition, degree of openness and inflation 
reflect the open market aspect and the regulatory efficiency aspect of the freedom 
index, respectively. Therefore, after controlling for those variables, the coefficient of 
economic freedom becomes positive and statistically significant at 1% level as in 
column 3 and 5 of table 3.1. Comparing with advanced economies, the beneficial effect 
of freedom on growth in emerging countries is economically and statistically higher 
(column 7 versus 9).  
Focusing on the primary interest, table 3.1 presents the non-linear effect of fiscal 
policy on growth, in other words, the interdependence between freedom and 
government investment in determining economic growth. The coefficient of the 
variable of interest – the interaction between government investment and freedom – is 
marginally negative at 10% significance as shown in column 4. Given the average 
freedom of 64 in the whole sample, one percentage point of GDP increase in 
government investment leads to 0.19 percentage point increase in growth. However, if 
the economic freedom accelerates by 10 points (approximately one standard 
deviation), the impact of government investment on growth reduces to 0.11, reflecting 
about 40% drop. The beneficial impact of government investment is the lower the 
higher economic freedom.  
The eroding influence of freedom on fiscal policy’s effectiveness is strengthened with 
the inclusion of more control variables. Given the same growth-determining factors, 
such as initial income, capital accumulation, population growth, openness and 
inflation, countries with higher economic freedom have lower positive effect of public 
investment. The coefficient of the interaction is now statistically significant at 5% 
level. The point estimate of -0.719 of the interaction and of 3.158 of government 
investment imply that a 10-point rise in freedom index from its average would make 
the effectiveness of public spending reduce from 0.168 to 0.063 percentage point 
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increase in per capita GDP growth rate, representing about 60% drop in the fiscal 
impact on economic growth.  
Does the detrimental influence of economic freedom on public investment 
effectiveness differ with level of economic development? Column 8 and 10 of table 
3.1 answer “yes”. In emerging countries, the interaction coefficient remains 
statistically significant with negative sign, which is consistent with what have been 
found in the full sample regression. The corresponding coefficients in column 8 
demonstrate that, on average and holding other factors fixed, one percentage point of 
GDP rise in public investment is associated with 0.24 percentage point increase in 
economic growth. The effect, however, is only 0.16 percentage point to countries with 
7-point higher freedom. In other words, one standard-deviation-higher economic 
freedom leads to a one-third drop in public investment effect in the developing group.     
On the contrary, this story does not hold in case of advanced economies. Although all 
the signs of coefficients of interest are similar to the case of emerging countries and 
the full sample, the inclusion of interaction term results in the insignificance for both 
variables of interest and their interaction. Suspecting that this significance 
disappearance may come from the multicollinearity problem usually happening in 
interactive regression models, I center the two variables at their means and run 
regression again for advanced economies. The result is not very much different from 
column 1020. It could be said that impact of public spending on economic growth 
among developed countries does not depend on their economic freedom.              
Most of the control variables appear in the regression results, for the whole sample and 
each sub-sample, with expected signs despite various levels of significance. As in the 
Solow-type growth model, I find strong evidence of conditional convergence when the 
coefficient of initial income – real GDP per capita in 1996 – is negative and statistically 
significant at 5% or better. Obviously, poor countries enjoy a greater growth rate than 
rich countries so that they can catch up each other as the conventional meaning of 
economic convergence. As well as predicted in the literature, increases in population 
                                                 
20 When centering the two main variables and estimating the baseline model with interaction term for 
advanced economies, I find a statistically positive impact of freedom on growth at a close to 5% level. 
Public investment is positively correlated to growth and while the interaction coefficient is negative but 
both are insignificant. I do not report the result for brevity but it is available upon request. 
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lower per capita income growth with 1% significance in most of the specifications. 
Both physical and human capital promotes economic prosperity although their 
coefficient is not always statistically significant. The main reason is that they are 
proxies rather than precise measurement of capital accumulation in my study. The four 
primary determinants of growth together with economic freedom and fiscal policy 
variables in the baseline specifications have already explained more than 55% 
variation of economic growth.  
Adding the other two variables, Openness and Inflation, helps increase the goodness-
of-fit of the model but gives unclear conclusions on their effect. Seemingly consistent 
to the international trade literature (Chang et al., 2009; Edwards, 1998; Frankel & 
Romer, 1999; Yanikkaya, 2003), economic growth and openness are positive 
correlated although this correlation coefficient is insignificant (column 5 and 6). The 
role of trade as a growth engine is confirmed in the sub-sample of advanced economies 
with marginal significance level. In emerging countries, however, those with smaller 
trade share in GDP grow more quickly with 5% or 10% significance level depending 
on the specification.  
Price level is positively but insignificantly correlated with growth in the case of full 
sample (column 5 and 6). Regardless of signs, this insignificance seems to be in line 
with the classical economic theory on the neutrality of the monetary sector: real growth 
rate is not affected by any change in the quantity of money conditional on price 
flexibility and constant fraction of income for saving (Sidrauski, 1967). In the case of 
advanced economies (column 9 and 10), the correlation becomes positive and 
statistically significant at 5% level or better. This positive correlation between inflation 
and growth may be best explained by Tobin (1965) who indicates the substitution 
effect between money and capital under a portfolio mechanism: inflation induces 
individuals to switch their holdings from money to interest-earning assets, hence, 
promotes capital accumulation and results in a higher growth rate. In the case of 
emerging countries, however, inflation negatively correlates growth though 
insignificantly. Of course, that high inflation is harmful to growth is widely accepted 
in the growth literature (Bruno & Easterly, 1998; Cooley & Hansen, 1989; Fischer, 
1993; Stockman, 1981). The sign-changing correlation coefficient of inflation 
observed in my study is not very much surprising because it is usual to find a non-
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linear effect of inflation on growth. Sarel (1996) and Bick (2010), among many others, 
postulates that high inflation is harmful to growth but at low level, say under 8 per 
cent, it has a growth-enhancing effect. In fact, the average inflation of advanced 
economies in my sample is only 1.96% compared to 9.97% of emerging countries and 
both groups have opposite correlation between inflation and growth.  
3.5.2. The importance of economic freedom in determining the growth effect of 
government consumption  
A subsequent question is going to be answered is whether the non-linear effect of fiscal 
policy observed in case of public investment also happens in the case of public 
consumption. In other words, does different composition of government spending have 
similar effect on growth, and does that effect depend on degree of economic freedom 
a country enjoys? I start with a simple look at the correlation between government 
consumption and economic growth. 
Figure 3.5 presents a downward sloping fitted line when regressing growth rate of real 
per capita GDP on government consumption for a sample of 72 countries. The 
estimated unconditional correlation of -0.1 in the univariate specification in table 3.2 
is statistically significant at 1%. It suggests that one percentage point of GDP increase 
in government consumption expenditure reduces average growth rate of real output 
per capita by 0.1 percentage points. Both emerging countries and advanced economies 
expose to this negative relationship relatively the same as shown in figure 3.6. The 
unconditional correlation does not imply causality but does be consistent with recent 
findings on the relationship between government size and economic growth – the 
bigger governments, the more detrimental to economic growth as there is higher 
chance for governments to deviate from its fundamental functions in ensuring 
economic and social stability.  
The growth-lessening impact of public purchases of goods and services remains 
consistent with the presence of economic freedom and other determinants of growth 
as shown in panel A of table 3.2. In the baseline model without interaction term 
(column 2), one percentage point of GDP increase in government consumption reduces 
economic growth by 0.078 percentage point significantly. After controlling for 
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openness and inflation (column 5), the coefficient becomes -0.072, which is not very 
much different from the baseline result in terms of size and still statistically significant.  
There is, however, a nonlinear impact of government consumption and economic 
growth based on the level of economic development. In panel B of table 3.2, 
developing countries suffer a 0.082 percentage point drop in economic growth if 
governments raise their consumption (to GDP) by one percentage point (column 5). 
This effect is statistically significant at 5%. Developed countries, conversely, seem to 
have no growth effect from any rise or drop in government consumption expenditure 
as the respective coefficient is insignificant at all conventional levels (column 5 of 
panel C). Therefore, it could be said that how government consumption affects long-
term growth depends on whether a country is in the developing or developed group. 
Economic freedom keeps its role of a growth engine as expected in the existing growth 
literature. A positive correlation coefficient between freedom and growth can be found 
significantly in either the baseline specification (controlling for population growth, 
initial income level, initial physical and human capital) or the specification with more 
control variables (including openness and inflation). This relationship between 
freedom and growth remains consistent no matter what level of development 
(emerging countries or advanced economies). The coefficient for advanced economies 
is a bit higher than that for emerging countries and they both are significant at 5% 
level. Certainly, countries with more economic freedom grow faster. 
Quite different from the case of public investment, evidence on the role of economic 
freedom in the effectiveness of public consumption is prettily weak. Column 3 and 6 
of table 3.2 provide surprising results from the interactive regression specifications: 
either government consumption or freedom (or both of them) converts its sign from 
what observed in the models without interaction term and becomes insignificant. 
Obviously, regression with interaction term appears to suffer the multicollinearity 
problem. The correlation between two variables of interest and their interaction inflates 
their standard errors, makes them insignificant and changes their sign. In order to 
address this problem, I center the two variables at their mean (i.e. subtracting each 
variable from its mean) and run regression with the interaction term based on the 
centered data whereas control variables are kept the same as in previous analyses. The 
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results from centered government consumption variable and freedom variable (column 
4 and 7) become conceivable: all the coefficients return to its normal values and 
statistical significance compared to the specifications without the interaction term. 
Observed from regression with centering data, economic freedom seems to soften the 
negative impact of government consumption expenditure. In the baseline specification 
for the whole sample (column 4 of panel A), both government consumption and 
freedom are present with expected signs and significant at 1% level. The interaction 
term is positive, meaning that higher freedom reduces total negative impact of public 
consumption, but insignificant. When adding openness and inflation as more control 
variables, the interaction term still is positive and becomes marginally significant. The 
point estimate of 0.326 of the interaction term and of -0.0698 of government 
consumption indicates that, holding other factors constant, at the average level of 
freedom, one percentage point of GDP increase in public consumption expenditure 
from its average would reduce growth rate by 0.0698 percentage point. If a country 
has a 10-point freedom above its average (or an increase by one standard deviation), 
the total effect of government consumption on economic growth is only -0.0227, 
reflecting approximately a 68% drop. At some considerate increase in level of freedom 
above its mean, say a 15.5-point rise, the total effect of government consumption on 
growth starts to become positive.  
The determining role of economic freedom in the impact of government consumption 
also differs with degree of economic development. Column 7 of panel B shows that 
total effect of public spending on goods and services in emerging countries is decided 
by the level of economic freedom in a similar fashion as in panel A. The interaction 
term is 0.675 and significant at 10% while the coefficient of government consumption 
is -0.0795 and significant at 5%. A one percentage point of GDP increase in 
government consumption reduces economic growth by 0.0795 percentage point in an 
emerging country with average freedom level but by 0.1646 percentage point in an 
emerging country with 7-point freedom below the average. Yet if an emerging country 
has 7-point freedom above the average, when their government raises consumption by 
one percentage point of GDP, their output per capita falls by only 0.0039 percentage 
point. On the other hand, comparing advanced economies together, there is no 
statistical evidence on the role of economic freedom in government consumption’s 
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effect. In column 6 of panel C, the coefficient of the interaction between government 
consumption and freedom is insignificant at all conventional levels. More 
interestingly, a rise in government purchases of goods and services seems to be 
associated with higher economic growth among advanced economies and more 
freedom can reinforce this relationship even though the respective correlation 
coefficients are not statistically significant. It may infer that institutions play a more 
important role in determining the effectiveness of government consumption in the 
developing countries than in the developed ones.  
3.5.2. The interaction between components of economic freedom and government 
expenditure 
The above analysis provides evidence on the influence of economic freedom on fiscal 
policy’s effectiveness but draws an unclear picture about which aspect of freedom is 
more important, which less. The economic freedom index is a combination of many 
aspects of freedom in a country. A single index is convenient for representation but 
cannot fully reflect the complication of an economically free society. It could be the 
case that only a certain aspect of freedom can influence the significance of fiscal policy 
while the others do not have any effect. Furthermore, government size component of 
the aggregate freedom index is highly correlated with a measure of fiscal policy 
instrument, government consumption. Therefore, decomposing the index can help 
explain better the interrelationship between freedom and government spending in 
affecting growth and give more useful information for policy-making decision.  
I focus on three aspects of economic freedom and use four indicators to capture them. 
Indicators of property rights and government integrity represent the rule of law aspect. 
Indicator of business freedom represents the regulatory efficiency aspect. Indicator of 
investment freedom represents the market openness aspect21. I begin my analysis by 
using the interactive regression model to examine the impact of government 
investment as in the previous section but replace economic freedom with each of its 
components. The analysis is then repeated by using government consumption instead 
of government investment. Due to the possible multicollinearity problem between 
                                                 
21 Government size, which includes government spending and tax burden, is a distinguished aspect of 




government consumption, economic freedom and their interaction, I center both the 
variable at their mean and use the centered data for regression.  In all the specifications, 
I control for other determinants of growth22 but report only three coefficients of interest 
– government spending, component of economic freedom, and the interaction between 
spending and freedom – for a concrete representation.  
Panel A of table 3.3 confirms the contribution of public investment and favorable 
economic institutions to long-term growth. In specifications without the interaction 
(column 1, 3, 5 and 7), the coefficient of government investment is always positive 
and significant at 5% level or better. Most of the coefficients of freedom components 
are also positive and significant. In specifications with the interaction (column 2, 4, 6 
and 8), government investment and freedom components are still positive but 
significant at different levels. Only property rights and business freedom appear to 
reduce the positive effect of government investment while government integrity and 
investment freedom seem to have no role in the effectiveness of public spending 
although their interaction coefficients are negative. 
In the absence of the interaction term, panel B of table 3.3 shows that government 
consumption is consistently detrimental to long-term growth at 1% significance level. 
All components of economic freedom are positively associated with economic growth 
but only government integrity is statistically significant. With the presence of the 
interaction term, both government consumption and freedom components remain their 
sign and significance level but none of the interactions is statistically significant. 
Contrasting to what have been found in the previous section, this result implies that 
economic freedom plays a minor role to public consumption’s effect. The result also 
infers that it is the combination of all aspects, not a single component, of economic 
freedom of freedom that does matter to the growth impact of government consumption 
expenditure.     
3.6. Robustness checks 
3.6.1. Cross-sectional regression 
                                                 
22 Core control variables include Income_1996, Initial investment, Initial schooling, Population growth, 
Openness and Inflation.  
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The results obtained from a cross-section framework may not avoid several critics on 
its validity and reliability. The classical argument on empirical studies about fiscal 
policy is that they easily lose their significance with different control variable sets. On 
the other hand, economic freedom is a broad and complicated concept and the results 
may change if different measures of economic freedom are used. The most crucial 
issue is that my results may suffer a reverse causation, for example the positive 
correlations between government investment and growth, economic freedom and 
growth occur because countries that grow more rapidly also have more incentive to 
improve their institutional quality and have more resources to invest in infrastructure. 
In fact, using 20-year-averaged values of fiscal variables can deal only partially, not 
completely, with this reverse causality.     
To address these issues I conduct the following robustness checks for my cross-
sectional regression models. First, I replace the index of economic freedom from the 
Heritage Foundation by the economic freedom index calculated by the Fraser Institute. 
The two indexes are calculated in different ways but they both intend to capture how 
economically free a country achieves. Secondly, I use alternative measures of human 
capital provided by WB – primary enrollment rates – instead the measure obtained 
from Barro-Lee dataset. The main reason is that economic freedom correlates human 
capital; consequently, different measures of human capital may lead to different 
results. Thirdly, I check for the robustness of my results by using different sets of 
control variables. The core controls23 are as usual but I take into consideration other 
factors that may change the relationship between government spending, economic 
freedom and economic growth. They include (i) the interrelationship among fiscal 
variables in affecting growth (by using government revenue and initial public debt), 
(ii) the role of legal origin (by using a dummy for British legal origin and a dummy for 
French legal origin), and (iii) the role of geography (by using country area and a 
dummy for tropical region).  
I do acknowledge that the reverse causality may produce a considerate bias in my 
estimation and could make the results meaningless. To minimize this problem, I re-
                                                 
23 Core control variables include Income_1996, Initial investment, Initial schooling, Population 
growth, Openness and Inflation. 
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estimate my models by using one-period lag of government spending and economic 
freedom. It means I regress the current period (1996-2015) average growth rate on the 
previous period (1990-1995) average values of fiscal policy and economic freedom. 
The regression specification implies that fiscal policy and institutional conditions in 
the past may affect the current growth rate while the current growth rate cannot change 
fiscal policy and institutional conditions in the past. This method is not perfect to tackle 
the reverse causality problem but may lend support to the argument on the causal 
relationship between government spending, economic freedom and economic growth. 
I prefer this approach to the instrumental variable approach because it is difficult to 
find valid instruments for both fiscal policy and economic freedom in the growth 
regression. Furthermore, the instrumental variable approach is not suitable in my case 
where the variables of interest are the possible endogenous variables (government 
spending) and its interaction with a continuous and possible endogenous variable 
(freedom). This typical problem of multiple endogenous variables in regression makes 
difficult for both identifying and interpreting. Therefore, I use the past value of fiscal 
variables and Fraser freedom index, the alternative measure of human capital and then 
combine with different sets of control variables for robustness checks, given a 
reminder that doing this way can minimize but incompletely solve the endogeneity 
problem in my estimation.   
As shown in table 3.4, the relationship between public investment and economic 
freedom in affecting growth keeps stable over different models. The size of the 
coefficients of interest does not much differ from one specification to another. Both 
government investment and economic freedom are significantly beneficial to long-
term growth. Their interaction is negative and statistically significant in all the 
specifications, implying that greater economic freedom reduces the favorable effect of 
government fixed capital expenditure.  
Specifically, when I replace the economic freedom index from the Heritage 
Foundation with the index from the Fraser Institute, the years of schooling with the 
primary enrollment rate, and use the average values over the previous period of 
government investment and economic freedom to run regressions, both government 
investment and its interaction with freedom are significant at 5% (column 1). In a more 
challenging model with the additional presence of other fiscal variables (column 2), 
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they are still significant and remain the same sign though the interaction becomes less 
significant. Adding legal origin (column 3) or considering geographic characteristics 
(column 4) do not change the story. Almost all the control variables appear with 
expected signs except initial investment whose coefficient becomes negative though 
insignificant. It happens due to the strong correlation between government investment 
and total investment in the same period in my regressions. These results highlight 
nothing special but confirm the claim about the diminishing return of public 
investment in a more freedom economy.  
The robustness checks also support the finding that economic freedom changes the 
extent to which government consumption affects growth. In all the specifications, 
economic freedom is positively associated with growth though insignificant. Three out 
of four specifications possess a negative, insignificant correlation between government 
consumption and growth. Meanwhile, the interaction between government 
consumption and economic freedom remains positive and statistically significant no 
matter what control variables are (column 5, 6, 7 and 8). It is obvious that countries 
with higher economic freedom have lower adverse impact of government consumption 
expenditure on growth. In other words, better institutional quality can make the 
government consumption become less detrimental or more beneficial to long-term 
growth.            
3.6.2. Panel data regression 
Although the cross section approach is standard in the growth regression, its basic 
assumption that all the countries share the same production function might be easily 
violated. In fact, every country has its own preference, institutional and technological 
characteristics determining its economic development. These factors could be 
unobservable or immeasurable. Estimation without taking account of these factors may 
lead to the omitted variable bias. This problem cannot be solved by the standard cross 
section framework but can be dealt with by a panel data approach (Acemoglu et al., 
2003; Afonso & Furceri, 2010; Fölster & Henrekson, 2001; Islam, 1995). Therefore, I 
construct a panel data set and estimate some panel data models to take into account the 
country specifics and the time dimension in investigating the interrelationship between 
government spending, economic freedom and economic growth.  
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My panel data is constructed by creating a five-year averaged data for a sample of 70 
countries from 1991 to 2015. Choosing the five-year interval is popular in the 
empirical growth literature because it possibly helps deal with business cycle 
fluctuations and missing variables (Afonso & Furceri, 2010; Bond et al., 2010; Fölster 
& Henrekson, 2001; Islam, 1995). As a result, I have five non-overlapping periods: 
1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015. I estimate equation 
(3.1) in a panel data framework by using the same variables as in the cross section 
regression. The dependent variable is the five-year average growth rate of real GDP 
per capita. All independent variables also take five-year average values, except initial 
income which is the real GDP per capita at the beginning year of each period. I use the 
economic freedom index of the Heritage Foundation in this exercise. Government 
investment is from ICSD of IMF. Government consumption and other variables are 
from WDI of WB while a measure of human capital – years of schooling of male aged 
25 and above – is from the Barro-Lee dataset as before.         
Table 3.5 presents the impacts of economic freedom on public investment’s 
effectiveness by using three distinguished estimators: pooled OLS, fixed effects and 
dynamic panel data or Arellano-Bond system GMM. In the pooled OLS models, all 
the variables appear with expected sign and high significance level. Column 1 and 2 
support my hypothesis that public investment is less effective in a more economically 
free country. Both government investment and freedom are positive and significant 
while the coefficient on their interaction term is also statistically significant but 
negative. In line with the existing literature, physical capital is an important 
determinant of growth, increases in population reduce per capita GDP growth, and 
richer countries grow less. Human capital is also positively correlated with growth but 
insignificant. The pooled OLS model in column 2 confirm the argument that countries 
with lower inflation rate and more open to international trade grow faster. 
Although the aforementioned results are very much encouraging to my hypothesis as 
well as consistent with the standard growth literature, the pooled OLS models are often 
criticized because they ignore the latent heterogeneity across countries and suffer from 
the misspecification problem. I take into consideration country specific effects and 
time effects by estimating the fixed effects models. In the baseline specification 
without time effects (column 3), the coefficient on government investment is positive 
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and significant while that on the interaction term is significantly negative. Adding 
more controls and accounting for time effects do not change the signs of the 
coefficients of interest but reduce the significance level to 10% as shown in column 4 
and 5. Other variables appear with expected signs and significance as similar as in the 
case of pooled OLS estimators. One remarkable observation is that there exists a strong 
relationship among government policies – trade policy, monetary policy and fiscal 
policy – in affecting growth. The presence of openness and inflation not only 
substantially improves the R-squared but also make the coefficient on government 
investment smaller.       
The impact of fiscal policy and economic freedom on growth from the pooled OLS 
and fixed effects estimators above could be biased if past economic success can lead 
to changes in government spending decision and induce revolution of institutional 
quality, and at the same time economic growth is highly persistent. A popular approach 
to tackle this problem is to use a dynamic model instead of the static one. However, in 
a dynamic framework, when the lagged dependent variable (growth rate of real GDP 
per capita) is included as a regressor, both the OLS and the fixed effects estimators 
become biased and inconsistent. An instrumental variable approach in panel data 
introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) and extended by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) can help deal with this problem. I apply the Arellano-
Bond methodology with system GMM estimator. I treat government investment, 
economic freedom and their interaction term as endogenous variables and the others 
as predetermined variables. The system GMM estimator takes advantage of exploiting 
all the information from both the levels and the differences of variables to obtain a set 
of instruments. In the baseline model with lagged growth rate (column 7 of table 3.5), 
the coefficients of interest appear with expected sign though insignificantly. When I 
add more control variables and account for both country fixed effects and time fixed 
effects (column 8), government investment is positively correlated with growth and 
the coefficient on its interaction is still negative. These results imply that greater 
economic freedom lowers the productive impact of public investment although this 
argument is not significantly supported.  
Table 3.6 provides results from some robustness checks when replacing government 
investment with government consumption. Generally, there is no statistical evidence 
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on the determining role of economic freedom in the impact of government 
consumption on economic growth. In the pooled OLS and fixed effects models, all the 
coefficients of interest have the same sign as in the cross section regressions but 
insignificant: government consumption is detrimental to growth but its negative effect 
decelerates with higher economic freedom. Using the Arellano-Bond system GMM, 
however, changes the sign of the interaction term from positive to negative although 
other coefficients are present as expected. These results illustrate that it is hard to draw 
a common conclusion on the growth impact of government consumption expenditure. 
It could be because different types of public consumption may not have the same 
implication on growth while the aggregate consumption variable cannot investigate 
these effects. Findings in the robustness checks as well as the prevailing growth 
literature give no clear-cut conclusion on the effect of government consumption on 
growth.  
As in other empirical macroeconomic studies, a limited number of observations 
naturally appears to be a shortcoming of this study. The panel data regressions with 5-
year averaged data help increase the number of observations from 72 in the baseline 
estimation to 210 (and more, depending on specification) in the robustness checks. 
However, it is still small compared to hundreds or thousands of observations in 
empirical microeconomic studies and still possesses a concern of robustness. 
Therefore, I attempt to conduct panel data regressions using 3-year instead of 5-year 
averaged data so that the total number of observations can be raised with a hope of 
achieving more robust results. As expressed in table 3.7 and 3.8, the total number of 
observations increases from 210 to 470 while the estimated results are not very much 
different from table 3.5 and 3.6. In other words, the aforementioned results seem to be 
robust regardless how panel data are constructed or how many observations are used.            
3.7. Discussion 
Regression results about the relationship among public investment, economic freedom 
and growth in table 3.1 highlight several key points. First, this empirical study supports 
the endogenous growth models which emphasize the positive effect of productive 
government spending on growth. As argued in the existing literature, increases in 
public investment benefit the private sector by enhancing their productivity, providing 
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positive externalities and result in long-term growth (Barro, 1990; Easterly & Rebelo, 
1993; Romero-Ávila & Strauch, 2008; Zagler & Dürnecker, 2003). This result is 
consistent in both bivariate and multivariate regressions. This result is also robust in 
the panel data approach with the pooled OLS and fixed effects estimators, except the 
system GMM estimators. Although this general finding is not new in any way, what I 
have found when splitting the sample into two groups is not completely standard. 
Government investment in advanced economies has no significant influence on long-
term growth although the partial correlation is positive. On the other hand, the 
coefficient for emerging countries is positive and very significant in all specifications. 
We may conclude that at a low level of development, government investment plays 
more important role in promoting growth. As a country achieves a certain level of 
development, the role of government investment diminishes.     
Secondly, the results in table 3.1 and 3.2 are also in line with the modern growth 
literature which underscores institutions as fundamental causes of economic 
development. Almost all the specifications show that economic freedom is important 
to both advanced and emerging countries and statistically significantly promotes long-
term growth. In an economically free country, all individuals and firms have equal 
opportunity to strike for their own dreams whereas resources are fairly allocated. The 
private sector, therefore, makes the best decision on production, investment and 
consumption, which in turn generates economic prosperity. This effect exists no matter 
how developed a country is. 
Thirdly, the (most) important and novel finding in my study is that the beneficial 
impact of public investment on growth is diminished in a more freedom environment. 
Infrastructure projects usually involve in clearing the ground, collecting land or 
occupying coastal area for construction, removing prevailing physical and/or spiritual 
assets, which would trigger opposition from local people, environmental and cultural 
activists. Opposition can also originate from community’s evaluation on government 
projects when people are doubtful about the transparency and efficiency of the 
projects. In a nation governed by rule of law with strong property rights protection, 
government investment projects encounter more difficulties, sometimes needs to 
change the initial plan, delays for unexpected time or even reaches a dead end. The 
problem, however, becomes less severe in countries with low level of economic 
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freedom. Characterized by more political as well as economic power, governments in 
those countries usually have no problem in forcing people to obey their decisions. 
Neglected contract enforcement and restricted competition and movement of capital 
also contribute to the importance of government and public investment projects. My 
empirical results highlight the fact that how strongly public investment contributes to 
economic growth depends on whether a country is economically free less or more. At 
this point, this study challenges the traditional view that better institutional quality 
promotes the effectiveness of fiscal policy represented by Rajkumar and Swaroop 
(2008), Cavallo and Daude (2011), Morozumi and Veiga (2016).  
Finally, the determining role of economic freedom in public investment effectiveness 
depends on the level of economic development. I find neither impact of economic 
freedom on the effectiveness of public investment nor impact of public spending on 
long-term growth in the group of advanced economies. On the other hand, government 
capital expenditure appears to boost long-term growth in the developing world and 
that effect decelerates if a nation possesses a higher economic freedom index. This 
finding is plausible as in reality advanced economies share relatively homogenous 
macroeconomic and institutional factors while emerging countries do not. 
Furthermore, advanced economies have already possessed a high and stable level of 
economic freedom and, consequently, the room for improving or worsening their 
freedom level is limited. Therefore, the determining role of economic freedom in 
public investment effectiveness is much more explicit among emerging countries than 
among advanced economies. This finding obviously does not support the results from 
Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008), Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), Wu et al. (2010) who 
ascertain the positive impact of public investment on economic growth in developed 
countries.  
The empirical analysis on the nexus between government consumption, economic 
freedom and economic growth as shown in table 3.2 uncovers some interesting facts. 
First, as emphasized in Barro (1991, 1996) and Romero-Ávila and Strauch (2008) 
among many others, a bigger government size is detrimental to economic growth in 
the long run. Barro (1991) argues that government consumption does not directly 
affect private productivity but creates distortions from raising taxes or government-
spending programs. Different from his measure of government consumption, my 
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measure includes some items seemingly promoting economic prosperity such as 
education and health. My results still show a negative association between real 
government consumption and real per capita GDP growth, implying that increases in 
total government consumption expenditure are not a good idea for economic growth. 
Therefore, a caution should be paid to allocate government consumption expenditure 
among sub-items to foster economic growth rather than pushing up total expenditure. 
Secondly, the adverse impact of government consumption on growth is reduced 
significantly in a more economically free country. The impact can even become 
positive if a country reaches a certain level of freedom. This finding is consistent with 
the general conclusion of Afonso and Jalles (2011), Cavallo and Daude (2011) who 
ascertain that good institutions can mitigate negative effects of fiscal policy. Finally, 
as similar as the case of government investment, the determining role of economic 
freedom in government consumption is emphasized in emerging countries rather than 
in advanced economies. Those results call for a critical consideration on institutional 
reform in countries where the government wants to expand some expenditure 
programs but highly restricts market competition and does not secure enough property 
rights. Otherwise, governments in those countries should retain a relative small size, 
given the fact that economic institutions cannot be improved quickly, to soften 
distortions of government consumption expenditure on economic growth. 
The analysis with the decomposition of freedom index in table 3.3 gives some insights 
into the interrelationship between fiscal policy, institutions and economic growth. 
First, it draws attention to the importance of the rule of law in determining the 
significance of public investment. There exist some reasons to believe that it is the rule 
of law existing in an economically free society that constrains discretionary behavior 
of any government. When a nation is governed by rule of law rather than decisions of 
government officials or agencies, all the public spending decisions have to pass a 
transparent regulatory process. Any actions that violate the people’s property rights, 
even though the affected group is negligible in size, may receive strong opposition 
from the people and have to cease or be replaced. The empirical result supports this 
argument with the negative and significant interaction term between government 
investment and property rights. Moreover, in a rule-of-law country, government 
transparency though is crucial to ensure the avoidance of corruption and regulatory red 
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tape can somehow make government policy expose to comments and critics, and even 
delayed. As a result, even growth-enhancing projects become less effective. Slightly 
supporting this point, column 4 of panel A in table 3.3 produces a negative but 
insignificant coefficient for the interaction between government investment and 
government integrity.        
Secondly, regulatory efficiency, represented by business freedom, facilitates economic 
growth but reduce the positive impact of public investment. When individuals freely 
establish and run their own business without facing regulatory barriers, entrepreneurial 
activities can be conducted more efficiently and more profitable private investment 
projects are made. Business transactions, which are based on voluntary principles and 
profit maximization, induce resources to be allocated more efficiently and give little 
room for government policy to intervene in the economy without impeding overall 
market efficiency. Barriers from burdensome and redundant regulations, in contrast, 
bring difficulties to the private sector, increase their production cost and lower their 
profitability. In the circumstance of restricted business freedom, public investment 
becomes more efficient than the private sector. In other words, regulatory inefficiency 
tends to strengthen the substitution effect of public investment to private investment 
in promoting long-term growth. This argument is supported with the fact that the 
interaction between government investment and business freedom is negative and 
significant at 1% level (column 6 of panel A in table 3.3). The evidence on the role of 
business freedom is even stronger than the case of property rights. 
Thirdly, expansion of government purchases of goods and services is harmful to 
economic growth in the long run and cannot be eliminated by improvement of any 
single freedom aspect. This result raises a cautious consideration about the trade-off 
between business cycle smoothing effects versus sustainable economic growth impacts 
of expansionary fiscal policy. When a government goes beyond their basic functions 
of promoting favorable environment for the private sector, they become an unequal 
competitor of the private sector, crowd out private investment and threaten long-term 
growth. Constraints from any individual aspect of economic institutions do not help 
soften this negative effect as shown in panel B of table 3.3, all the interaction terms 
are insignificant. However, if all the aspects of economic freedom improve together, 
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which results in a greater aggregate economic freedom index, growth-eroding effects 
of government consumption can be mitigated as observed in table 3.2. 
Some cautious interpretations are drawn from the robustness checks. My hypothesis 
on the determining role of economic freedom in the effectiveness of government 
investment is strongly supported by both cross-section and panel data approach with 
OLS and fixed effects estimators but insignificant with the Arellano-Bond system 
GMM estimators. The robustness checks about the interrelationship between 
government consumption and economic freedom on affecting growth show a statistical 
significance in the cross section approach but inconclusive in the panel data 
regressions. I offer three justifications for these observations. First, the sample time 
span is quite short and the creating a panel of five-year averaged data may still suffers 
the business cycle property, which does not imply the same meaning about the 
relationship between fiscal policy, institutions and long-term economic growth as in 
the cross section approach. Second, the unclear results obtained with government 
consumption variables just reflect the controversial conclusion in the existing 
literature: some papers propose a negative effect of government spending on growth 
(Afonso & Furceri, 2010; Fölster & Henrekson, 2001; Grier & Tullock, 1989; Landau, 
1983; Romero-Ávila & Strauch, 2008), others give evidence on a positive relationship 
(Devarajan et al., 1996; Ram, 1986; Wu et al., 2010) whereas several authors warn 
about the non-robust results in that relationship (Levine & Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin 
et al., 2004) and also find some non-linear effect of government spending 
(Asimakopoulos & Karavias, 2016; Chen et al., 2017). Finally, these results may suffer 
reverse causality when accounting for the dynamic feature of economic growth as 
shown by the GMM estimators and therefore, require a more robust approach. 
Unfortunately, due to data limitation and recent development in the growth empirics, 
the methodology employed in this study is pretty standard and this potential 
endogeneity problem might be left for future research24. Nevertheless, most of the 
                                                 
24 I have conducted another method – the fixed effects panel threshold model proposed by Hansen 
(1999) – to examine whether the impact of fiscal policy on economic growth depends on the degree of 
economic freedom. I find a significant threshold effect of economic freedom in our growth regression. 
The result (not shown in this paper) also supports our hypothesis about the interrelationship between 
government spending and economic freedom on affecting growth. I prefer a linear approach with an 
interaction term in the growth regression due to its simplicity and straightforward interpretation as well 
as identification.        
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specification checks lend support to the hypothesis that how fiscal policy affects 
economic growth depends on how economically free a country enjoys.   
3.8. Conclusions and policy implications 
Does the growth impact of fiscal policy depend on economic institutions? The answer 
in this study is yes. I provide empirical evidence on the determining role of property 
rights protection and freedom to make choice in the impact of fiscal policy on long-
term economic growth by conducting an analysis on 72 countries over the period 1990 
through 2015. The economic freedom index is used as a measure of economic 
institutions while government investment and government consumption are used as 
measures of fiscal policy. I split my sample into emerging countries and advanced 
economies to examine whether the interrelationship between institutions and fiscal 
policy in affecting growth depends on the level of economic development. Different 
aspects of economic freedom are also taken into account in the analysis. Finally, I run 
a bundle of robustness checks with both cross section and panel data approach to 
account for possible endogeneity problem, unobserved heterogeneity across countries 
and dynamic property of economic growth.  
My empirical results document that public investment in infrastructure is beneficial to 
long-term growth but this effect is weaker at the higher degree of economic freedom. 
This finding coincides with situations happening around the world where more 
economically free countries usually spend more time on discussing and passing any 
public investment plan or face more opposition from their people to implement 
investment projects, which results in lower economic growth effect of the investment. 
My analysis also shows that the determining role of economic freedom in the growth 
impact of public investment depends on the level of economic development. Economic 
freedom plays more important role among emerging countries than among advanced 
economies.  
Considering another type of government spending, this study reveals that public 
consumption is not really good to growth but its adverse impacts are mitigated if 
countries enjoy greater economic freedom. Furthermore, at some high degree of 
freedom, public consumption becomes beneficial to growth. This finding is 
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understandable when government purchase decisions have to be appraised carefully 
before being implemented in high economically free countries and in consequence 
perhaps only productive consumption expenditures are usually carried out. Similar to 
the case of public investment, the determining role of economic freedom in emerging 
countries is more obvious than in advanced economies.             
Taking into account components of economic freedom, the empirical results 
emphasize the importance of property rights and business freedom in the growth 
impact of public investment. In countries where exist stronger property rights 
protection and individuals are free to conduct their own business, government 
investment become less effective in promoting economic growth. However, I find no 
evidence on the determining role of a single dimension of freedom in the effectiveness 
of public consumption.  
In general, the findings imply that both fiscal policy and economic freedom are 
significant determinants of growth. Economic freedom can lead to greater growth by 
providing more favorable environment for private sector to innovate and manufacture. 
The impacts of fiscal policy depend on type of fiscal instrument used. While 
government investment in physical assets is good to long-term growth, government 
purchase of goods and services is generally not. A more detailed analysis on 
components of public consumption is necessary to understand the whole story but out 
of the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it brings a caution to governments that total 
effects of fiscal policy, especially public investment, depend on the institutional setting 
of a country. While economic institutions are decided by political institutions 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008), these results encourage a more 
active approach of governments with limited resources for infrastructure investment 
to improve their economic institutions for a long-term prosperity.    
It is plausible to argue that governments can boost economic growth by increasing 
investment in physical assets or improving institutional quality such as achievement 
of the rule of law, higher regulatory efficiency and market openness. While 
institutional reforms may be difficult and take much time to be implemented, increases 
in government capital expenditure can facilitate private sector production and result in 
greater output. However, the significant and negative coefficient on the interaction 
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between economic freedom and public investment implies that governments in lower 
economically free countries can achieve better growth rate by raising public 
investment. Furthermore, emerging countries may achieve a greater growth rate to 
catch up advanced economies when their government puts more resources on 
infrastructure.  
The empirical results also imply that increase in total government consumption is not 
a good idea to achieve long-term growth and an attention to the distribution of 
government expenditure among sub-items should be paid. Nevertheless, the growth-
eroding effects of government consumption can be mitigated by improvement of all 
aspects of economic freedom together. This result is more important to emerging 
countries than to advanced economies. Emerging countries usually attain lower 
economic freedom and, hence, have more room to improve their institutional quality 
so that the negative impact on growth of government consumption expenditure can be 
significantly reduced.   
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Tables and figures 
Table 3.1. Government investment, economic freedom, and economic growth 
 Univariate  Baseline   More Controls   Emerging Economies   Advanced Economies  
















 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
               
Public investment 0.210**   0.245*** 2.514**  0.245*** 3.158**  0.273*** 3.187**  0.0460 5.163 
 (2.092)   (3.763) (2.100)  (3.276) (2.342)  (4.529) (2.125)  (0.474) (0.481) 
Freedom  -0.0149  0.0404*** 0.0729***  0.0438*** 0.0825***  0.0531*** 0.0958***  0.0445** 0.0908 
  (-1.281)  (4.706) (3.534)  (3.862) (3.752)  (5.507) (3.840)  (2.143) (0.946) 
Public investment x Freedom     -0.558*   -0.719**   -0.722*   -1.196 
     (-1.914)   (-2.182)   (-1.939)   (-0.474) 
Income_1996    -0.00995*** -0.0104***  -0.00983*** -0.0105***  -0.00853*** -0.00948***  -0.00477* -0.00468* 
    (-6.788) (-7.275)  (-6.344) (-6.802)  (-4.625) (-5.526)  (-1.878) (-1.827) 
Initial investment    -0.00117 0.00572  0.00160 0.00826  0.00419 0.00907  0.0484* 0.0472 
    (-0.0593) (0.277)  (0.0758) (0.376)  (0.218) (0.440)  (1.739) (1.661) 
Initial schooling    0.00188 0.00160  0.00186 0.00153  0.00454** 0.00423**  0.000695 0.000466 
    (1.275) (1.073)  (1.269) (1.060)  (2.417) (2.188)  (0.669) (0.370) 
Population growth    -0.738*** -0.768***  -0.693*** -0.743***  -0.741*** -0.807***  -0.174 -0.110 
    (-5.687) (-5.788)  (-4.570) (-4.776)  (-4.339) (-4.731)  (-0.342) (-0.175) 
Openness        0.000851 0.00267  -0.0143** -0.0107*  0.00297* 0.00408 
       (0.341) (0.933)  (-2.514) (-1.801)  (1.851) (1.238) 
Inflation       0.0188 0.0197  -0.00237 -0.000828  0.353*** 0.319** 
       (1.008) (1.031)  (-0.178) (-0.0589)  (3.217) (2.249) 
Constant 0.0138*** 0.0850*  -0.0647* -0.194**  -0.0830 -0.236***  -0.124** -0.292***  -0.149 -0.348 
 (3.037) (1.740)  (-1.843) (-2.403)  (-1.655) (-2.682)  (-2.688) (-2.812)  (-1.518) (-0.876) 
               
Observations 72 72  69 69  69 69  41 41  28 28 
R-squared 0.159 0.028  0.554 0.579  0.567 0.603  0.657 0.695  0.589 0.598 
Note: Dependent variable is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita over the period 1996-2015. Independent variables including Public investment, Economic freedom, Population 
growth, Openness and Inflation also take average value from 1996 through 2015. Initial investment and Initial schooling take average value from 1990 through 1995 while Income_1996 is 




Table 3.2. Government consumption, economic freedom, and economic growth 
 Univariate   Baseline  More controls 
   No interaction Interaction Centered consumption 
& freedom 
 No interaction Interaction Centered consumption 
& freedom 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
A. Full sample 
Public consumption -0.100***  -0.0776*** -0.920 -0.0784***  -0.0716** -1.421* -0.0698*** 
 (-4.047)  (-3.058) (-1.179) (-3.086)  (-2.635) (-1.746) (-2.673) 
Freedom   0.0334*** 0.00555 0.0390***  0.0310** -0.0155 0.0382*** 
   (3.710) (0.202) (3.812)  (2.393) (-0.469) (2.852) 
Public consumption x Freedom    0.203 0.203   0.326* 0.326* 
    (1.089) (1.089)   (1.678) (1.678) 
          
Observations 72  69 69 69  69 69 69 
R-squared 0.145  0.422 0.432 0.432  0.433 0.456 0.456 
          
B. Emerging economies 
Public consumption       -0.0819** -2.829* -0.0795** 
       (-2.195) (-1.749) (-2.255) 
Freedom       0.0336** -0.0558 0.0430*** 
       (2.353) (-0.975) (3.096) 
Public consumption x Freedom        0.675* 0.675* 
        (1.702) (1.702) 
          
Observations       41 41 41 
R-squared       0.432 0.475 0.475 
          
C. Advanced economies 
Public consumption       0.0447 -0.923 0.0378 
       (1.462) (-0.402) (1.161) 
Freedom       0.0484** 0.00462 0.0481** 
       (2.578) (0.0443) (2.406) 
Public consumption x Freedom        0.225 0.225 
        (0.420) (0.420) 
          
Observations       28 28 28 
R-squared       0.608 0.614 0.614 
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Note: Dependent variable is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita over the period 1996-2015. In baseline models (column 2, 3, 4), control variables include Income_1996, 
Initial investment, Initial schooling and Population growth. Models with more controls (column 5, 6, 7) add Openness and Inflation together with controls in the baseline models. 
All variables take average value from 1996 through 2015, except Initial investment and Initial schooling which take average value from 1990 through 1995 and Income_1996 which 
is the value in 1996. None of the control variables is presented for brevity. Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.3. Government expenditure, economic growth, and components of freedom 
 Rule of law  Regulatory efficiency  Market openness 
 Property rights  Government integrity  Business freedom  Investment freedom 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
A. Government investment  
            
Public investment 0.247*** 0.963**  0.219*** 0.685  0.232*** 4.031***  0.256*** 0.838 
 (2.989) (2.251)  (3.036) (1.194)  (2.889) (3.730)  (3.172) (1.373) 
Freedom component 0.00848 0.0219**  0.0102* 0.0162  0.0240** 0.0659***  0.0101* 0.0197 
 (1.637) (2.090)  (1.816) (1.671)  (2.006) (3.744)  (1.934) (1.517) 
Public investment x Freedom  -0.195*   -0.130   -0.930***   -0.154 
  (-1.802)   (-0.852)   (-3.518)   (-1.016) 
            
Observations 69 69  69 69  69 69  69 69 
R-squared 0.510 0.539  0.514 0.521  0.516 0.585  0.518 0.530 
            
B. Government consumption 
            
Public consumption -0.0815*** -0.0822***  -0.101*** -0.103***  -0.0799*** -0.0817***  -0.0832*** -0.0845*** 
 (-2.844) (-2.779)  (-3.380) (-3.382)  (-2.914) (-2.953)  (-2.756) (-2.801) 
Freedom component 0.00436 0.00553  0.0150*** 0.0154***  0.0191 0.0234  0.00504 0.00788 
 (0.758) (0.986)  (2.778) (2.840)  (1.254) (1.536)  (0.912) (1.413) 
Public consumption x Freedom  0.0513   0.0315   0.176   0.101 
  (0.837)   (0.769)   (1.129)   (1.180) 
            
Observations 69 69  69 69  69 69  69 69 
R-squared 0.398 0.403  0.452 0.455  0.411 0.422  0.400 0.411 
            
Note: Dependent variable is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita over the period 1996-2015. In panel A and B, control variables are Income_1996, Initial investment, 
Initial schooling, Population growth, Openness and Inflation. In panel B, both Public consumption and Freedom components are centered at their mean and the interaction term is 
based on the centered data. All variables take average value from 1996 through 2015, except Initial investment and Initial schooling which take average value from 1990 through 
1995 and Income_1996 which is the value in 1996. None of the control variables is presented for brevity. Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4. Government expenditure, economic freedom, and economic growth; Robustness checks 
 Public investment  Public consumption 
 Core controls Fiscal variables Legal origin Geography  Core controls Fiscal variables Legal origin Geography 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Public spending  1.065** 1.058** 1.128*** 1.007**  -0.00317 0.0139 -0.0160 -0.00379 
 (2.517) (2.378) (2.920) (2.458)  (-0.181) (0.599) (-0.951) (-0.184) 
Freedom  0.00904** 0.00740* 0.00917** 0.00880**  0.00316 0.00228 0.00246 0.00341 
 (2.188) (1.947) (2.292) (2.116)  (1.327) (0.884) (0.926) (1.327) 
Public spending x Freedom  -0.152** -0.143* -0.166** -0.141**  0.0371** 0.0464** 0.0291* 0.0373** 
 (-2.236) (-1.953) (-2.661) (-2.085)  (2.165) (2.334) (1.915) (2.057) 
Income_1996 -0.00832*** -0.00632** -0.00825*** -0.00888***  -0.00921*** -0.00818*** -0.00868*** -0.00974*** 
 (-3.842) (-2.644) (-3.715) (-3.700)  (-3.589) (-3.191) (-3.083) (-3.314) 
Initial investment -0.00810 -0.0181 -0.0105 -0.0120  0.00517 0.00197 -0.00430 0.00464 
 (-0.338) (-0.754) (-0.415) (-0.484)  (0.189) (0.0736) (-0.153) (0.173) 
Primary enrollment  0.00768 0.0113 0.0109 0.00907  0.0140 0.0135 0.0168 0.0159 
 (0.969) (1.306) (1.237) (1.071)  (1.343) (1.233) (1.388) (1.321) 
Population growth -0.758*** -0.641*** -0.659*** -0.712***  -0.775*** -0.635*** -0.644*** -0.720*** 
 (-3.684) (-3.221) (-3.323) (-3.401)  (-3.466) (-3.043) (-3.136) (-3.195) 
Openness 0.00647* 0.00593 0.00772** 0.00689  0.00630 0.00591 0.00720* 0.00632 
 (1.718) (1.421) (2.033) (1.664)  (1.578) (1.418) (1.815) (1.423) 
Inflation 0.0114 0.0174 0.00812 0.0113  0.0108 0.0116 0.00490 0.0125 
 (0.634) (0.546) (0.424) (0.638)  (0.586) (0.309) (0.255) (0.660) 
Government debt   0.00177     -0.00752   
  (0.412)     (-1.509)   
Government revenue   -0.0267     -0.0278   
  (-1.156)     (-1.271)   
British legal origin   -0.000270     -0.00125  
   (-0.0633)     (-0.198)  
French legal origin   -0.00693*     -0.00778  
   (-1.947)     (-1.440)  
Tropical    -0.00303     -0.00304 
    (-0.794)     (-0.649) 
Area    0.000227     -0.000378 
    (0.282)     (-0.428) 
Constant 0.0320 0.0231 0.0299 0.0347  0.0923*** 0.0923*** 0.0888*** 0.0999*** 
 (1.321) (0.863) (1.303) (1.358)  (4.525) (4.193) (3.730) (3.773) 
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Observations 66 62 65 65  66 62 65 65 
R-squared 0.520 0.563 0.572 0.527  0.398 0.425 0.452 0.405 
Note: Dependent variable is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita over the period 1996-2015. Freedom is the economic freedom index from the Fraser Institute. Public 
spending (either Public investment or Public consumption), Freedom, Initial investment, Primary enrollment, and Government debt take average value from 1990 through 1995. 
Other control variables take average value from 1996 through 2015. In specifications with Public consumption, both Public consumption and Freedom are centered at their 
mean. Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.5. Government investment, economic freedom and economic growth; Panel data approach (5-year average) 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Arellano-Bond System-GMM 
 Baseline More 
controls 
 Baseline More controls with 
country effects 
More controls with 
country and time effects 
With lagged 
growth 
 Baseline More controls 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
           
Public investment 3.946** 3.070***  7.465** 5.783* 5.916* 9.203**  1.840 1.214 
 (1.814) (1.149)  (3.502) (2.976) (2.978) (3.652)  (2.469) (1.877) 
Freedom 0.0986** 0.0582***  0.128 0.0541 0.0521 0.00852  0.0151 -0.000615 
 (0.0383) (0.0192)  (0.0815) (0.0504) (0.0472) (0.0505)  (0.0400) (0.0329) 
Public investment x Freedom -0.916** -0.714**  -1.808** -1.399* -1.406* -2.243**  -0.431 -0.289 
 (0.438) (0.280)  (0.841) (0.718) (0.721) (0.875)  (0.594) (0.454) 
Initial income -0.0102*** -0.00853***  -0.0586*** -0.0472*** -0.0712*** -0.0277  -0.00600 -0.00770*** 
 (0.00154) (0.00157)  (0.0207) (0.0129) (0.0204) (0.0238)  (0.00460) (0.00263) 
Investment 0.106*** 0.115***  0.236*** 0.266*** 0.263*** 0.198***  0.164*** 0.177*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0261)  (0.0462) (0.0395) (0.0473) (0.0495)  (0.0481) (0.0442) 
Schooling 0.00112 0.000613  0.0107** 0.00491 -0.00313 -0.00103  -2.99e-05 0.000572 
 (0.00165) (0.00152)  (0.00508) (0.00337) (0.00372) (0.00389)  (0.00328) (0.00225) 
Population growth -0.773*** -0.800***  -1.875*** -1.566*** -1.068*** -1.251***  -1.105*** -0.967*** 
 (0.154) (0.154)  (0.486) (0.382) (0.372) (0.412)  (0.270) (0.192) 
Openness  0.00471**   0.0167* 0.0154* -2.30e-05   0.00546 
  (0.00206)   (0.00920) (0.00806) (0.00965)   (0.00383) 
Inflation  -0.00807*   -0.00776** -0.00613* -0.0136**   -0.0110* 
  (0.00456)   (0.00381) (0.00362) (0.00630)   (0.00607) 
Lagged growth       0.0579  0.124* 0.123** 
       (0.0829)  (0.0658) (0.0616) 
Constant -0.320** -0.168**  -0.0535 0.148 0.377* 0.215  -0.0134 0.0534 
 (0.148) (0.0786)  (0.228) (0.200) (0.217) (0.261)  (0.138) (0.124) 
           
Observations 262 262  262 262 262 210  210 210 
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R-squared 0.295 0.426  0.296 0.444 0.502 0.374    
Number of countries    70 70 70 70  70 70 
Country Fixed Effects    YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Time Fixed Effects    NO NO YES YES  NO YES 
AR-1 test         0.0318 0.0470 
OID test         0.204 0.182 
Note: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth rate. Freedom is the logarithm of economic freedom index from the Heritage Foundation. All the dependent and explanatory 
variables are averaged over each of 5-year intervals 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015, except Initial income which takes the value in the first year of each 
period. Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.6. Government consumption, economic freedom and economic growth; Panel data approach (5-year average) 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Arellano-Bond System-GMM 
 Baseline More controls  Baseline More controls with 
country effects 
More controls with 
country and time effects 
With lagged 
growth 
 Baseline More controls 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
           
Public consumption -0.0859*** -0.0726***  -0.256*** -0.271*** -0.237*** -0.301***  -0.0363 -0.0460 
 (0.0246) (0.0231)  (0.0804) (0.0620) (0.0617) (0.102)  (0.0419) (0.0453) 
Freedom  0.0501** 0.0189*  0.0198 -0.0334 -0.0322 -0.108***  0.0150 -0.00315 
 (0.0208) (0.0109)  (0.0491) (0.0271) (0.0270) (0.0305)  (0.0238) (0.0224) 
Public consumption x Freedom 0.455* 0.245  0.519 0.220 0.146 0.444  -0.164 -0.239 
 (0.252) (0.158)  (0.423) (0.349) (0.350) (0.626)  (0.269) (0.325) 
Initial income -0.00725*** -0.00602***  -0.0642*** -0.0521*** -0.0706*** -0.0417  -0.00753** -0.00697*** 
 (0.00169) (0.00174)  (0.0226) (0.0146) (0.0220) (0.0271)  (0.00339) (0.00214) 
Investment 0.175*** 0.166***  0.213*** 0.243*** 0.245*** 0.198***  0.160*** 0.187*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0255)  (0.0397) (0.0325) (0.0392) (0.0486)  (0.0550) (0.0441) 
Schooling -0.000228 -0.000442  0.0120** 0.00633* -0.000633 0.00200  -0.000205 0.000310 
 (0.00162) (0.00147)  (0.00537) (0.00361) (0.00352) (0.00384)  (0.00232) (0.00192) 
Population growth -0.901*** -0.880***  -1.689*** -1.435*** -1.043** -1.064**  -1.136*** -1.036*** 
 (0.170) (0.154)  (0.509) (0.425) (0.428) (0.474)  (0.256) (0.223) 
Openness  0.00452**   0.0142 0.0133 0.00374   0.00164 
  (0.00214)   (0.00930) (0.00868) (0.0132)   (0.00408) 
Inflation  -0.00799*   -0.00786* -0.00660* -0.0198***   -0.0124* 
  (0.00468)   (0.00396) (0.00388) (0.00572)   (0.00710) 
Lagged growth       0.0165  0.136** 0.121* 
       (0.117)  (0.0569) (0.0628) 
Constant 0.0588*** 0.0488***  0.521*** 0.416*** 0.590*** 0.354  0.0671** 0 
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 (0.0159) (0.0139)  (0.191) (0.120) (0.191) (0.244)  (0.0319) (0) 
           
Observations 262 262  262 262 262 210  210 210 
R-squared 0.298 0.422  0.338 0.484 0.522 0.362    
Number of countries    70 70 70 70  70 70 
Country FE    YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Time FE    NO NO YES YES  NO YES 
AR-1 test         0.0441 0.0594 
OID test         0.281 0.183 
Note: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth rate. Freedom is the logarithm of economic freedom index from the Heritage Foundation. All the dependent and explanatory variables 
are averaged over each of 5-year intervals 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015, except Initial income which takes the value in the first year of each period. Both 
Public consumption and Freedom are centered at their mean. Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.7. Government investment, economic freedom and economic growth; Panel data approach (3-year average) 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Arellano-Bond System-GMM 
 Baseline More 
controls 
 Baseline More controls with 
country effects 
More controls with 
country and time effects 
With lagged 
growth 
 Baseline More controls 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
           
Public investment 1.923*** 1.870***  2.775** 2.174** 2.656** 2.178**  1.422* 1.805* 
 (0.665) (0.694)  (1.186) (1.077) (1.007) (1.007)  (0.827) (0.945) 
Freedom 0.00173** 0.00161**  -0.000463 -0.00146 -0.000966 -0.00125  0.000932 0.00108 
 (0.000708) (0.000713)  (0.00144) (0.00127) (0.00116) (0.00111)  (0.000789) (0.000859) 
Public investment x Freedom -0.0264** -0.0257**  -0.0417** -0.0329* -0.0368** -0.0311*  -0.0190 -0.0286 
 (0.0112) (0.0119)  (0.0204) (0.0188) (0.0170) (0.0166)  (0.0133) (0.0176) 
Initial income -0.0210*** -0.0209***  -0.0923*** -0.103*** -0.0850*** -0.0985***  -0.0190*** -0.0158*** 
 (0.00296) (0.00300)  (0.0140) (0.0163) (0.0191) (0.0235)  (0.00354) (0.00345) 
Investment 0.199*** 0.191***  0.464*** 0.455*** 0.452*** 0.417***  0.222** 0.182 
 (0.0482) (0.0485)  (0.0697) (0.0717) (0.0698) (0.0694)  (0.109) (0.115) 
Schooling -3.56e-05 -3.36e-05  0.000172 0.000142 0.000158 0.000190  -0.000319 -3.66e-05 
 (0.000152) (0.000153)  (0.000238) (0.000252) (0.000253) (0.000261)  (0.000259) (0.000271) 
Population growth -1.878*** -1.903***  -3.128*** -2.835*** -2.751*** -2.785***  -1.745*** -1.468*** 
 (0.327) (0.328)  (0.579) (0.612) (0.649) (0.651)  (0.369) (0.439) 
Openness  0.00145   0.0259* 0.0206 0.0258   0.0143 
  (0.00789)   (0.0140) (0.0149) (0.0160)   (0.0128) 
Inflation  -0.0119   -0.0335 -0.0266 -0.0235   -0.0144 
  (0.0140)   (0.0214) (0.0203) (0.0151)   (0.0180) 
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Lagged growth       0.115*  0.156*** 0.244*** 
       (0.0641)  (0.0534) (0.0646) 
Constant 0.104** 0.112**  0.843*** 0.991*** 0.785*** 0.924***  0.155*** 0.0338 
 (0.0430) (0.0436)  (0.107) (0.132) (0.180) (0.220)  (0.0557) (0.0547) 
           
Observations 474 474  474 474 474 474  474 474 
R-squared 0.180 0.182  0.230 0.249 0.412 0.421    
Number of cid    70 70 70 70  70 70 
Country FE    YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Time FE    NO NO YES YES  NO YES 
AR-1 test         2.62e-05 0.000141 
OID test         1 1 
Note: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth rate. Freedom is the economic freedom index from the Heritage Foundation. Investment is real private investment to real GDP. All the 
dependent and explanatory variables are averaged over each of 3-year intervals 1992-1994, 1995-1997, 1998-2000, 2001-2003, 2004-2006, 2007-2009, 2010-2012, and 2013-2015, except 
Initial income which takes the value in the first year of each period. Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.8. Government consumption, economic freedom and economic growth; Panel data approach (3-year average) 
 Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Arellano-Bond System-GMM 
 Baseline More controls  Baseline More controls with 
country effects 
More controls with 
country and time effects 
With lagged 
growth 
 Baseline More controls 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
           
Public consumption -0.181*** -0.185***  -0.462** -0.478** -0.409** -0.366**  -0.127 -0.122 
 (0.0536) (0.0547)  (0.197) (0.192) (0.187) (0.183)  (0.0956) (0.114) 
Freedom  0.000226 7.46e-05  -0.00287** -0.00348*** -0.00326*** -0.00313***  -0.000176 -0.000318 
 (0.000418) (0.000413)  (0.00110) (0.00106) (0.00103) (0.000986)  (0.000504) (0.000397) 
Public consumption x Freedom 0.00391 0.00268  -0.00907 -0.0147 -0.0112 -0.0158  0.000933 0.00639 
 (0.00655) (0.00585)  (0.0173) (0.0157) (0.0162) (0.0149)  (0.00930) (0.0113) 
Initial income -0.0166*** -0.0164***  -0.0926*** -0.107*** -0.0976*** -0.116***  -0.0154*** -0.0124*** 
 (0.00326) (0.00325)  (0.0146) (0.0178) (0.0219) (0.0266)  (0.00411) (0.00390) 
Investment 0.211*** 0.193***  0.451*** 0.442*** 0.439*** 0.398***  0.250*** 0.210** 
 (0.0490) (0.0501)  (0.0716) (0.0722) (0.0692) (0.0688)  (0.0886) (0.103) 
Schooling 3.81e-05 3.62e-05  0.000350 0.000288 0.000296 0.000273  -0.000244 4.21e-05 
 (0.000149) (0.000151)  (0.000261) (0.000263) (0.000299) (0.000295)  (0.000269) (0.000219) 
Population growth -1.950*** -1.988***  -3.394*** -3.095*** -2.822*** -2.917***  -1.777*** -1.647*** 
 (0.314) (0.315)  (0.659) (0.677) (0.659) (0.676)  (0.340) (0.343) 
Openness  0.00332   0.0302** 0.0220 0.0275*   0.00810 
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  (0.00716)   (0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0142)   (0.0110) 
Inflation  -0.0201   -0.0396* -0.0353* -0.0299**   -0.0118 
  (0.0133)   (0.0202) (0.0186) (0.0133)   (0.0190) 
Lagged growth       0.148**  0.178*** 0.272*** 
       (0.0579)  (0.0510) (0.0565) 
Constant 0.177*** 0.178***  0.810*** 0.921*** 0.839*** 0.999***  0.179*** 0.116*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0325)  (0.125) (0.152) (0.198) (0.238)  (0.0375) (0.0361) 
           
Observations 474 474  474 474 474 474  474 474 
R-squared 0.156 0.162  0.230 0.257 0.405 0.421    
Number of cid    70 70 70 70  70 70 
Country FE    YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Time FE    NO NO YES YES  NO YES 
AR-1 test         2.53e-05 5.65e-05 
OID test         1 1 
Note: Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth rate. Freedom is the freedom index from the Heritage Foundation. Investment is real private investment to real GDP. All the 
dependent and explanatory variables are averaged over each of 3-year intervals 1992-1994, 1995-1997, 1998-2000, 2001-2003, 2004-2006, 2007-2009, 2010-2012, and 2013-2015, except 
Initial income which takes the value in the first year of each period. Both Public consumption and Freedom are centered at their mean. Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
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Appendix 3.1. Countries in the sample 
Country ISO 
code 






investment to GDP 
(1996-2015, percentage) 
Government 
consumption to GDP 
(1996-2015, percentage) 
benin BEN Emerging 1.36 57.0 4.48 14.29 
bangladesh BGD Emerging 3.89 50.5 4.97 4.88 
bulgaria BGR Emerging 3.50 58.4 3.15 17.90 
brazil BRA Emerging 1.41 57.8 2.13 19.80 
botswana BWA Emerging 2.73 67.4 11.05 22.89 
chile CHL Emerging 3.08 76.9 2.02 11.80 
china CHN Emerging 8.33 52.7 17.56 12.54 
colombia COL Emerging 2.15 64.9 4.84 16.35 
ecuador ECU Emerging 1.66 54.1 6.41 12.64 
egypt EGY Emerging 2.36 55.4 1.79 12.61 
hungary HUN Emerging 2.44 63.9 3.23 22.02 
indonesia IDN Emerging 2.72 56.2 3.32 8.11 
india IND Emerging 5.19 52.2 5.69 11.36 
iran IRN Emerging 1.93 41.0 9.18 14.23 
jordan JOR Emerging 1.04 66.5 3.91 21.85 
kazakhstan KAZ Emerging 5.22 56.5 1.92 11.85 
kenya KEN Emerging 1.26 58.1 2.73 14.69 
srilanka LKA Emerging 4.49 60.8 3.02 7.71 
morocco MAR Emerging 3.11 59.2 3.51 18.36 
mexico MEX Emerging 1.37 63.9 4.59 11.82 
macedonia MKD Emerging 2.56 62.7 4.72 20.77 
mali MLI Emerging 1.91 57.0 3.91 15.26 
mauritius MUS Emerging 3.79 71.1 6.65 14.38 
malaysia MYS Emerging 2.69 65.0 9.77 11.74 
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namibia NAM Emerging 2.60 62.9 7.14 25.09 
nigeria NGA Emerging 3.62 52.9 2.53 4.59 
pakistan PAK Emerging 1.68 55.5 2.27 9.25 
panama PAN Emerging 4.04 67.1 3.09 12.95 
peru PER Emerging 3.18 65.7 3.10 10.84 
philippines PHL Emerging 2.76 59.1 2.59 10.37 
poland POL Emerging 4.03 61.6 3.62 19.21 
romania ROU Emerging 3.33 57.0 4.72 18.67 
russia RUS Emerging 3.16 51.2 2.19 21.94 
senegal SEN Emerging 1.32 57.5 4.54 15.33 
togo TGO Emerging 0.59 48.1 2.96 11.82 
thailand THA Emerging 2.43 65.2 6.78 14.46 
trinidadtobago TTO Emerging 4.44 68.9 11.75 14.01 
tunisia TUN Emerging 2.81 59.5 6.05 15.00 
turkey TUR Emerging 3.21 59.4 3.54 13.93 
tanzania TZA Emerging 3.00 57.7 4.02 14.95 
uganda UGA Emerging 2.99 62.5 5.00 11.00 
ukraine UKR Emerging 1.94 48.0 1.44 21.99 
venezuela VEN Emerging 0.79 46.4 7.66 9.61 
southafrica ZAF Emerging 1.52 63.5 2.79 19.28 
australia AUS Advanced 1.83 79.4 2.45 17.97 
austria AUT Advanced 1.34 69.3 3.06 20.02 
belgium BEL Advanced 1.22 68.2 2.70 23.71 
canada CAN Advanced 1.44 75.7 3.64 20.66 
switzerland CHE Advanced 1.04 79.3 3.57 11.35 
cyprus CYP Advanced 0.69 70.4 4.46 17.15 
czechrepublic CZE Advanced 2.29 68.8 3.95 21.59 
germany DEU Advanced 1.32 69.8 2.11 18.67 
denmark DNK Advanced 1.00 73.6 3.93 25.54 
spain ESP Advanced 1.26 67.1 4.16 18.02 
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finland FIN Advanced 1.73 70.9 4.47 24.33 
france FRA Advanced 1.00 61.4 4.25 23.50 
unitedkingdom GBR Advanced 1.49 77.1 2.59 20.52 
greece GRC Advanced 0.63 59.3 4.30 21.16 
hongkong HKG Advanced 2.51 89.5 4.99 9.81 
ireland IRL Advanced 4.07 78.2 4.00 18.64 
iceland ISL Advanced 2.09 73.1 3.84 24.13 
italy ITA Advanced 0.16 61.8 3.38 19.73 
japan JPN Advanced 0.77 70.8 6.14 18.69 
korea KOR Advanced 3.62 69.6 5.66 14.13 
luxembourg LUX Advanced 1.89 75.4 7.82 16.83 
netherlands NLD Advanced 1.44 73.5 4.02 23.99 
norway NOR Advanced 1.20 68.3 3.82 20.40 
newzealand NZL Advanced 1.50 81.1 4.40 18.43 
portugal PRT Advanced 0.97 64.3 4.41 20.00 
singapore SGP Advanced 2.94 87.7 6.74 10.17 
sweden SWE Advanced 1.90 69.1 4.18 26.66 
unitedstates USA Advanced 1.45 77.9 4.04 16.28 
Appendix 3.2. Variable description 
Variable name Description Source 
Growth Growth rate of real GDP per capita (difference in logarithm of real GDP per capita between  2015 and 1996) WDI 
Public investment Real government investment to real GDP (average over 1996-2015) ICSD  
Public consumption Real government consumption to real GDP (average over 1996-2015) WDI 
Freedom Logarithm of economic freedom index (average over 1996-2015) HF, FI 
Income_1996 Logarithm of real GDP per capita in 1996 WDI 
Initial investment Real investment to real GDP (average over 1990-1995) WDI 
Initial schooling Years of schooling for male aged 25 and over (average over 1990-1995) BL 
Population growth Annual change in population (average over 1996-2015) WDI 
Openness Real exports plus imports to real GDP (average over 1996-2015) WDI 
Inflation  Annual change in GDP deflator (average over 1996-2015) WDI 
Property rights Logarithm of property rights index (average over 1996-2015) HF 
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Government integrity Logarithm of government integrity index (average over 1996-2015) HF 
Business freedom Logarithm of business freedom index (average over 1996-2015) HF 
Investment freedom Logarithm of investment freedom index (average over 1996-2015) HF 
Primary enrollment The ratio of total enrollment at primary level to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to 
that level (average over 1996-2015) 
WDI 
Government debt Public debt to GDP (average over 1990-1995) HPDD 
Government revenue Total government revenue to GDP (average over 1996-2015) WDI 
British legal origin Dummy equal to 1 if country has British legal origin, 0 otherwise   ES 
French legal origin Dummy equal to 1 if country has French legal origin, 0 otherwise   ES 
Tropical  Dummy equal to 1 if country is in tropical area, 0 otherwise   ES 
Area Logarithm of country area ES 
Note: 
WDI: World Development Indicators (WB) 
ICSD: Investment and Capital Stock database (IMF) 
HF: Heritage Foundation 
FI: Fraser Institute 
BL: Barro-Lee dataset  
HPDD: Historical Public Debt Database (IMF) 
ES: Easterly and Sewadeh (2001) 
Appendix 3.3. Summary statistics of main variables 
 Full sample  Emerging economies  Advanced economies 
VARIABLES Obs Mean S.Dev Min  Max   Obs Mean  S.Dev  Obs Mean  S.Dev 
              
Growth 72 0.0234 0.0136 0.00162 0.0833  44 0.0281 0.0141  28 0.0160 0.00869 
Public investment 72 0.0458 0.0258 0.0144 0.176  44 0.0483 0.0313  28 0.0418 0.0124 
Public consumption 72 0.165 0.0515 0.0459 0.267  44 0.146 0.0482  28 0.194 0.0432 
Freedom 72 4.151 0.152 3.710 4.494  44 4.070 0.122  28 4.279 0.0984 
Income_1996 72 8.835 1.485 5.941 11.22  44 7.844 0.972  28 10.39 0.417 
Investment 71 0.210 0.0696 0.0962 0.466  43 0.203 0.0781  28 0.220 0.0538 
Schooling 70 3.060 1.498 0.291 6.706  42 2.265 1.195  28 4.253 1.053 
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Population growth 72 0.0115 0.00962 -0.00790 0.0347  44 0.0141 0.0108  28 0.00742 0.00536 
Openness 72 0.842 0.618 0.192 3.541  44 0.713 0.343  28 1.045 0.865 
Inflation 72 0.0686 0.0902 -0.00657 0.584  44 0.0997 0.104  28 0.0196 0.0105 
Note: Sample averages using data from 1996 to 2015, except Investment and Schooling using average of period 1990 – 1995, Income_1996 using data in 1996. 
Variables are in decimal, unless otherwise specified. 
   





Freedom Income_1996 Investment Schooling Population 
growth 
Openness Inflation 
Growth 1          
Public investment 0.399 1         
Public consumption -0.381 -0.103 1        
Freedom -0.167 -0.0638 0.280 1       
Income_1996 -0.399 -0.0489 0.519 0.681 1      
Investment 0.138 0.154 0.0171 0.106 0.0744 1     
Schooling -0.187 -0.230 0.404 0.466 0.723 0.230 1    
Population growth -0.0716 0.0490 -0.440 -0.151 -0.520 -0.147 -0.553 1   
Openness 0.0325 0.180 -0.00260 0.469 0.285 0.201 0.149 0.0245 1  
Inflation 0.186 -0.0754 -0.150 -0.495 -0.263 -0.179 -0.129 -0.140 -0.175 1 






CHAPTER 4. GOVERNMENT SPENDING MULTIPLIERS: 
ANOTHER LOOK FROM INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
4.1. Introduction 
Since the aftermath of the global financial crisis 2008-2009 the role of fiscal policy in 
dampening negative effects of business cycles has been impressively highlighted. 
Tremendous fiscal stimulus packages have been embraced by many countries as short-
term interest rates have approached to zero or very low value and cannot be reduced 
further to stimulate the economy. The renewed interest in the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy has triggered a growing literature on fiscal multiplier, a ratio of a change in 
output to an exogenous change in a fiscal instrument. Despite a great number of 
studies, no consensus has been reached on the size or determinants of fiscal multipliers 
(Batini, Eyraud, Forni, et al., 2014; Caldara & Kamps, 2017; Hebous, 2011; Leeper et 
al., 2017). Fiscal multipliers might be best described as “a function of country 
characteristics and the state of the economy, in addition to the type of fiscal instrument 
used” (Brinca et al., 2016, p. 53). 
Much public and academic discussion of the effectiveness of fiscal policy has been 
devoted to the role of macroeconomic characteristics in determining the size of fiscal 
multipliers but little connects the multipliers to the more fundamental factors such as 
institutions. In fact, institutions play an important role in any policy efficacy because 
they shape behavior of all agents in the society by determining transaction and 
production costs (North, 1991). Literature on the link between institutions and 
economic growth, as well as how institutions affect the way government policy is 
formed and implemented is enormous. It establishes that countries enjoy more 
favorably institutional quality such as property rights protection and government 
accountability also experience greater economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001; 
Aguirre, 2017; Bennett et al., 2017; Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Mauro, 1995). Meanwhile, 
there is evidence that political institutions impose constraints on actions of political 
elites and help reduce the volatility of fiscal policy or substantial budgetary imbalances 
(Acemoglu et al., 2003; Fatás & Mihov, 2003, 2013; Henisz, 2004; Keefer & Knack, 
2007; Poterba, 1994). In addition, Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002) 
construct a model to capture the relationship between electoral system (proportional 
103 
 
systems versus majoritarian system) and government spending types while Persson 
(2002) confirms that political institutions, more specifically electoral rules and 
political regimes, shape economic policy or affect the choice of fiscal instruments. 
Surprisingly, the existing literature has not much to say about the determining role of 
institutions in short-term impacts of fiscal policy, the fiscal multipliers25. 
Institutions can affect the output response of an increase in government spending 
through at least two mechanisms. The first mechanism can be called government 
spending efficiency where the effectiveness of any stimulus package depends on how 
less or more wasteful the package is. In other words, aggregate demand cannot grow 
as desired if money from stimulus packages goes to the pocket of some government 
officials or their relatives instead of being available for general consumers. Therefore, 
low corruption and more transparent government can help improve the policy efficacy. 
Batini, Eyraud, and Weber (2014) also point out that inefficient management of public 
spending and revenue is among salient factors decreasing the multipliers in emerging 
and low-income countries.  
Second, institutions can affect fiscal multipliers through an expectation channel. 
Absence of violence and political turbulence and presence of prudential commitment 
from the government in conducting economic policy and ensuring rule of law are 
supposed to bring less uncertainty about the future. It creates friendlier environment 
for firms to produce and households to work and consume. Given a rise in public 
provision in a politically and economically stable society, households are confident to 
make their consumption decision, entrepreneurial activities are encouraged; and 
consequently, output grows. In contrast, private saving tends to be high when private 
sector faces more uncertainty; as a result, that will leads to lower multipliers (Batini, 
Eyraud, & Weber, 2014). Mertens and Ravn (2014) also show that low confidence can 
lead to a lower spending multiplier when zero lower bound is binding while Bernardo, 
Caio, and Marcel (2016) emphasize the confidence channel of fiscal policy in their 
standard macroeconomic static model. As transaction costs, trust and certainty in a 
                                                 
25 The role of institutions in deciding the magnitude of fiscal multipliers is shortly mentioned in 
Spilimbergo et al. (2009) without a detailed discussion nor any empirical evidence.   
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society are crucially determined by its institutional characteristics, the effectiveness of 
fiscal stimulus also depends on institutional factors.  
Given the importance of institutions in affecting the environment where individuals, 
firms and governments interact, it is vital to analyze output response of fiscal stimuli 
in different institutional settings. The central question to be answer in this study is 
whether institutional factors can explain the variation in government expenditure 
multipliers across countries and which dimension of institutions does matter to that 
discrepancy. This study focuses on formal institutions rather than informal institutions 
due to data availability and because the former can be changed more rapidly than the 
later, and therefore it is more meaningful for policy implications26. It is worth noting 
that this study does not focus on quantitatively estimating fiscal multipliers for specific 
countries – the topic has been intensively explored in the literature. I rather attempt to 
apply a simple but plausible method to obtain the impact multipliers for each 
individual country and to provide evidence on the connection between institutional 
factors and the impact multiplier variation across countries.  
The empirical analysis in this chapter is based on a sample of 72 countries over the 
period from 1960 through 2015. I exploit both time series and cross sectional 
dimensions by estimating fiscal multipliers for each country and then relating the 
multipliers to countries’ institutional characteristics. Similarly to chapter 3, two 
instruments of fiscal policy, government consumption and government investment, are 
taken into account for better understanding about the effect of various government 
spending components. I also use different measures of economic institutions and 
political institutions to obtain robust results in estimating the relationship between 
fiscal multipliers and institutions.    
The contribution of this chapter to the literature on short-term effect of fiscal policy is 
twofold. First, the multipliers for a large sample of countries across different levels of 
development are estimated and analyzed. While literature on fiscal multipliers in 
                                                 
26 According to Van den Berg (2012, p. 505) formal institutions include rules, regulations, laws, and 
human behavior which may “be changed as fast as the political system, the bureaucracies that manage 
the political system, and the other interests that influence society’s social, political, and economic 
organizations are able to act. The informal institutions are the traditions, morals, norms, beliefs, 
accepted myths, mannerisms, and common social behaviors”.  
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developed countries is huge, little is known in case of emerging and developing 
countries (Batini, Eyraud, Forni, et al., 2014). This study can help shed more light on 
the untold story about the effectiveness of fiscal policy in the less developed world, 
complementing the work of Ilzetzki et al. (2013), Kraay (2012, 2014) and Shen, Yang, 
and Zanna (2018). Second, I extend the existing literature on determinants of fiscal 
multipliers by providing empirical evidence on the relationship between multipliers 
and institutional characteristics across countries. Although institutions are regarded as 
fundamental determinants of economic growth and have attracted numerous studies 
over the last two decades (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008; Fuchs-
Schündeln & Hassan, 2016; La Porta et al., 2008), there is little (or no) empirical 
evidence on its relationship with fiscal multipliers. Moreover, studies on fiscal policy 
and institutions do not explicitly distinguish economic from political institutions while 
each of them has different policy implications. To the best of my knowledge, this is 
the first empirical study connecting different types of institutions with fiscal 
multipliers using a large set of countries.    
The results are summarized as follows. First, I find significant and positive correlations 
between fiscal multipliers and measures of economic institutions. Countries with 
greater economic freedom, more efficiently regulatory system and less corruption have 
greater government expenditure multipliers. The relationship remains stable despite 
controlling for other determinants of multipliers established in the literature such as 
constraints on monetary policy, openness of the economy, and level of development. 
In contrast, there is weak evidence on the direct impact of political institutions on the 
multipliers. It can be inferred as a support to Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Fatás and 
Mihov (2013) who argue that political institutions do not affect economic performance 
directly but indirectly through its impacts on policymakers’ behavior. In general, this 
finding confirms the argument that the stimulation effect of government spending in 
short-term depends much on the quality of economic institutions that a country enjoys. 
Second, there is evidence that the role of institutions is not the same to different 
components of fiscal stimulus. Whereas the government consumption multipliers are 
strongly correlated with economic institutions throughout various specifications, the 
connection between government investment multipliers and institutions is less robust. 
In other words, institutional characteristics are confirmed to be significant factors 
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explaining the variations in short-term output response to consumption-based fiscal 
stimulus rather than to investment-based stimulus across countries. This finding 
complements the results in chapter 3 where I find the growth impact of public 
investment, rather than public consumption, depends on economic institutions (i.e. 
economic freedom).   
Extending the analysis to legal institutions, the result shows that government 
investment in countries with socialist and French legal origin is less effective to 
stimulate output in short-term than in the other countries. Government consumption in 
socialist-legal countries is also less effective than in countries with other legal origins. 
It reinforces the finding on significant and positive correlation between the multipliers 
and economic institutions because civil law countries, such as those coded with 
socialist and French legal origin, have been found to have weaker investor protection 
compared to common law countries (La Porta et al., 2008). In line with recent studies 
on fiscal multipliers around the world (Batini, Eyraud, Forni, et al., 2014; Ilzetzki et 
al., 2013) the estimated multipliers are higher in advanced economies than in emerging 
and developing countries. This seems plausible since advanced economies usually 
enjoy more favorable institutions which have been proved to be strongly positively 
correlated with the multipliers.          
This chapter is constructed as follows. Section 2 reviews some literature on the short-
term impact of government expenditure, the fiscal multiplier. Section 3 presents 
research questions and hypotheses. Section 4 explains the methodology, variables and 
data employed. The empirical relationship between institutions and the multiplier are 
examined in section 5. Robustness checks are conducted in section 6. Section 7 
concludes.  
4.2. Literature review on government spending multipliers  
4.2.1. Theoretical background on government spending multipliers 
Fiscal multipliers are a common measure used to evaluate the short-term effect of 
fiscal policy on the economy. Conceptually, it is defined as the ratio of a change in 
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output to an exogenous change in a fiscal instrument27. Depending on the type of 
instrument and its aggregate level, fiscal multipliers can be classified as government 
spending multiplier, tax multiplier, or expenditure/revenue sub-category multipliers 
such as defense-spending multiplier, education-spending multiplier, or income-tax 
multiplier. Based on time horizons, multipliers are usually distinguished among three 
types – impact multiplier, multiplier at a specific horizon, and cumulative multiplier. 
As my focus is government spending, the following representation for each type of 
multiplier is in terms of government expenditure28:  
3äãn2*	äåç*3ãç3dé = ∆è,∆',   (4.1) 
äåç*3ãç3dé	n*	ℎêé3ëê5	3 = ∆è,íì∆',   (4.2) 




  (4.3) 
where !" and ~" are level of output (or GDP) and government spending at time *, 
respectively. 
In equation (4.1) the impact multiplier indicates how much output level changes given 
an exogenous change in government spending in period *, e.g. a year or a quarter. The 
multiplier at horizon 3 in equation (4.2) measures the response of output at the 3 period 
after the change in government spending at time *, i.e. accounting for lagged effects 
of fiscal policy. The cumulative multiplier in equation (4.3) expresses the cumulative 
response of output over some horizon 5 with respect to the cumulative change in 
government spending over the same horizon and typically has greater magnitude than 
the other multipliers  (Spilimbergo et al., 2009). Notwithstanding the generally 
accepted definition, fiscal multipliers cannot be interpreted simply because it is a 
function of structural parameters and policy reaction parameters (Chinn, 2013).             
                                                 
27 Other definitions of multipliers are provided in the literature, e.g. the percentage increase in output 
resulted from an increase in government spending by one percent of GDP (Miyamoto, Nguyen, & 
Sergeyev, 2018; Nakamura & Steinsson, 2014). 
28 In fact, those representations can also be applied for government revenue, where I replace government 
spending (~) with government revenue (ò) or its sub-categories. 
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Different macroeconomic models can produce very different magnitudes on the fiscal 
multipliers. The prediction depends much on underlying assumptions impeded in each 
model, such as whether prices are flexible or not, whether consumers behave in a 
Ricardian or non-Ricardian manner, whether there is absence of nominal rigidities, 
nominal variables and imperfect competition (Hebous, 2011). In general, analyses 
based on the neoclassical models usually give multipliers less than one while those 
based on the new-Keynesian models provide multipliers typically greater than one 
(Woodford, 2011). I briefly review the prediction of four typical theories explaining 
the impact of fiscal policy on economic performance: classical, Keynesian, 
neoclassical or real business cycle (RBC), and new-Keynesian (NK). 
In the classical model where prices are fully flexible and markets are perfectly 
competitive, the economy operates at the natural level of output and unemployment 
and the supply curve is vertical (or inelastic to price levels). A rise in public spending 
can raise the aggregate demand by the same amount but has no effect on output. 
Because the increase in government spending is necessarily financed by a deficit or 
borrowing, that spending reduces national saving and raises interest rates. The higher 
interest rates make private investment less attractive and discourage private 
consumption. As a result, the crowding-out effects on the private sector of government 
purchase offset the increase in the demand for goods and services induced by the 
expansionary fiscal policy. Consequently, there is no role for fiscal policy to stimulate 
the economy in the classical model settings or fiscal multiplier is zero.  
In the Keynesian model illustrated by the IS-LM model in a closed economy and the 
Mundell-Fleming model in an open economy, expansionary fiscal policy has multiple 
effects on output. These models are based on a critical assumption that prices are sticky 
and there exists wasted resources in the short run due to non-timely adjusted prices. 
Considering a closed economy, a rise in government spending raises income and 
fosters private consumption because private consumption is a function of current 
disposable income. This effect exhibits a shift to the right of the IS curve. At a given 
money supply, the increase in output leads to higher money demand and pushes up 
interest rate. The LM curve remains unchanged but higher interest rate crowds out 
private investment and income falls accordingly. As a result, the total effect of the 
government spending expansion on output is the net between the positive effect 
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through private consumption (the marginal propensity to consume) and the crowding-
out effect on private investment (the sensitivity to changes in interest rate of private 
investment). 
Considering an open small economy with perfect capital mobility, the impact of fiscal 
policy on output depends much on the exchange rate system chosen by the country. 
An expansionary fiscal policy tends to raise the domestic interest rate but international 
capital inflow helps keep it at the world level. If the exchange rate is flexible, capital 
inflow causes domestic currency to appreciate, which in turn reduces net export 
because the increase in nominal exchange rate is associated with a rise in real exchange 
rate given prices are sticky. Therefore, fiscal policy becomes powerless because its 
expansionary effect on income is fully offset by the drop in net export. On the other 
hand, if the exchange rate is fixed, demand for domestic currency created by the capital 
inflow is offset by an increase in the money supply to hold the exchange rate fixed at 
the committed level, and finally raises output. Hence, government spending multiplier 
in the fixed exchange rate system is much higher than that in the flexible exchange rate 
system.  
Both the classical and Keynesian models make things simple without considering 
behavior of different (representative) agents in the economy. In contrast, the two 
competing classes of the state-of-the-art dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models – RBC models (or the neoclassical models plus a “shock”) and NK 
models – attempt to incorporate microeconomic foundations in a systemic framework 
to analyze interactions among agents in the economy and economic outcomes. They 
both rely on the assumption of forward-looking behavior and rational expectation and 
regard economic agents as optimizers in making decision, i.e. consumers maximize 
expected utility over their life subject to their budget constraint, firms maximize profits 
subject to available resources, and government behaves subject to its budget constraint. 
The main differences between these two models lie on the assumption of the degree of 
price flexibility and market competition. 
The standard RBC models take the underlying assumption of the neoclassical model 
in which prices are fully flexible and markets are perfectly competitive. When 
government unexpectedly and permanently increases current spending financed by 
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lump-sum taxation, forward-looking households face a negative wealth effect as they 
anticipate a substantial tax rise in the future, and therefore decrease their consumption 
and leisure. The increase in labor supply results in a lower real wage but a greater 
marginal product of capital which in turn stimulates investment and capital 
accumulation. Consequently, output grows in the short run and the fiscal multiplier 
possibly exceeds unity in the long run when the capital/labor ratio becomes constant, 
provided that the labor supply is highly elastic. If public spending expansion is 
temporary rather than persistent, lower private consumption accompanies with a fall 
in investment during the transition stage and the magnitude of the multiplier becomes 
low. In this case, the output rise due to the temporary increase in government spending 
is much less than the output drop due to the crowding out effect on consumption and 
investment (Baxter & King, 1993). In general, these models usually accompany with 
the “wealth effect” and predict that a temporary fiscal shock leads to a drop in private 
consumption and a rise in labor supply, which in turn raises output, employment and 
reduces real wage, but the multiplier is typically low. 
The size and sign of the multiplier may vary across financing methods in the RBC 
models. The Ricardian Equivalence theorem (Barro, 1974) implies that impact of 
government spending on the economy is irrelevant to whether that spending is financed 
by a lump-sum tax or a debt. However, the impact becomes slightly different between 
a distortionary tax financing and a debt (or a lump-sum tax) financing. Government 
purchase financed by a distortionary tax normally produces a lower multiplier than the 
one financed by a lump-sum tax. An increase in marginal labor income tax rate implies 
a substitution effect in which consumers reduce both consumption and labor supply. 
A rise in tax on capital income also discourages private investment and results in a 
lower capital stock because it reduces the after-tax rate of return to capital. In either 
case, the net increase in output is less than the rise in government spending, or in other 
words, the multiplier is less than one or even negative (Baxter & King, 1993) for a 
temporary increase in government purchase. When a government spending stimulus is 
financed by debt, output rises initially because people supply more labor service under 
the wealth effect. Nevertheless, the debt has to be returned and necessarily leads to 
higher taxes in later years. Therefore, output increases in short term but eventually 
drops in long term because of the disincentives on the labor market (if the distortionary 
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labor tax rises in later years to reduce the debt burden). The multiplier can exceed unity 
in the short run but its discounted value over the long run becomes negative (Uhlig, 
2010).   
The NK models are built on the similar microeconomic foundations of the RBC 
models to analyze the economic impact of fiscal policy but take the assumption of 
price stickiness and imperfect competition. Accordingly, during economic expansions 
stimulated by government spending, prices remain unchanged while marginal cost 
increases, which in turn leads to a declining markup and allows wage to rise. As a 
result, labor supply increases offsetting the rise in labor demand in the expansions and 
output grows largely with the fiscal stimulus (Hall, 2009).  
In fact, the introduction of stickiness into the NK models makes nominal variables 
become important and creates the necessity of interaction between fiscal and monetary 
policy in generating the outcomes of fiscal policy (Linnemann & Schabert, 2003). 
Under alternative scenarios of monetary policy response to fiscal policy, the multiplier 
in the NK models can be either greater or lower than in the neoclassical (or RBC) 
models. More specifically, if the central bank remains the same path for the real 
interest rate regardless of the path of public spending, consumers will choose a 
constant consumption plan and the output increases one-to-one to a temporary rise in 
government purchase (the multiplier is equal to one). However, if the central bank 
follows a strict inflation target (say zero inflation), the NK models produce a similar 
result as the neoclassical models where the multiplier is smaller than one. In case the 
central bank chooses to accommodate the effect of fiscal expansion by following a 
Taylor rule where the real interest rate is allowed to increase in response to any rise in 
prices, the multiplier is greater than in the strict inflation target case but less than in 
the constant real interest rate policy case. In this scenario, the size of multiplier is the 
greater the higher degree of price stickiness (Woodford, 2011).  
The NK models also predict that the multiplier can achieve extremely high value under 
recessions or severe credit constraint situations. When households behave in the 
manner of hand-to-mouth or rule-of-thumb rather than Ricardian consumers, the 
expansionary effects of fiscal policy are reinforced because private consumption 
increases in proportion to any rise in employment and wage stimulated by additional 
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government purchase (Corsetti, Meier, & Müller, 2012; Galí, López‐Salido, & Vallés, 
2007). The multiplier may become well above unity if monetary policy faces a 
constraint of zero lower bound. Because monetary policy becomes ineffective under 
this liquidity trap, a temporary government spending raises expected inflation and 
lowers the real interest rate. The fall in real interest rate encourages private 
consumption and investment and produces an especially high value of the multiplier 
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, & Rebelo, 2011; Woodford, 2011).   
In general, different economic theories predict dissimilar behaviors of economic 
aggregates and fiscal multipliers. This diversity mainly comes from different 
underlying assumptions employed in each model. It may be inarguable to assert that 
stabilization policies have a neglected impact on the long-term economic development 
when output is at its natural rate and resources are fully utilized; however, the short-
term effect of fiscal policy is still controversial. Therefore, an explosive number of 
empirical research on estimating the size and determinants of fiscal multiplier has been 
carried out in the past few years to provide additional evidence on the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy in smoothing business cycle.    
4.2.2. Empirical evidence on government spending multipliers 
Empirical studies on the fiscal multipliers can be categorized based on (i) the 
estimation methods employed, (ii) the scope of the multipliers, and (iii) the economic 
conditions when fiscal policy is carried out. Regarding the estimation method, vector 
autoregressions (VAR) and DSGE simulations are the most popular approaches in the 
prevailing literature. However, other miscellaneous approaches are also offered in 
recent studies, e.g. dynamic panel data regression. In terms of the scope of the 
multipliers, a large number of research focuses on the multipliers at the national (or 
federal) level with a special attention paid to the U.S; nevertheless, more recent studies 
estimate the multipliers at the local level as well as at the cross-country level. 
Regarding the economic environment, empirical research basically distinguishes the 
multipliers in normal times versus in depressed times, with or without accommodative 
monetary policy, in an open or a closed economy, and with a fixed or a flexible 
exchange rate system. Ramey (2011a) among a few authors provides an excellent 
review on this literature. 
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Within the VAR framework, perhaps the most challenging issue to estimating the 
fiscal multiplier is how to identify exogenous fiscal policy shocks. Traditional 
approach is to set a restriction that government spending and revenue are not 
contemporaneously affected by variations in the macro-economic environment. In 
their classic paper, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) use institutional information to 
identify the automatic response and the discretionary response of the U.S. fiscal policy 
to economic activity. The authors assume that government spending and tax revenue 
are predetermined variables, meaning that it takes more than a quarter for 
policymakers to respond discretionarily to unexpected movements in the economy. 
Their structural VAR model results in a rise in output, with the multiplier close to one, 
for either a positive shock to government spending or a negative shock to taxes. Their 
findings also present a contradiction between two macro-economic theories: private 
consumption rises as predicted by the Keynesian model but private investment falls as 
expected in the neoclassical model, given an expansionary fiscal policy.  
The identification strategy based on structural assumptions about the dynamics of 
fiscal policy and output is widely utilized in other studies. Miyamoto et al. (2018) 
estimate the spending multiplier for Japan using the period 1980Q1 – 2014Q1 with the 
identification strategy as proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and find that the 
impact multiplier is 1.5 in the zero lower bound (ZLB) period and 0.6 in the normal 
time. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) also apply this strategy but employ a 
smooth transition VAR framework to estimate the output response to fiscal policy in 
the U.S. over the business cycle. Moreover, the authors employ a more precise measure 
of fiscal policy shocks with forecast information collected from professional agencies 
and discover a large differences in the multipliers between expansions and recessions. 
On the other hand, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) impose sign restrictions on 
macroeconomic variables in a VAR framework to identify fiscal policy shocks when 
estimating the impact of fiscal policy on the U.S. economy during the 1955-2000 
period and find similar results as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). The sign restriction 
method to estimate the spending multipliers is also utilized in Chian Koh (2016) but 
at a scope as broad as 120 countries.     
Another identification strategy in a VAR framework is pioneered by Romer and Romer 
(2010) who use a narrative approach to calculate a tax multiplier for the U.S. The main 
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idea in this approach is to isolate the exogenous changes in taxes by using the historical 
record (or events) on tax changes which is motivated by factors uncorrelated with the 
ones affecting the current or prospective state of the economy. The authors find that 
output declines by nearly 3 percent over three years given a 1-percent-of-GDP increase 
in tax. Ramey (2011b) also employs a narrative method with information on wars and 
military expenditure but comes up with a spending multiplier between 0.8 and 1.5 for 
the U.S.  
Arguing that both the narrative and structural VAR models are prone to suffering the 
endogeneity of fiscal policy and may not satisfactorily deal with the problem of limited 
number of observations, weak instruments, as well as the anticipation of forward-
looking agents about changes in fiscal policy, other regression approaches are 
employed in recent studies. Some authors use variation in fiscal policy across 
geographic regions to estimate the so-called local multipliers. For example, Nakamura 
and Steinsson (2014) utilize the panel data on military procurement across states and 
regions in the U.S. over the period 1966-2006 to estimate the fiscal multiplier in a 
monetary union with instruments based on the sensitivity of military spending at the 
region level to national military spending. Dupor and Guerrero (2017) construct a 
defense spending data set at the state level for the U.S. over a longer period, from 1951 
to 2014, and estimate both local multipliers and aggregate multipliers (remarkably, 
they use employment and personal income, not gross state product, as outcome 
variables). Acconcia, Corsetti, and Simonelli (2014) exploit the Italy law on 
mandatorily replacing local officials due to evidence of Mafia activity in a city council 
to construct instruments for local government investment and estimate the local 
multiplier for Italy of 1.5 or above. Markus and Anita (2014) employ a dynamic panel 
data model to estimate the local multiplier for 47 Japanese prefectures during the 1990s 
and also come up with a positive but not-greater-than-one multiplier for average local 
government spending.    
Another empirical approach to evaluate the output response to fiscal policy has 
becomes popular recently is DSGE simulations. Most of the studies in this approach 
rely on the NK model and calibration based on parameters estimated in (their own or) 
other empirical work. The estimated multipliers differ across studies due to different 
assumptions impeded in each model. For example, Christiano et al. (2011) employ the 
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DSGE model with price- and wage-setting frictions, habit formation, variable capital 
utilization, and investment adjustment costs to estimate the multiplier in the ZLB and 
find the impact multiplier can peak to 2.3 if the nominal interest rate is irresponsive to 
changes in government spending. Coenen et al. (2012) use seven DSGE models to 
investigate the effects of different fiscal policy actions, including rises in government 
spending, declines in taxes, and increases in transfers. They find that discretionary 
fiscal policy measures have positive effect on output in the short run and that effect 
increases considerably if the monetary policy is more accommodative. Leeper et al. 
(2017) use Bayesian prior and posterior analyses with alternative monetary-fiscal 
regimes and produce an impact multiplier of around 1.3 across regimes. Fève, 
Matheron, and Sahuc (2013) account for the possibility of being “Edgeworth 
complements” of private consumption and government spending in the utility function 
and gain the spending multiplier of greater than unity.   
Generally, empirical studies on advanced economies whose data availability is rich 
produce various estimates on government spending multipliers. It may be either 
between zero and one (Barro & Redlick, 2011; Blanchard & Perotti, 2002; Mountford 
& Uhlig, 2009) or well above unity (Caldara & Kamps, 2017; Christiano et al., 2011; 
Miyamoto et al., 2018; Romer & Romer, 2010). Some recent studies on emerging and 
developing countries, in contrast, find typically lower multipliers than in developed 
countries (Chian Koh, 2016; Ilzetzki et al., 2013). According to Kraay (2012, 2014) 
who uses a database on international loans to construct an instrument for government 
spending, one-year government spending multiplier in low-income and developing 
countries is only around 0.4 or 0.5.   
Despite the controversial results in the size of multipliers, it seems to have a consensus 
that macroeconomic conditions are important determinants of the multiplier 
magnitude. Fiscal multipliers behave differently across states of the economy. 
Numerous studies find that government spending multipliers become large when the 
economy in depressed time or faces a liquidity trap at which the monetary policy 
appears ineffective under zero lower bound (Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2012; 
Caggiano, Castelnuovo, Colombo, & Nodari, 2015; Canzoneri, Collard, Dellas, & 
Diba, 2016; Christiano et al., 2011; Coenen et al., 2012; DeLong & Summers, 2012; 
Miyamoto et al., 2018).  
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Responses of output to government spending shocks are also found to be nonlinear to 
fiscal position or fiscal sustainability. Using an interacted panel VAR for 17 European 
countries from 1970 to 2010, Nickel and Tudyka (2014) conclude that the 
effectiveness of government spending stimulus on output declines as the public 
debt/GDP ratio increases. Ilzetzki et al. (2013) even present zero or negative spending 
multipliers in high-debt countries using a quarterly dataset of 20 high-income and 24 
developing countries. Chian Koh (2016) employs a large data set of 120 countries and 
finds that fiscal multipliers are large when public debt is low. 
Degree of trade openness and the exchange rate system are also important to the 
effectiveness of government spending. Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find that closed economies 
(those with low ratio of total exports and imports to GDP, say less than 60% of GDP) 
have higher fiscal multipliers than open economies. They also support the prediction 
of the Mundell-Fleming model with the evidence that fiscal policy appears ineffective 
in countries under flexible exchange rate regimes. The estimation from Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2014), who regard regions and states of the U.S. as a monetary union (or a 
fixed exchange rate system), confirms this finding with a relative multiplier of 
approximately 1.5. Another factor which is also important to explain fiscal multiplier 
variations across countries is wealth inequality. Brinca et al. (2016) contend that fiscal 
multipliers are highly sensitive to the fraction of the population who face binding credit 
constraints and also to the average wealth level in the economy. 
4.2.3. Fiscal multipliers and institutions 
Obviously, both theoretical and empirical studies about the effectiveness or short-term 
impact of fiscal policy have been devoted to the role of macroeconomic characteristics 
in determining the size of fiscal multipliers. However, there still lacks a connection 
between the multipliers with the more fundamental factors such as institutions.  
In fact, institutions play an important role in any policy efficacy because they shape 
behavior of all agents in the society by determining transaction and production costs 
(North, 1991) and how the policy is made (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Cuberes & 
Mountford, 2012; Fatás & Mihov, 2003, 2013; Keefer & Knack, 2007; Poterba, 1994). 
Batini, Eyraud, and Weber (2014) also point out that low institutional quality such as 
inefficient management of fiscal policy is among salient factors determining the lower 
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multipliers in emerging and low-income countries. Spilimbergo et al. (2009) assert the 
important role of institutional features in influencing the multiplier size though without 
presenting empirical evidence. Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2010) provide an analysis 
on the government investment multiplier in a neoclassical growth model and 
emphasize the importance of implementation delays in determining the 
macroeconomic effects of public investment spending. Although the authors do not 
explicitly discuss the role of institutional factors, they reason that a long and 
complicated process of planning, bidding, contracting, construction, and evaluation 
that government investment projects have to go through can make government 
investment contractionary in short-term. Obviously, that long-lasting process in 
making and implementing decision illustrates institutional characteristics of a country.   
As we can see, despite the importance of institutions in the effectiveness of fiscal 
stimulus, the prevailing literature is limited to discussion of theoretical relationship 
between institutions and fiscal multipliers without providing adequate empirical 
evidence. Therefore, it is crucial to discover empirically the role of institutions in 
determining fiscal multipliers, which is the primary purpose and contribution of the 
present study. 
4.3. Research questions and hypotheses 
This chapter attempts to shed light on whether institutions and which institutional 
dimensions are important determinants of fiscal multipliers across countries. More 
specifically, I seek the answers to the following research questions.  
(1). How do output responses of fiscal stimulus through government 
spending differ across countries? 
(2). Which dimensions of institutions are important to explain variation in 
short-term impact of fiscal stimulus across countries? 
(3). Do institutions play the same role in determining the output response 
of different types of fiscal stimulus?  
The main hypotheses to be tested in this chapter are as follows.   
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Hypothesis 4.1. Countries with favorable economic institutions also have greater 
government spending multipliers.  
It is plausible to believe that the effectiveness of any stimulus package depends on how 
less or more wasteful the package is. In other words, aggregate demand cannot grow 
as desired if money from the stimulus packages goes to the pocket of government 
officials or their relatives instead of being used for final consumption to satisfy 
individual and collective needs of the population. Therefore, low corruption and more 
transparent government can help improve the policy efficacy. Furthermore, in the 
economy with a strong protection of property rights as well as effective enforcement 
of contracts, people feel less uncertain about their assets and the fruits of their labor. 
Given any public provision to stimulate the economy, households are confident to 
make their consumption decision, entrepreneurial activities are encouraged, and 
consequently, output grows more strongly. 
Hypothesis 4.2. Political institutions do not directly affect the short-term impact of 
government spending multipliers across countries.  
According to Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), political 
institutions determine the distribution of political power and the choice of economic 
institutions.  Economic institutions in turn determine economic performance and 
resource distribution in the society. In other words, political institutions do not directly 
affect the economic outcome of government policies but indirectly through their 
impact on how policies are made. In the context of government spending stimulus and 
its output response, we should find insignificant effect of political institutions but 
significant effect of economic institutions on fiscal multipliers.     
Hypothesis 4.3. Institutions are more important to the short-term impact of 
government consumption spending than government investment spending.  
Generally, public investment has long-term rather than short-term impacts on the 
economy because investment projects in infrastructure such roads, airports, seaports, 
and telecommunications need time to complete and benefit the private sector and the 
society as a whole. On the contrary, consumption-based fiscal stimulus is assumed be 
more effective than the investment-based in the short run because it is relating to the 
purchase of goods and services for current use, and consequently, has immediate effect 
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on aggregate demand. Therefore, the impact of institutions, if any, on government 
spending multipliers should be more pronounced in the case of government 
consumption than government investment.  
4.4. Methodology 
4.4.1. Empirical strategy 
To uncover the link between institutions and the effectiveness of fiscal policy in the 
short run, I exploit the cross-country variations in the impact multipliers by regressing 
the country-specific government spending multiplier É on various measures of 
institutions as follows 
É} = 7= + 7D0} + Å′\ + Ñ} (4.4)  
where 0 denotes institutional factors, Å is a vector of control variables (including per 
capita income level, trade openness, inflation, and the government size), 7= is a 
constant term, \ is the corresponding coefficient of control variables, Ñ is the error 
term, and 3 indexes country. 
The inclusion of control variables in (4.4) are based on the following reasons. First, 
the same policy may result in different outcomes between the rich and the poor because 
they have different preferences and financial constraints. In fact, Brinca et al. (2016) 
find a strong correlation between average wealth level, credit constraints and fiscal 
multipliers in OECD economies. On the other hand, income level and institutions 
might correlate each other because favorable institutions can lead to the prosperity of 
a country or, in the other way around, rich countries may choose institutions different 
from poor countries. The inclusion of per capital income aims to capture this possible 
correlation when estimating the impact of institutions on fiscal multipliers.  
Second, Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find that closed economies have higher fiscal multipliers 
than open economies do. A vast literature also emphasizes the role of monetary policy 
in deciding the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus (Christiano et al., 2011; Coenen et al., 
2012; DeLong & Summers, 2012; Leeper et al., 2017; Miyamoto et al., 2018; 
Woodford, 2011). Because institutions are rules and constraints that shape behavior of 
all agents in the society and may determine how trade policy and monetary policy are 
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formed and conducted in a country, I control for the possible correlation between 
institutions and trade policy and monetary policy by including trade openness and 
inflation in (4.4).  
Finally, governments are assumed optimal when they maintain moderate size to carry 
out their basic functions of policing, enforcing law and protecting property rights. 
However, when governments become too big, they unfairly compete with the private 
sector in resource allocation and thus any increase in public spending may result in 
crowding-out rather than crowding-in effect. Given the fact that institutional 
characteristics may affect whether government can expand or reduce its size, I account 
for this possible correlation by including government size in estimating (4.4).  
I use the country-specific impact multipliers É for two fiscal instruments, namely 
government consumption and government investment, as dependent variable in (4.4). 
My coefficient of interest is 7D which refers the correlation between the impact 
multipliers and the institutional factors. I summarize variables representing institutions 
first and explain how to construct the country-specific multiplier É subsequently.    
I group institutional factors into three groups which have been widely studied in 
institutional economic literature: economic institutions, political institutions and other 
fixed factors. Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) provide a 
dynamic theoretical framework describing the interaction between economic 
institutions, political institutions, economic performance and resource distribution. 
Examples of economic institutions are property rights protection, corruption and entry 
barriers, while that of political institutions are government form (democracy versus 
dictatorship) and constraints on executives. Based on their idea, I use five variables to 
capture various aspects of economic institutions of a country: economic freedom, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. 
On the other hand, I use six variables to capture different perspectives of political 
institutions: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, parliamentary system, democracy, political competition and 
opposition, and constraints on executives. Other fixed factors employed in this study 
are variables representing legal origin and geographic characteristics, following 
Djankov et al. (2003), La Porta et al. (2008), Fatás and Mihov (2013), Fortunato and 
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Panizza (2015), Gallup et al. (1999), Lavergne et al. (2004) and Williamson and 
Mathers (2011) among others29. 
The country-specific impact multipliers É} for two fiscal instruments, namely 
government consumption and government investment, are derived based on the 
common definition of fiscal multipliers (Acconcia et al., 2014; Miyamoto et al., 2018; 
Nakamura & Steinsson, 2014)30. Accordingly, the impact multiplier for each country 
3 is the coefficient É} estimated in the following reduced-form model 
∆!}," = H} + É}ö}," + å}," (4.5) 
where !}," is the logarithm of real GDP; ö}," is the change in discretionary government 
spending (or government spending shock); H} is a constant term and  å}," is an error 
term. The magnitude of the coefficient É} represents how many percentage point 
change in real GDP is associated with one percentage point increase in real 
discretionary government spending for each country 3 at the same year. I regard É} as 
an estimate of impact multiplier for government spending. It is worth noting that my 
measure of impact multiplier is quite different from those using the VAR framework. 
More precisely, the coefficient É should be interpreted as elasticity of real output to 
real government spending. The usual multiplier as defined in other studies can be 
recovered by multiplying É by an inverse ratio of government spending to GDP of 
each country. However, I ignore this recovery (i) because it may result in imprecise 
estimate due to using the average ratios and (ii) for the sake of making the estimation 
and analysis consistent and straightforward throughout the study. The positive value 
of É} means an increase in government spending rises output while the negative value 
infers the opposite.      
As discussed in the literature review, the estimation of fiscal multipliers is complicated 
by the fact that it is difficult to isolate the automatic component from fiscal policy 
instruments. Moreover, due to the anticipation effects, the impact of fiscal policy on 
the economy may already have taken place when the public knew the news about the 
                                                 
29 Description on each variable and its data source is presented in the subsequent part of this section.  




policy and have immediately changed their behavior, not when the policy is 
implemented. As a result, the estimation of the multiplier may become imprecise with 
the presence of the anticipation effects. I address those issues by, first, stripping the 
automatic response of government spending to the economic conditions by estimating 
the residuals of model (4.6) below and, second, using low frequency (annual) data for 
the estimation. In fact, the anticipation effects become more serious with high 
frequency data, say quarterly or monthly, than with low frequency data (Beetsma, 
Giuliodori, & Klaassen, 2008; Markus & Anita, 2014). Annual data can also reflect 
closely the fiscal discretion in a cross-country study because fiscal decisions in many 
countries are usually made based on annual cycle. Moreover, the choice of annual data 
can help avoid the seasonal adjustment issue (Barro & Redlick, 2011). As justified in 
other studies on short-term impacts of fiscal policy, government spending is usually 
chosen instead of tax because the former is considered as a more effective fiscal tool 
than the latter and appears to have lower automatic stabilizers (Nickel & Tudyka, 
2014). In addition, given a large body of literature investigating the macroeconomic 
impacts of government spending, this study can be easily contrasted with the existing 
studies. 
I follow the method proposed by Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2013) to isolate the automatic 
stabilization component from the discretionary component of fiscal instruments. It 
should be noted that there is no consensus on how to calculate the discretionary fiscal 
policy. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identify the automatic response of fiscal policy 
and the shocks to fiscal policy by using a structural VAR framework with institutional 
information about the U.S. tax system and collections. Von Kalckreuth and Wolff 
(2011) estimate discretionary fiscal policy reactions for the U.S. by exploiting the 
differences between the final GDP and the real-time GDP. The authors reason that 
automatic fiscal policy reacts to the state of the economy while discretionary policy is 
the result of conscious response of policy makers to the state of the economy observed 
in the real time. Although it seems plausible to use either institutional information or 
real time data to identify the discretionary fiscal policy for advanced economies like 
the U.S., it is almost infeasible to conduct this task for studies with a developed and 
developing country mix. I hence employ a more suitable method of Fatás and Mihov 
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(2003, 2013) by estimating the fiscal policy reaction function for each country i as 
follows 
∆~}," = H=} + HD}∆!}," + HZ}∆~},"GD +õú,ùk 7} + ö},",  (4.6) 
where ~ is logarithm of real government spending; ! is logarithm of real GDP; 3 and 
* index country and year respectively. The control vector õ includes a time trend, 
inflation (log difference of the GDP deflator) and inflation squared31. By construction, 
ö is country-specific change in discretionary government spending or discretionary 
spending shock. Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2008) and Woo (2009) also use a 
strategy similar to mine to estimate their fiscal policy reaction function by OLS.   
In the specification (4.6), endogeneity problem may occur due to the presence of 
contemporanous value of output growth (∆!). To address the possible endogeneity 
problem I instrument for current real GDP growth with its two lags, the lagged value 
of inflation and of govenment expenditure growth. I estimate equation (4.6) by 2SLS 
method and obtain the residuals as my measure of discretionary fiscal policy which is 
input of (4.5).           
I conduct two robustness checks for my analysis. First, I notice that not all the country-
specific multipliers estimated in (4.5) appear to be significant to be included in (4.4). 
Therefore, in the first robustness check, each spending multiplier is weighted by its 
standard error and the specification (4.4) is re-estimated based on the standard error 
weighted multipliers. Second, I acknowledge that the estimates of É} in (4.5) could be 
biased and inconsistent because of mispecification problem. I try to minimize this 
possibility with the second robustness check where I add more control variables in 
(4.5) to account for the persistency of output growth as well as omitting variable 
problem. The alternative model for (4.5) is     
∆!}," = H} + É}ö}," + l}∆!},"GD + ûkü + å}," (4.7) 
                                                 
31 The inclusion of inflation squared is reasoned by Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2013) and Akitoby and 
Stratmann (2008) to account for the non-linear effect of inflation.  
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where û includes trade openness, inflation and population growth as control variables, 
and ü is a vector of corresponding coefficients. The other notations are defined 
similarly as before.  
4.4.2. Sample, variables and data sources 
I employ a sample of 72 countries from 1960 through 2015. The choice of the sample 
is based on data availability as well as the consistency with the analysis about the 
impact of fiscal policy on economic growth in the previous chapter. Notably, country 
included in the sample must have at least 25 observations on real government 
consumption, real government investment and real GDP so that the time series 
regression, (4.5) and (4.6), for each country can produce meaningful results.  
In the first step, I estimate model (4.6) to obtain country-specific government spending 
shock ö},". Model (4.6) is estimated separately for each types of government spending 
~, i.e. real government consumption and real government investment. Real 
government consumption is taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database of the World Bank (WB). It includes all government current expenditures for 
purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also 
includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but excludes government 
military expenditures that are part of government capital formation. Real government 
investment is taken from the Investment and Capital Stock database (ICSD) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Government investment is defined as public 
spending on social infrastructure (such as schools and hospitals) and economic 
infrastructure (such as roads and airports) and calculated using gross fixed capital 
formation of general government. On the right hand side of (4.6), real GDP and 
inflation are taken from WDI. Real GDP is GDP at constant local currency units while 
inflation is the difference in the logarithm of GDP deflator between two consecutive 
years. Both real public spending and real GDP are in logarithm form.        
In the second step, the country-specific government spending shock ö}," obtained from 
(4.6) is used to estimate the country-specific fiscal multiplier É} in (4.5) by OLS.  
In the third step, É} obtained from estimating model (4.5) is regressed on institutional 
variables and control variables based on model (4.4). Institutional variables in (4.4) 
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are categorized into three groups: economic institutions, political institutions, and 
fixed factors.  
Regarding economic institutions, based on the argument of Acemoglu et al. (2005) and 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), five variables32 employed to capture various aspects 
of economic institutions of a country include 
• Economic freedom: this is an aggregate economic freedom index compiled by 
the Fraser Institute. It measures the extent to which (i) institutions and policies 
of a country support the (primary) protective function of government and (ii) 
individuals are free to make economic choices, e.g. trading and cooperating. 
The index consists of five sub-indices –  (i) size of government, (ii) legal 
system and security of property rights, (iii) sound money, (iv) freedom to trade 
internationally, and (v) regulation – and takes value from 0 to 10 where greater 
value corresponding to higher freedom. The index was released every five 
years from 1970 to 2000. Its frequency has become annual since 2000 so far.  
• Government effectiveness: this variable is obtained from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) of WB. It captures perceptions of the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies. I use the government effectiveness rank, which takes value from 0 to 
100 where higher values corresponding to better institutional quality, as a 
measure of government effectiveness in my analysis.   
• Regulatory quality: this variable is obtained from WGI of WB. It captures 
perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. I 
use the regulatory quality rank, which takes value from 0 to 100 where higher 
values corresponding to better institutional quality, as a measure of regulatory 
quality in my analysis.    
                                                 
32 Definition of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption is 
taken from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) 
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• Rule of law: this variable is obtained from WGI of WB. It captures perceptions 
of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. I use 
the rule of law rank, which takes value from 0 to 100 where higher values 
corresponding to better institutional quality, as a measure of rule of law in my 
analysis.      
• Control of corruption: this variable is obtained from WGI of WB. It captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the 
state by elites and private interests. I use the control of corruption rank, which 
takes value from 0 to 100 where higher values corresponding to better 
institutional quality, as a measure of control of corruption in my analysis.    
Regarding political institutions, based on Acemoglu et al. (2005), Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2008), and Fatás and Mihov (2003, 2013), six variables33 employed to 
capture various aspects of political institutions of a country include 
• Voice and accountability: this variable is obtained from WGI of WB. It 
captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. I use the voice and accountability 
rank, which takes value from 0 to 100 where higher values corresponding to 
better institutional quality, as a measure of voice and accountability in my 
analysis.     
• Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism: this variable is obtained 
from WGI of WB. It captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. I use the political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism rank, which takes value from 0 to 
                                                 
33 Definition of voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism is taken 
from Kaufmann et al. (2011) 
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100 where higher values corresponding to better institutional quality, as a 
measure of political stability in my analysis.      
• Political system: I use a dummy variable of one for country with parliamentary 
system and zero otherwise. Data on political system is obtained from the 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 2015 of the Inter-American 
Development Bank.   
• Democracy: I use the Combined Polity Score from the Polity IV Project. This 
score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score 
and ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy).  
• Political competition: this variable measures the extent to which the political 
system enables non-elites to influence political elites in regular ways. It is a 
sum of two component variables: regulation of participation ranging from 1 
(lowest regulation) to 5 (highest regulation) and the competitiveness of 
participation ranging from 1 (lowest competition) to 5 (highest competition). 
Data on regulation of participation and the competitiveness of participation is 
taken from the Polity IV Project.  
• Constraints on executives: this variable measures the extent of institutionalized 
constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether 
individuals or collectivities. It ranges from 1 (lowest level of constraints) to 5 
(highest level of constraints) and is taken from the Polity IV Project. 
Regarding fixed factors, following Djankov et al. (2003), La Porta et al. (2008), Fatás 
and Mihov (2013), Fortunato and Panizza (2015), Gallup et al. (1999), Lavergne et al. 
(2004) and Williamson and Mathers (2011), I use variables from Easterly and Sewadeh 
(2001) which reflect 
• Legal origin: four dummy variables representing British legal origin, French 
legal origin, socialist legal origin, and Scandinavian legal origin. The 
benchmark is German legal origin. 
• Geographic characteristics: four variables taken into account include (i) 
country latitude, (ii) a dummy variable of one if country is land-lock and zero 
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otherwise, (iii) (logarithm of) country area, and (iv) a dummy variable of one 
if country is in tropical area and zero otherwise. 
All control variables in model (4.4) are taken from WDI of WB. Trade openness is the 
ratio of total exports and imports to GDP. Government size is the ratio of real 
government consumption to real GDP. Inflation is the difference in logarithm of GDP 
deflator between two consecutive years. Per capita income level is logarithm of real 
GDP per capita averaged over the period 1995-2015 (the period that data is available 
for all the countries in our sample). The other explanatory variables, including 
institutional variables, are averaged over the period 1960-2015.   
In the robustness check with the alternative model for estimating the multipliers, model 
(4.7), all the variables are defined similarly as before. Population growth is the 
difference in logarithm of population from WDI. A summary of variable definition and 
data source is presented in appendix 4.1.   
4.5. Empirical results 
4.5.1. Government spending impact multipliers 
Table 4.1 summarizes the estimated impact multipliers for 72 countries in the sample 
according to the specification (4.5). In general, the impact multipliers of advanced 
economies are greater than that of emerging and developing economies for both 
government consumption and government investment. On average, one percentage-
point increase in public consumption raises output by 0.109 percentage points in 
advanced economies but reduces output by 0.052 percentage points in emerging and 
developing economies. Similar pattern is observed in case of government investment 
but with smaller magnitudes. This result is consistent with Chian Koh (2016) and 
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) who also find multipliers in emerging and developing countries 
typically lower than that in developed countries. In fact, Batini, Eyraud, Forni, et al. 
(2014) present the possibility of negative fiscal multipliers in emerging and low-
income countries, which is not far from my result.           
When countries are grouped by income level, fiscal policy intervention appears to have 
diverse impacts across groups. Fiscal stimuli, increases in either public consumption 
or public investment, seem ineffective in the middle-income group. On average, output 
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falls by 0.066 and 0.012 percentage points respectively given one percentage point 
increase in government consumption and government investment in middle-income 
countries. On the contrary, fiscal stimuli in high-income countries appear to be 
effective regardless of spending instrument used. In low-income countries, 
government consumption has negligible positive effect on output in short-term while 
government investment has negative effect. This observation implies somehow the 
short-term inefficiency of public investment in middle- and low-income group 
compared to high-income one which is typically characterized by high level of 
institutional quality. 
Short-term impact of government spending is also heterogeneous across geographic 
regions. Consumption-based stimulus has the highest impact in countries located in 
East Asia and Pacific, North America, and Western Europe with the average 
multipliers of 0.168, 0.135 and 0.114 respectively. In contrast, government 
consumption in countries located in East Europe and Central Asia strongly reduces 
output with a negative impact multiplier of 0.21. Countries in Latin America and 
Caribbean, South Asia, and Sub-Sahara Africa also have negative government 
consumption multipliers but with lower magnitude. Fiscal policy seems to have no 
short-term effect on output in Middle East and North Africa countries when both 
average consumption multiplier and average investment multiplier are close to zero. 
Remarkably, regions having positive (negative) government consumption multiplier 
also have positive (negative) government investment multiplier, except Sub-Sahara 
Africa where government consumption multiplier is negative but government 
investment multiplier is positive.         
It is worth noting that not all the multipliers estimated in model (4.5) are statistically 
significant. Table 4.2 summarizes the number of countries with impact multiplier 
significant at 5% and 10% for each type of government spending. Regarding public 
consumption multiplier, 35 out of 72 countries have multiplier statistically significant 
at 5% while 41 out of 72 have multiplier significant at 10%. More than half of 
emerging economies as well as advanced economies in the sample have consumption 
multiplier significant at 10%. The number of countries with significant investment 
multiplier is fewer than the case of consumption multiplier. Only 26 and 32 out of 72 
countries have investment multiplier significant at 5% and 10% respectively. While 
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half of advanced economies have significant public investment multiplier, only 40% 
of emerging economies in the sample do.  
In general, the estimated government consumption multipliers with marginally 
significant level excess half of the sample and outnumber the estimated government 
investment multipliers with comparable significant level. It implies that consumption-
based public spending is a more effective tool to stimulate the economy in short-term 
rather than investment-based one. This is understandable because investment spending 
usually take time to carry out and bring benefit to firms and individuals; therefore, it 
tends to have long-term rather than short-term effect on the economy. On the contrary, 
consumption-based public spending targets to current spending items and hence 
possesses short-term rather than long-term effects on output. This observation 
complements the findings in chapter 3 where government investment is more 
important than government consumption in affecting economic growth in long term.        
4.5.2. The role of economic institutions in determining the impact multipliers 
Some observations about the relationship between government consumption 
multipliers and indicators of economic institutions are worth noting first. As shown in 
panel A of table 4.3, all the economic institution variables have significant, positive 
correlation with government consumption multiplier. In the univariate specifications, 
all the coefficients of interest are significant at 5% or better. Including control variables 
does not change the story but improves the significance level of the variables of interest 
and increases the goodness-of-fit of the models. This result indicates that countries 
with better economically institutional quality also have higher government 
consumption multiplier. Economic freedom, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption appear to be important determinants of 
the short-term impact of government consumption on output.  
Regarding control variables, results in panel A of table 4.3 seem to be consistent with 
findings in other studies about determinants of fiscal multipliers. Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 
conclude that closed economies have higher fiscal multipliers than open economies. 
Here I obtain significant, negative coefficients of trade openness in four out of five 
specifications, meaning that countries with greater degree of openness have lower 
fiscal multiplier. This phenomenon could be explained by the leakage effect – part of 
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government expenditure leaks out for imported goods in more open countries rather 
than being fully absorbed by domestic sectors. 
Panel A of table 4.3 also gives evidence supporting the relationship between monetary 
and fiscal policy in stimulating the economy. Higher inflation is associated with lower 
government consumption multiplier across specifications with 5% significance level. 
It implies when there is more space for conducting monetary policy (i.e., high inflation, 
high interest rate) fiscal policy becomes less effective in stimulating the economy. This 
result can be inferred that government purchases would raise more output when the 
economy is constrained at liquidity trap or at ZLB as argued in theoretical work of 
Christiano et al. (2011), DeLong and Summers (2012), Woodford (2011) and empirical 
work of Miyamoto et al. (2018) among others.  
Government consumption impact multipliers appear to correlate strongly with 
government size but insignificantly correlated with income level. The coefficient of 
government size is negative and significant at 5% or better in all the specifications. 
This result is in line with the initial projection and reflects the fact that stimulation 
effect of government consumption falls as the degree of government intervention in 
the economy rises.   
Economic institutions are also significant in determining government investment 
multipliers. In panel B of table 4.3, the coefficient of institutional factors are positive 
and significant at 5% or better across all the specifications, regardless univariate 
models or multivariate models. It shows that better economic institutions enhance 
short-term effect of government investment on output. Government size is still 
negative correlated with investment multiplier but only at marginal significance level 
of 10%. Different from the case of government consumption multiplier, trade openness 
and inflation play no role in explaining the variations in investment multipliers across 
countries. It seems absent the leakage effect through international trade as well as 
accommodative impact of monetary policy on the output response of government 
investment spending.    




Table 4.4 presents weak evidence on the direct impact of political institutions on 
government spending multipliers. Panel A of the table exhibits the relationship 
between government consumption multipliers and six selected measures of political 
institutions. In the univariate models, only political competition is positively correlated 
with the multipliers at 5% significance level. The coefficient of other political 
variables is not statistically different from zero though positive. Including control 
variables reduces the significance level of political competition to 10% but makes 
political stability significant at 5%. In short, government consumption spending raises 
more output in countries that are more politically stable and competitive.   
Panel B of table 4.4 shows the relationship between political institutions and the output 
response of government investment spending. All the political institution variables 
positively correlate with the public investment multipliers but only two of them are 
statistically significant. This result implies that investment-based fiscal stimulus is 
more effective in countries that have higher level of political stability and greater 
democracy. This correlation is weak at only 10% significance level.   
Regarding some fixed factors, table 4.5 demonstrates the relationship between output 
response of government spending and some fixed characteristics of countries in the 
sample. There is evidence that the short-term impact of fiscal policy differs across 
legal system and level of development. Countries with socialist legal system have 
lower government spending multipliers than countries with other legal origins. The 
coefficient of the socialist legal dummy is negative and significant at 10% in the 
regression of government consumption multipliers and at 5% in the regression of 
government investment multipliers. Moreover, countries with the French legal origin 
have lower investment multipliers than those with German, British and Scandinavian 
legal origin at 10% significance level.  
In terms of development level, there is statistical evidence on the differences in 
government consumption multipliers and government investment multipliers between 
emerging and advanced economies. Both consumption-based and investment-based 
stimulation policies in advanced economies are more effective than that in emerging 
and developing economies with 10% significance level. The other fixed factors – 
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geographical characteristics – appear to play no role in explaining the variations in 
government spending multipliers across countries.           
4.6. Robustness checks 
4.6.1. Government spending multipliers weighted by standard error 
As previously mentioned, not all the fiscal multipliers are statistically significant when 
being estimated by model (4.5). This insignificance may lead to imprecise conclusions 
in model (4.4) because some fiscal multipliers are actually not statistically different 
from zero. I therefore conduct the first robustness check by weighting each multiplier 
estimated in (4.5) by its standard error and re-estimating model (4.4) based on those 
weighted multipliers.   
Table 4.6 summarizes the relationship between economic institutions and the 
multipliers of government consumption (panel A) and government investment (panel 
B). In panel A of the table, all the institution variables appear with expected signs and 
high significance levels across specifications. Countries with higher economically 
institutional quality also have higher government consumption multipliers. Other 
control variables, however, become insignificant when the multipliers are weighted by 
their standard error. Surprisingly, there is almost no statistical evidence on the 
determining role of economic institutions in government investment multipliers. Panel 
B shows that, only economic freedom and government size are marginally significant, 
the other institutional and control variables play no role in explaining the cross-
countries differences in output response of government investment spending.   
Regarding the correlation between political institutions and fiscal multipliers, table 4.7 
expresses the fact that political institutions have no direct impact on both government 
consumption and government investment multipliers. The coefficients of all the 
variables of interest appear with positive sign but insignificant at any conventional 
significance level. It may conclude that political institutions are not direct determinants 
of the effectiveness of fiscal policy in the short run. In line with this result, Fatás and 
Mihov (2013) find that political institutions do not directly affecting economic growth 
but indirectly through its effect on the fiscal policy volatility which is proved to harm 
growth.    
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4.6.2. Alternative model for fiscal multiplier estimation 
In the second robustness check, acknowledging that the reduced form model (4.5) may 
suffer a misspecification problem, I re-estimate the government spending multipliers 
by using the alternative model (4.7). Interestingly, including more control variables 
increases the number of statistically significant multipliers. As shown in table 4.8, 46 
and 48 out of 72 government consumption multipliers are significant at 5% and 10% 
level respectively, compared to only 35 and 41 in the baseline model presented in table 
4.2. The number of government investment multipliers also rises to 35 at 5% 
significance level and to 37 at 10% significance level. This improvement is more 
favorable to the next step estimation where the multipliers are used as a dependent 
variable.    
As expected, the baseline results about the positive relationship between economic 
institutions and government spending multipliers are confirmed in table 4.9. Five 
measures of economic institutions positively correlate with government consumption 
multipliers at 5% or better significance level. Also, public investment multipliers and 
economical institutions are significantly correlated in all the specifications but at 
different levels depending on the institutional variable used.     
Consistent with the baseline results, table 4.10 expresses a weak connection between 
political institutions and fiscal policy effectiveness. Only political stability positively 
correlates with government consumption multipliers at 5% level; the others are 
statistically insignificant. On the other hand, countries which are more politically 
stable, higher level of democracy, and greater constraints on executives appear to have 
more effective government investment in short-term. This relationship is significant at 
5% for political stability and only 10% for the other two.  
Regarding the fixed factors, table 4.11 presents nothing special but similar results as 
in the baseline case. Both French and socialist legal system countries have lower 
government investment multipliers but only socialist legal system countries have 
lower government consumption multipliers. Fiscal multipliers are not statistically 
different across geographical regions but government investment multipliers of 
advanced economies are higher than that of emerging and developing countries at 10% 
significance level. Developed countries and emerging economies differ in many 
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aspects in which institutions are the fundamental issue. This result can be inferred as 
indirect evidence on the determining role of institutions in short-term impact of fiscal 
policy.  
4.7. Discussion and policy implications 
This chapter uses a novel three-step regression procedure to examine the role of 
institutional factors in the short-term output response of government spending, or the 
impact multiplier of government spending. By exploiting both time dimension and 
country specific dimension, the empirical results support the hypothesis about the 
importance of favorable economic institutions in the efficacy of fiscal stimulus. Some 
crucial observations and remarks are drawn. 
First, there is a diverse impact of fiscal stimulus across countries, regions and 
economic development levels. Fiscal expansion can increase more output in East Asia 
and Pacific, North America, and Western Europe than in other regions. Generally, 
economic stimulation through government spending can raise more output in 
developed countries than in less developed countries as found by Ilzetzki et al. (2013) 
and Batini, Eyraud, Forni, et al. (2014). Because countries differ in many aspects, the 
same stimulation package can have different effects on output across countries. Yet is 
the observation not very much useful unless we can find some sources of these 
discrepancies for policy implications.  
Second, one important source of variations in fiscal multiplier confirmed in this study 
is economic institutions. The positive, significant correlation between the five 
measures of economic institutions and the estimated fiscal multipliers in this chapter 
supports the argument about the two channels that institutions can affect fiscal 
multipliers: government spending efficiency and private sector expectation. Countries 
with higher degree of economic freedom, more effective government and law 
enforcement, and better control of corruption possess greater fiscal multipliers 
regardless consumption- or investment-based stimulus. Consequently, advanced 
economies have greater fiscal multipliers than emerging and developing economies 
because, beside differences in macroeconomic characteristics, the former is superior 
to the later in terms of economic institution quality. In fact, Batini, Eyraud, and Weber 
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(2014) reasonably argue that inefficient management of public spending and revenue 
is among salient factors decreasing the multipliers in emerging and low-income 
countries while Leeper et al. (2010) conclude the long-lasting process resulting in 
implementing delays is a crucial determinant of government investment multiplier in 
the short run. The finding in this study provides empirical support to these arguments.        
Third, there is weak evidence on the direct impact of political institutions on the 
multipliers. According to Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Fatás and Mihov (2013), political 
institutions do not affect economic performance directly but indirectly through its 
impacts on policymakers’ behavior. Here I find only political stability positively 
correlates with fiscal multiplier at 10% significance level in the baseline estimation 
and 5% in the second robustness check. The relationship between other measures of 
political institutions (e.g. democracy, voice and accountability, political competition, 
constraints on executives) and fiscal multiplier is generally weak and not robust. In 
short, we may claim that countries enjoying a more stable political condition also have 
more effective fiscal stimulus. This finding complements the profound literature on 
relationship between political stability and economic growth. For instance, Barro 
(1991) finds significant negative effect of political instability on growth in a study of 
98 countries from 1960 to 1985; Alesina, Özler, Roubini, and Swagel (1996) deal with 
the joint determination of political instability and economic growth and conclude the 
robustly negative effect of political instability on growth; Aisen and Veiga (2013) use 
cabinet changes as a proxy for political instability and find negative relationship 
between political instability on per capita output growth.  
Fourth, the role of institutions is not the same to different components of fiscal 
stimulus. Whereas the government consumption multipliers are strongly correlated 
with economic institutions throughout various specifications, the connection between 
government investment multiplier and institutions is less robust. In other words, 
institutional characteristics are significant factors explaining the variations in short-
term output response to consumption-based rather than to investment-based fiscal 
stimulus across countries. This phenomenon may happen because each type of public 
expenditure differs in their targets as well as short-term impacts. Government 
investment in infrastructure projects usually aims at long-term growth and need 
sufficient time to be planned, discussed, and implemented. The effect of government 
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investment on the economy, if any, should be clearer in long term than in short term. 
Meanwhile, government investment impact multipliers is merely a measure of short-
term output response of government investment, not the long term impact. In contrast, 
government consumption targets current spending items and consequently has stronger 
effect on aggregate demand in short term than government investment. Therefore, the 
impact of institutions, if any, on government spending multipliers should be more 
pronounced in the case of government consumption than government investment. This 
finding complements the results in chapter 3 where I find the impact of public 
investment, rather than public consumption, on economic growth in long term depends 
on economic institutions (i.e. economic freedom). In fact, Leeper et al. (2010) also 
ascertain that fiscal stimulus by expansionary government investment can result in 
greater growth effect in the long run rather than in the short run.   
Extending the analysis to legal institutions, this chapter shows that government 
investment in countries with socialist and French legal origin is less effective to 
stimulate output in short-term than government investment in the other countries. 
Government consumption in socialist-legal countries is also less effective than 
government consumption in countries with other legal origin. It reinforces the finding 
on significant and positive correlation between the multipliers and economic 
institutions because civil law countries, such as those coded with socialist and French 
legal origin, have been found to have weaker investor protection compared to common 
law countries (La Porta et al., 2008).  
In summary, this chapter provides a plausible explanation on why the fiscal multiplier 
in advanced economies is higher than that in emerging and developing economies 
observed in Ilzetzki et al. (2013) and Batini, Eyraud, Forni, et al. (2014). Numerous 
studies since the 2008-2009 Great Recession have proved that macroeconomic factors 
such as the responsiveness of monetary policy, fiscal sustainability, trade openness, 
exchange rate system, and income distribution are important determinants of output 
response of fiscal stimulus. In this chapter, other more fundamental factors also appear 
to be significant to explain the variation in short-term effect of fiscal stimulus across 
countries: economic institutions and political stability. Accordingly, since advanced 
economies usually enjoy more favorable institutions than emerging and developing 
countries do while institutions positively correlate with the multipliers, they also have 
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greater government spending impact multiplier than emerging and developing 
economies.          
The results in this chapter have important policy implications. Regarding short-term 
effect, governments can implement expansionary fiscal policy to stimulate the 
economy during downturns by increasing either consumption or investment spending. 
Although the short-term impact of fiscal policy differs across countries, consumption-
based spending generally is more effective than the investment-based. Empirical 
results in this chapter combined with the findings in chapter 3 imply that for the best 
use of fiscal policy, governments may invest more in physical assets for long-term 
economic growth and spend more on current items to stimulate output in the short run.  
Another policy implication from this study is that greater stimulation effect of fiscal 
policy can be achieved with some institutional reforms. While political institutions do 
not directly influence the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus, economic institutions play a 
crucial role in determining the size of government spending multipliers. Low 
corruption and more transparent government can help improve the policy efficacy. 
Furthermore, in the economy with a strong protection of property rights as well as 
effective enforcement of contracts, people feel less uncertain about their assets and 
fruits of their labor. Given any public provision to stimulate the economy, households 
are confident to make their consumption and working decision, entrepreneurial 
activities are encouraged, and consequently, output grows more strongly.  
This study also suggests that it is not necessary to have painful changes in political 
institutions to achieve better policy outcome. In fact, the efficacy of fiscal stimulus is 
not determined by whether a country is democratic or autocratic, presidential or 
parliamentary system but is higher if a country enjoys a greater degree of political 
stability. Therefore, without violent revolutions, military coups or frequent political 
regime changes, incumbent governments can take more actions to improve the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy such as ensuring rule of law, reducing corruption, 
improving regulatory quality as well as government effectiveness, and creating a better 




Table 4.1. Summary of impact multipliers 
  Number 
of 
countries 
 Public consumption multiplier  Public investment multiplier 
  
 
Mean S.Dev Min Max  Mean S.Dev Min Max 
East Asia and Pacific 11  0.168 0.129 -0.630 0.511  0.042 0.041 -0.139 0.180 
East Europe and central Asia 10  -0.210 0.209 -1.263 0.487  -0.014 0.030 -0.112 0.122 
Latin America and Caribbean 9  -0.067 0.074 -0.382 0.568  -0.038 0.027 -0.186 0.007 
Middle East and North Africa 7  0.001 0.134 -0.304 0.425  0.000 0.039 -0.077 0.081 
North America 2  0.135 0.182 -0.325 0.594  0.044 0.062 0.035 0.054 
South Asia 4  -0.044 0.045 -0.139 0.052  -0.014 0.020 -0.060 0.046 
Sub-Sahara Africa 12  -0.034 0.071 -0.258 0.202  0.008 0.024 -0.071 0.103 
West Europe 17  0.114 0.178 -0.836 0.655  0.001 0.046 -0.121 0.181 
Average by region 72  0.011 0.132 -1.263 0.655  0.002 0.035 -0.186 0.181 
Low-income 9  0.004 0.048 -0.187 0.202  -0.012 0.024 -0.071 0.054 
Middle-income 35  -0.066 0.119 -1.263 0.568  -0.012 0.030 -0.186 0.122 
High-income 28  0.109 0.177 -0.836 0.655  0.023 0.046 -0.121 0.181 
Average by income 72  0.011 0.132 -1.263 0.655  0.002 0.035 -0.186 0.181 
Emerging and developing 
economies 44 
 
-0.052 0.104 -1.263 0.568  -0.012 0.029 -0.186 0.122 
Advanced economies 28  0.109 0.177 -0.836 0.655  0.023 0.046 -0.121 0.181 
Average by development 72  0.011 0.132 -1.263 0.655  0.002 0.035 -0.186 0.181 
Table 4.2. Number of countries with significant impact multiplier 
  Public consumption multiplier Public investment multiplier Sample size 
Significance level 5% 10% 5% 10%   
Emerging economies 22 25 15 18 44 
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Advanced economies 13 16 11 14 28 
Total 35 41 26 32 72 
Table 4.3. Relationship between economic institutions and fiscal multipliers 
 Economic freedom  Government effectiveness  Regulatory quality  Rule of law  Control of corruption 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
A. Government consumption multiplier 
               
Institution 0.123*** 0.183***  0.00394** 0.00562***  0.00356** 0.00561**  0.00361** 0.00527**  0.00360** 0.00547*** 
 (2.881) (3.535)  (2.449) (3.139)  (2.070) (2.540)  (2.161) (2.525)  (2.245) (2.886) 
Income_9515  -0.00468   -0.00455   -0.00188   -0.00491   -0.00365 
  (-0.197)   (-0.196)   (-0.0754)   (-0.207)   (-0.162) 
Openness  -0.215**   -0.145*   -0.157*   -0.138   -0.148* 
  (-2.529)   (-1.721)   (-1.791)   (-1.584)   (-1.774) 
Inflation  -0.906**   -0.802**   -0.914**   -0.749**   -0.756** 
  (-2.371)   (-2.139)   (-2.499)   (-2.046)   (-2.165) 
Government size  -1.551**   -1.942***   -1.942**   -2.031**   -2.132*** 
  (-2.419)   (-2.765)   (-2.513)   (-2.531)   (-2.773) 
Constant -0.810*** -0.632  -0.245** 0.227  -0.222* 0.216  -0.214* 0.271  -0.207** 0.279 
 (-2.832) (-1.665)  (-2.305) (0.699)  (-1.898) (0.680)  (-1.969) (0.842)  (-2.015) (0.891) 
               
Observations 72 72  72 72  72 72  72 72  72 72 
R-squared 0.083 0.286  0.080 0.265  0.064 0.269  0.078 0.259  0.084 0.276 
               
B. Government investment multiplier 
               
Institution 0.0298*** 0.0364***  0.000660** 0.000917**  0.000676** 0.000930**  0.000632** 0.000989**  0.000552* 0.000808* 
 (2.965) (2.894)  (2.031) (2.061)  (2.005) (2.040)  (2.042) (2.032)  (1.835) (1.719) 
Income_9515  -0.000468   -0.000214   0.000213   -0.000436   1.84e-05 
  (-0.0992)   (-0.0448)   (0.0451)   (-0.0923)   (0.00373) 
Openness  -0.00213   0.0142   0.0121   0.0140   0.0149 
  (-0.121)   (0.775)   (0.663)   (0.766)   (0.816) 
Inflation   -0.0226   -0.0157   -0.0334   0.00359   -0.0150 
  (-0.300)   (-0.213)   (-0.464)   (0.0427)   (-0.184) 
Government size  -0.282*   -0.315*   -0.318*   -0.362*   -0.323* 
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  (-1.782)   (-1.765)   (-1.813)   (-1.922)   (-1.687) 
Constant -0.197*** -0.183*  -0.0411** -0.0102  -0.0424** -0.0121  -0.0376** -0.00362  -0.0317** -0.00127 
 (-3.098) (-1.906)  (-2.261) (-0.146)  (-2.305) (-0.173)  (-2.280) (-0.0522)  (-2.000) (-0.0181) 
               
Observations 72 72  72 72  72 72  72 72  72 72 
R-squared 0.107 0.149  0.049 0.107  0.051 0.111  0.053 0.118  0.044 0.103 
Note: Dependent variable is impact multiplier of government consumption in panel A and impact multiplier of government consumption in panel B. Income_9515 is real 
per capita GDP (in logarithm) averaged over the period 1995-2015. Openness, Inflation, and Government size are averaged over the period 1960-2015. Robust t-statistics 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.4. Relationship between political institutions and fiscal multipliers 
 Voice and 
accountability 
 Political Stability   Parliamentary system  Democracy  Political competition  Executive constraints 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
A. Government consumption multiplier 
                  
Institution 0.00228 0.00242  0.00227 0.00416**  0.0924 0.0603  0.00679 0.00406  0.0460** 0.0417*  0.0351 0.0246 
 (1.374) (1.348)  (1.446) (2.066)  (1.105) (0.714)  (1.095) (0.702)  (2.283) (1.792)  (1.655) (1.204) 
Income_9515  6.59e-05   -0.00432   0.00252   0.0106   0.0104   0.0111 
  (0.00277)   (-0.184)   (0.109)   (0.480)   (0.494)   (0.508) 
Openness   -0.0795   -0.160   -0.0845   -0.127   -0.123   -0.124 
  (-0.829)   (-1.646)   (-0.876)   (-1.099)   (-1.045)   (-1.051) 
Inflation   -1.039***   -0.945***   -1.130***   -1.134**   -0.923**   -1.087** 
  (-2.669)   (-2.659)   (-2.721)   (-2.604)   (-2.109)   (-2.563) 
Government size  -1.293*   -1.830**   -0.844   -0.442   -1.022   -0.574 
  (-1.771)   (-2.312)   (-1.243)   (-0.707)   (-1.355)   (-0.866) 
Constant -0.129 0.259  -0.109 0.377  -0.0354 0.287  -0.0119 0.175  -0.314** -0.0331  -0.164 0.0752 
 (-1.209) (0.780)  (-1.238) (1.145)  (-0.587) (0.873)  (-0.301) (0.550)  (-2.155) (-0.111)  (-1.485) (0.257) 
                  
Observations 72 72  72 72  72 72  70 70  70 70  70 70 
R-squared 0.030 0.202  0.034 0.232  0.017 0.188  0.012 0.206  0.069 0.235  0.030 0.214 
                  
B. Government investment multiplier 
                  
142 
 
Institution 0.000402 0.000605  0.000501* 0.000729*  0.0260 0.0250  0.00245 0.00274*  0.00441 0.00547  0.00700 0.00788 
 (1.212) (1.403)  (1.677) (1.685)  (1.465) (1.238)  (1.616) (1.682)  (0.931) (0.833)  (1.438) (1.483) 
Income_9515  0.000386   -0.000250   0.00111   0.000251   -3.25e-05   0.000235 
  (0.0799)   (-0.0498)   (0.230)   (0.0486)   (-0.00613)   (0.0453) 
Openness  0.0248   0.0109   0.0223   0.0120   0.0114   0.0122 
  (1.297)   (0.559)   (1.103)   (0.598)   (0.584)   (0.605) 
Inflation  -0.0414   -0.0362   -0.0541   -0.0594   -0.0488   -0.0556 
  (-0.593)   (-0.505)   (-0.839)   (-0.968)   (-0.708)   (-0.898) 
Government size  -0.261   -0.310   -0.175   -0.158   -0.166   -0.156 
  (-1.425)   (-1.539)   (-1.027)   (-0.963)   (-0.822)   (-0.932) 
Constant -0.0229 -0.00832  -0.0247* 0.0153  -0.0112 -0.00335  -0.0109 0.0106  -0.0325 -0.0137  -0.0368 -0.0194 
 (-1.160) (-0.119)  (-1.723) (0.215)  (-0.959) (-0.0484)  (-1.155) (0.143)  (-0.969) (-0.186)  (-1.495) (-0.260) 
                  
Observations 72 72  72 72  72 72  70 70  70 70  70 70 
R-squared 0.020 0.086  0.036 0.092  0.030 0.080  0.033 0.064  0.013 0.041  0.026 0.055 
Note: Dependent variable is impact multiplier of government consumption in panel A and impact multiplier of government consumption in panel B. Income_9515 is real per capita GDP 
(in logarithm) averaged over the period 1995-2015. Openness, Inflation, and Government size are averaged over the period 1960-2015. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.5. Relationship between fiscal multipliers and other country-specific fixed factors 
Dependent variable  Government consumption multiplier  Government investment multiplier 
  Legal Geography Development  Legal Geography Development 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
         
British  -0.199    -0.0643   
  (-0.880)    (-1.207)   
French  -0.265    -0.0940*   
  (-1.166)    (-1.794)   
Socialist  -0.555*    -0.123**   
  (-1.933)    (-2.124)   
Scandinavian  -0.228    -0.0403   
  (-0.733)    (-0.695)   
Latitude   -0.00122    0.000413  
   (-0.538)    (0.907)  
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Landlock   0.0102    0.0308  
   (0.0767)    (0.912)  
Area   0.0136    -0.00503  
   (0.493)    (-0.920)  
Tropical   -0.0388    0.0257  
   (-0.410)    (1.137)  
Advanced     0.161*    0.0353* 
    (1.814)    (1.826) 
Constant  0.268 -0.0997 -0.0518  0.0790 0.0365 -0.0119 
  (1.215) (-0.301) (-1.092)  (1.542) (0.586) (-1.250) 
         
Observations  70 70 72  70 70 72 
R-squared  0.126 0.009 0.049  0.169 0.060 0.052 
Note: Dependent variable is impact multiplier of government consumption and government investment, respectively. Description of other 
variables is presented in the text (section 4.4.2). Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.6. Economic institutions and fiscal multipliers weighted by standard error 
 Economic freedom  Government effectiveness  Regulatory quality  Rule of law  Control of corruption 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
A. Government consumption multiplier 
               
Institution 1.379*** 1.625***  0.0525*** 0.0751***  0.0483*** 0.0659***  0.0423*** 0.0623**  0.0390*** 0.0554** 
 (2.998) (2.976)  (3.165) (3.211)  (2.756) (2.750)  (2.783) (2.625)  (2.732) (2.566) 
Income_9515  0.153   0.126   0.167   0.131   0.156 
  (0.700)   (0.587)   (0.734)   (0.606)   (0.732) 
Openness   -0.484   -0.167   -0.194   0.0279   0.0279 
  (-0.516)   (-0.212)   (-0.223)   (0.0330)   (0.0334) 
Inflation   -0.934   1.735   -0.226   1.749   0.938 
  (-0.317)   (0.484)   (-0.0682)   (0.444)   (0.238) 
Government size  -5.834   -14.96*   -12.90   -14.05   -12.81 
  (-0.785)   (-1.715)   (-1.513)   (-1.567)   (-1.511) 
Constant -9.128*** -11.06**  -3.339*** -3.761  -3.086** -3.764  -2.562** -3.122  -2.294** -2.991 
 (-2.851) (-2.260)  (-2.813) (-1.087)  (-2.410) (-1.079)  (-2.362) (-0.894)  (-2.258) (-0.860) 
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Observations 72 72  72 72  72 72  72 72  72 72 
R-squared 0.105 0.128  0.143 0.195  0.119 0.166  0.108 0.153  0.100 0.143 
               
B. Government investment multiplier 
               
Institution 0.532 0.918*  0.0142 0.0327  0.0119 0.0261  0.0104 0.0283  0.00779 0.0210 
 (1.279) (1.755)  (0.886) (1.394)  (0.771) (1.253)  (0.769) (1.311)  (0.586) (1.032) 
Income_9515  -0.138   -0.143   -0.123   -0.142   -0.127 
  (-0.850)   (-0.866)   (-0.749)   (-0.861)   (-0.761) 
Openness  -0.355   -0.0577   -0.0332   0.0134   0.0667 
  (-0.530)   (-0.0899)   (-0.0519)   (0.0214)   (0.106) 
Inflation  0.771   1.606   0.627   1.710   1.014 
  (0.229)   (0.405)   (0.173)   (0.398)   (0.246) 
Government size  -9.296   -12.27*   -10.80*   -12.18*   -10.52 
  (-1.550)   (-1.737)   (-1.699)   (-1.754)   (-1.550) 
Constant -3.480 -2.728  -0.856 1.516  -0.712 1.553  -0.581 1.788  -0.406 1.863 
 (-1.208) (-0.630)  (-0.727) (0.542)  (-0.638) (0.548)  (-0.596) (0.646)  (-0.429) (0.675) 
               
Observations 72 72  72 72  72 72  72 72  72 72 
R-squared 0.021 0.053  0.014 0.056  0.010 0.043  0.009 0.048  0.005 0.036 
Note: Dependent variable is impact multiplier of government consumption in panel A and impact multiplier of government consumption in panel B. Income_9515 is real 
per capita GDP (in logarithm) averaged over the period 1995-2015. Openness, Inflation, and Government size are averaged over the period 1960-2015. Robust t-statistics 
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.7. Political institutions and fiscal multipliers weighted by standard error 
 Voice and 
accountability 
 Political Stability  Parliamentary system  Democracy  Political competition  Executive constraints 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
A. Government consumption multiplier 
                  
Institution 0.0193 0.0179  0.0248* 0.0266  1.003 0.796  0.0629 0.0513  0.306* 0.300  0.282 0.254 
 (1.266) (0.967)  (1.687) (1.576)  (1.205) (0.722)  (0.990) (0.701)  (1.680) (1.270)  (1.252) (0.932) 
Income_9515  0.198   0.172   0.220   0.282   0.278   0.285 
  (0.878)   (0.772)   (0.990)   (1.212)   (1.223)   (1.237) 
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Openness   0.726   0.214   0.647   0.704   0.717   0.729 
  (0.774)   (0.230)   (0.715)   (0.613)   (0.619)   (0.626) 
Inflation  -2.346   -1.894   -2.663   -2.893   -1.547   -2.485 
  (-0.742)   (-0.664)   (-0.909)   (-1.053)   (-0.511)   (-0.847) 
Government size  -2.631   -5.470   -0.243   1.885   -1.605   0.822 
  (-0.340)   (-0.675)   (-0.0259)   (0.223)   (-0.182)   (0.0978) 
Constant -1.115 -3.081  -1.237 -2.288  -0.429 -2.946  -0.159 -3.773  -2.095 -5.239  -1.345 -4.789 
 (-0.966) (-0.797)  (-1.287) (-0.619)  (-0.770) (-0.792)  (-0.312) (-0.984)  (-1.388) (-1.341)  (-1.043) (-1.246) 
                  
Observations 72 72  72 72  72 72  70 70  70 70  70 70 
R-squared 0.022 0.057  0.040 0.066  0.020 0.056  0.009 0.057  0.028 0.068  0.018 0.064 
                  
B. Government investment multiplier 
                  
Institution 0.00128 0.00891  0.00351 0.0133  0.929 1.202  0.0653 0.0855  0.0243 0.103  0.210 0.291 
 (0.0887) (0.515)  (0.274) (0.883)  (1.306) (1.362)  (1.084) (1.334)  (0.139) (0.508)  (1.007) (1.265) 
Income_9515  -0.112   -0.125   -0.0920   -0.124   -0.133   -0.122 
  (-0.683)   (-0.752)   (-0.575)   (-0.702)   (-0.752)   (-0.697) 
Openness  0.330   0.0734   0.193   0.0155   -0.0138   0.0314 
  (0.537)   (0.122)   (0.290)   (0.0222)   (-0.0205)   (0.0445) 
Inflation  -0.0992   0.129   0.550   -0.0439   -0.111   0.217 
  (-0.0280)   (0.0373)   (0.173)   (-0.0146)   (-0.0349)   (0.0698) 
Government size  -7.192   -8.621   -8.128   -6.832   -5.927   -7.231 
  (-1.159)   (-1.348)   (-1.099)   (-0.987)   (-0.838)   (-1.056) 
Constant -0.0130 1.793  -0.120 2.190  -0.399 1.696  -0.257 2.219  -0.166 1.811  -1.063 1.089 
 (-0.0123) (0.631)  (-0.144) (0.817)  (-0.809) (0.620)  (-0.537) (0.771)  (-0.116) (0.587)  (-0.891) (0.358) 
                  
Observations 72 72  72 72  72 72  70 70  70 70  70 70 
R-squared 0.000 0.021  0.001 0.024  0.024 0.049  0.014 0.034  0.000 0.016  0.013 0.035 
Note: Dependent variable is impact multiplier of government consumption in panel A and impact multiplier of government consumption in panel B. Income_9515 is real per capita GDP (in 
logarithm) averaged over the period 1995-2015. Openness, Inflation, and Government size are averaged over the period 1960-2015. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
 
Table 4.8. Number of countries with significant impact multiplier in the alternative model 
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  Public consumption multiplier Public investment multiplier 
Sample size 
(countries) 
Significance level 5% 10% 5% 10%   
Emerging economies 28 29 20 21 44 
Advanced economies 18 19 15 16 28 
Total 46 48 35 37 72 
Table 4.9. Economic institutions and fiscal multipliers in the alternative model 
 Economic freedom  Government effectiveness  Regulatory quality  Rule of law  Control of corruption 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
A. Government consumption multiplier 
               
Institution 0.101** 0.177***  0.00318* 0.00554***  0.00279 0.00549**  0.00282 0.00507**  0.00287* 0.00534*** 
 (2.183) (3.267)  (1.855) (2.842)  (1.556) (2.444)  (1.615) (2.331)  (1.715) (2.684) 
Income_9515  -0.00549   -0.00550   -0.00283   -0.00569   -0.00455 
  (-0.231)   (-0.236)   (-0.114)   (-0.241)   (-0.201) 
Openness  -0.225**   -0.158*   -0.169*   -0.149   -0.160* 
  (-2.432)   (-1.743)   (-1.804)   (-1.603)   (-1.796) 
Inflation  -0.833**   -0.725**   -0.838**   -0.684*   -0.684** 
  (-2.392)   (-2.077)   (-2.470)   (-1.940)   (-2.033) 
Government size  -1.908**   -2.311***   -2.302***   -2.368**   -2.484*** 
  (-2.527)   (-2.813)   (-2.660)   (-2.629)   (-2.866) 
Constant -0.690** -0.546  -0.221** 0.281  -0.197* 0.271  -0.190* 0.325  -0.188* 0.333 
 (-2.276) (-1.369)  (-2.081) (0.846)  (-1.729) (0.831)  (-1.791) (0.986)  (-1.880) (1.036) 
               
Observations 72 72  72 72  72 72  72 72  72 72 
R-squared 0.050 0.246  0.046 0.231  0.035 0.234  0.042 0.223  0.048 0.239 
               
B. Government investment multiplier 
               
Institution 0.0364*** 0.0479***  0.000790** 0.00115**  0.000868** 0.00127**  0.000799** 0.00132**  0.000669* 0.00103* 
 (3.108) (2.961)  (2.176) (2.121)  (2.270) (2.262)  (2.249) (2.198)  (1.970) (1.838) 
Income_9515  0.00131   0.00171   0.00218   0.00133   0.00198 
  (0.253)   (0.323)   (0.423)   (0.257)   (0.364) 
Openness  -0.0119   0.0104   0.00613   0.00907   0.0109 
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  (-0.564)   (0.496)   (0.297)   (0.449)   (0.534) 
Inflation  -0.00353   0.00135   -0.0154   0.0326   0.00403 
  (-0.0474)   (0.0173)   (-0.201)   (0.349)   (0.0453) 
Government size  -0.319*   -0.349*   -0.377*   -0.430**   -0.366* 
  (-1.851)   (-1.751)   (-1.932)   (-2.032)   (-1.726) 
Constant -0.242*** -0.270**  -0.0507** -0.0415  -0.0561** -0.0455  -0.0491** -0.0338  -0.0399** -0.0304 
 (-3.233) (-2.401)  (-2.512) (-0.532)  (-2.594) (-0.582)  (-2.532) (-0.434)  (-2.213) (-0.384) 
               
Observations 72 72  72 72  72 72  72 72  72 72 
R-squared 0.126 0.170  0.056 0.107  0.066 0.124  0.066 0.130  0.050 0.105 
Note: Dependent variable is impact multiplier of government consumption in panel A and impact multiplier of government consumption in panel B. Income_9515 is real per 
capita GDP (in logarithm) averaged over the period 1995-2015. Openness, Inflation, and Government size are averaged over the period 1960-2015. Robust t-statistics in 






Table 4.10. Political institutions and fiscal multipliers in the alternative model 
 Voice and 
accountability 
 Political Stability  Parliamentary system  Democracy  Political competition  Executive constraints 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
A. Government consumption multiplier 
                  
Institution 0.00158 0.00228  0.00164 0.00426**  0.0552 0.0425  0.00483 0.00381  0.0375 0.0414  0.0277 0.0234 
 (0.910) (1.245)  (0.974) (2.038)  (0.620) (0.471)  (0.702) (0.622)  (1.614) (1.624)  (1.197) (1.094) 
Income_9515  -0.000865   -0.00551   0.00128   0.0108   0.0106   0.0112 
  (-0.0363)   (-0.235)   (0.0546)   (0.500)   (0.519)   (0.529) 
Openness  -0.0933   -0.176*   -0.0962   -0.142   -0.139   -0.139 
  (-0.922)   (-1.698)   (-0.946)   (-1.153)   (-1.103)   (-1.109) 
Inflation  -0.966**   -0.857**   -1.066***   -1.051**   -0.840**   -1.006** 
  (-2.639)   (-2.574)   (-2.780)   (-2.651)   (-2.125)   (-2.586) 
Government size  -1.643**   -2.244**   -1.183   -0.791   -1.373   -0.917 
  (-2.042)   (-2.593)   (-1.556)   (-1.114)   (-1.633)   (-1.244) 
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Constant -0.112 0.315  -0.101 0.432  -0.0422 0.344  -0.0277 0.211  -0.277* 0.00405  -0.150 0.116 
 (-1.079) (0.925)  (-1.172) (1.301)  (-0.723) (1.026)  (-0.704) (0.674)  (-1.724) (0.0135)  (-1.326) (0.391) 
                  
Observations 72 72  72 72  72 72  70 70  70 70  70 70 
R-squared 0.013 0.175  0.016 0.206  0.005 0.162  0.005 0.179  0.041 0.205  0.017 0.186 
                  
B. Government investment multiplier 
                  
Institution 0.000639 0.000974  0.000700** 0.00115**  0.0263 0.0262  0.00349* 0.00399*  0.00635 0.00877  0.0101 0.0119* 
 (1.519) (1.663)  (2.096) (2.259)  (1.311) (1.099)  (1.737) (1.764)  (1.116) (1.067)  (1.653) (1.690) 
Income_9515  0.00231   0.00131   0.00332   0.00288   0.00248   0.00288 
  (0.439)   (0.239)   (0.615)   (0.513)   (0.418)   (0.507) 
Openness  0.0233   0.00133   0.0211   0.0124   0.0116   0.0128 
  (1.111)   (0.0607)   (0.976)   (0.525)   (0.504)   (0.537) 
Inflation  -0.0172   -0.0101   -0.0518   -0.0478   -0.0278   -0.0410 
  (-0.215)   (-0.134)   (-0.724)   (-0.701)   (-0.357)   (-0.604) 
Government size  -0.337   -0.410*   -0.161   -0.177   -0.202   -0.178 
  (-1.586)   (-1.847)   (-0.863)   (-0.977)   (-0.893)   (-0.968) 
Constant -0.0386 -0.0428  -0.0364** -0.00507  -0.0125 -0.0319  -0.0161 -0.0236  -0.0474 -0.0631  -0.0538* -0.0692 
 (-1.493) (-0.541)  (-2.126) (-0.0629)  (-0.875) (-0.405)  (-1.337) (-0.287)  (-1.181) (-0.714)  (-1.709) (-0.797) 
                  
Observations 72 72  72 72  72 72  70 70  70 70  70 70 
R-squared 0.040 0.104  0.055 0.113  0.024 0.066  0.051 0.080  0.021 0.048  0.041 0.069 
Note: Dependent variable is impact multiplier of government consumption in panel A and impact multiplier of government consumption in panel B. Income_9515 is real per capita GDP (in 
logarithm) averaged over the period 1995-2015. Openness, Inflation, and Government size are averaged over the period 1960-2015. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
 
Table 4.11. Fiscal multipliers and other country-specific fixed factors in the alternative model 
 Government consumption multiplier  Government investment multiplier 
 Legal Geography Development  Legal Geography Development 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
British -0.240    -0.0756   
 (-1.006)    (-1.179)   
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French -0.291    -0.115*   
 (-1.230)    (-1.819)   
Socialist -0.548*    -0.136*   
 (-1.886)    (-1.916)   
Scandinavian -0.247    -0.0435   
 (-0.733)    (-0.651)   
Latitude  -0.00175    0.000522  
  (-0.726)    (1.131)  
Landlock  0.00603    0.0503  
  (0.0403)    (1.423)  
Area  0.0129    -0.00384  
  (0.466)    (-0.677)  
Tropical  -0.0330    0.0281  
  (-0.337)    (1.143)  
Advanced    0.116    0.0427* 
   (1.185)    (1.966) 
Constant 0.270 -0.103 -0.0598  0.0913 0.0155 -0.0160 
 (1.173) (-0.309) (-1.279)  (1.475) (0.232) (-1.496) 
        
Observations 70 70 72  70 70 72 
R-squared 0.101 0.013 0.023  0.177 0.070 0.060 
Note: Dependent variable is impact multiplier of government consumption and government investment, respectively. Description of 
other variables is presented in the text (section 4.4.2). Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Appendices  
Appendix 4.1. Variable description 
Variable name Description Source 
Government consumption  Logarithm of general government consumption in constant local currency WDI 
Public investment  Logarithm of government investment in billions of constant 2011 dollar ICSD  
Real GDP Logarithm of GDP in constant local currency WDI 
Inflation Log difference of the GDP deflator between two consecutive years WDI 
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Economic freedom  Economic freedom index FI 
Government effectiveness   Government effectiveness in percentile rank from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) WGI 
Regulatory quality  Regulatory quality in percentile rank from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) WGI 
Rule of law  Rule of law in percentile rank from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) WGI 
Control of corruption  Control of corruption in percentile rank from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) WGI 
Voice and accountability  Voice and accountability in percentile rank from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) WGI 
Political stability  Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism in percentile rank from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) WGI 
Parliamentary system  Dummy equal 1 if parliamentary system, 0 otherwise (presidential system) DPI 
Democracy Combined Polity Score =”DEMOCRACY index”-“AUTOCRACY index”, ranging from +10 (full democracy) 
to -10 (full autocracy) 
Polity IV 
Political competition  The extent to which the political system enables non-elites to influence political elites in regular ways = index of 
regulation of participation (“PARREG” ranging from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest)) + index of the competitiveness of 
participation (“PARCOMP” ranging from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest)) 
Polity IV 
Executive constraints The extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives: “XCONST” 
ranging from 1 (lowest) to 7 (highest) 
Polity IV 
British  Dummy equal to 1 if country has British legal origin, 0 otherwise   ES 
French Dummy equal to 1 if country has French legal origin, 0 otherwise   ES 
Socialist  Dummy equal to 1 if country has Socialist legal origin, 0 otherwise   ES 
Scandinavian  Dummy equal to 1 if country has Scandinavian legal origin, 0 otherwise   ES 
Latitude Country latitude ES 
Landlock Dummy equal to 1 if country is land-locked, 0 otherwise   ES 
Area Logarithm of country area ES 
Tropical  Dummy equal to 1 if country is in tropical area, 0 otherwise   ES 
Advanced  Dummy equal to 1 if country is advanced economy, 0 otherwise WEO 
Income_9515 Logarithm of real GDP per capita, averaging over 1995-2015 WDI 
Government size Real government consumption to real GDP WDI 
Openness Real exports plus imports to real GDP WDI 
Note: 
WDI: World Development Indicators (WB) 
ICSD: Investment and Capital Stock database (IMF) 
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FI: Fraser Institute 
WGI: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WB) 
DPI: Database of Political Institutions (Inter-American Development Bank) 
Polity IV:  Polity IV Project (Center for Systemic Peace) 
ES: Easterly and Sewadeh (2001) 
WEO: World Economic Outlook (IMF) 
Appendix 4.2. Pairwise correlation between institution and fixed factor variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Government effectiveness (1)  1                    
Regulatory quality (2) 0.957 1             
Rule of law (3) 0.963 0.947 1            
Control of corruption (4) 0.966 0.946 0.975 1           
Voice and accountability (5) 0.838 0.862 0.876 0.863 1          
Political stability (6) 0.837 0.839 0.878 0.876 0.822 1         
Parliamentary system (7) 0.622 0.605 0.647 0.611 0.640 0.603 1        
Democracy (8) 0.643 0.649 0.645 0.649 0.796 0.564 0.619 1       
Political competition (9) 0.802 0.784 0.824 0.808 0.859 0.783 0.641 0.770 1      
Executive constraints (10) 0.689 0.696 0.687 0.689 0.812 0.581 0.645 0.964 0.771 1     
British (11) 0.036 0.039 0.036 0.020 -0.046 -0.062 0.050 0.133 -0.065 0.150 1    
French (12) -0.239 -0.238 -0.225 -0.190 -0.159 -0.259 -0.237 -0.211 -0.101 -0.264 -0.588 1   
Socialist (13) -0.191 -0.137 -0.232 -0.241 -0.197 -0.0532 -0.0796 -0.263 -0.251 -0.209 -0.251 -0.302 1  
Scandinavian (14) 0.351 0.311 0.361 0.361 0.372 0.396 0.285 0.280 0.364 0.287 -0.194 -0.233 -0.0996 1 
Advanced (15) 0.809 0.788 0.829 0.808 0.785 0.759 0.570 0.640 0.878 0.637 0.00800 -0.190 -0.285 0.350 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS  
The modern approach of economic growth highlights institutions as the fundamental 
causes of growth which determine the approximate causes of growth such as 
technology progress and capital accumulation. Previous studies deal with the usual 
mechanism to explain how institutions affect economic growth through their impact 
on factors of production such as physical capital, human capital, and technological 
changes. My dissertation explores another channel of institutions affecting growth: 
fiscal policy.   
The primary focus of my study is the impact of fiscal policy on economic growth from 
an institutional perspective. In chapter 2, I augment the standard Solow growth model 
by allowing for the impact of property rights protection on the distribution of private 
and public capital stock in a Cobb-Douglass production function. The analysis shows 
that theoretically productive government investment enhances economic growth but a 
greater property rights protection can either improve or deteriorate the growth impact 
of government investment, depending on the relationship between private and public 
saving rate.  
The empirical study in chapter 3 confirms this prediction with a broader concept of 
institutions, not only limited in property rights protection. It finds that government 
investment in infrastructure benefits long-term economic growth but countries with 
greater economic freedom have lower growth effect of government investment. 
Government consumption is not good to long-term economic growth but its negative 
impact is lower when a country is more economically free. These relationships are 
more pronounced in emerging and developing countries than in advanced economies. 
Extending the analysis with a broader set of economic and political institutions and 
taking into account the stimulation impact of fiscal policy over business cycles, chapter 
4 reveals the importance of economic institutions and political stability in improving 
the efficacy of government spending in the short run. The empirical analysis supports 
the argument made by Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Fatás and Mihov (2013) who claim 
that political institutions do not affect economic performance directly but indirectly 
through its impacts on policymakers’ behavior and economic institutions. Especially, 
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consumption-based fiscal stimulus appears to be more effective than the investment-
based in short term and economic institutions can explain the variations in the impact 
multiplier of government consumption better than that of government investment.                     
The findings from this dissertation offer important policy implications. First, both 
fiscal policy and economic freedom, especially property rights protection, are 
significant determinants of growth. Economic freedom can lead to greater growth by 
providing more favorable environment for private sector to innovate and manufacture. 
The impacts of fiscal policy depend on fiscal instrument used. While government 
investment in physical assets is good to economic growth, government purchase of 
goods and services is generally not.  
Second, it brings a caution to governments that total effects of fiscal policy on the 
economy, especially public investment, depend on the economic institutions of a 
country. Governments can boost economic growth by increasing investment in 
physical assets or improving institutional quality such as the rule of law, regulatory 
efficiency and market openness. While institutional reforms may be difficult and take 
much time to be implemented, increases in government capital expenditure can result 
in greater output. In other words, emerging countries which are usually characterized 
by low institutional quality may achieve a greater growth rate to catch up advanced 
economies when their government puts more resources on infrastructure investment.  
Third, increases in total government consumption may not be a good idea to achieve 
long-term growth but the growth-eroding effects of government consumption can be 
mitigated by improvement of all aspects of economic freedom together. This result is 
more important to emerging countries than to advanced economies. Emerging 
countries usually attain lower economic freedom and, hence, have more room to 
improve their institutional quality so that the negative impact on growth of government 
consumption can be significantly reduced. 
Fourth, regarding the short-term effect, governments can implement expansionary 
fiscal policy to stimulate the economy during downturns by increasing either 
consumption or investment spending. Although the short-term impact of fiscal policy 
differs across countries, consumption-based spending generally is more effective than 
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the investment-based. Empirical results in chapter 4 and chapter 3 imply that for the 
best use of fiscal policy, governments may invest more in physical assets for long-term 
economic growth and spend more on current items to stimulate output in the short run.  
Finally, a greater stimulation effect of fiscal policy can be achieved with some 
institutional reforms. While political institutions do not directly influence the 
effectiveness of fiscal stimulus, economic institutions play a crucial role in 
determining the size of government spending multipliers. Moreover, countries have 
higher level of political stability also have higher government spending multiplier. 
Therefore, without painful changes in political institutions such as military coups or 
violent revolutions, governments can take more actions to ensure rule of law, reduce 
corruption, improve regulatory quality as well as government effectiveness, and create 
a freer environment for individuals and firms to make their own economic choices. As 
showed in chapter 4, fiscal stimulus becomes more effective in countries with higher 
economic institution quality and stable political condition.  
Institutional approach to economic growth has become a fruitful research area in the 
past two decades. Despite a vast literature on economic growth, the gap between the 
rich and the poor or developed and less developed countries has not considerately 
reduced and there are still a lot untold stories about this disparity. Why don’t low-
income countries just copy the model of high-income ones to achieve greater economic 
development given the common knowledge of determinants of economic growth and 
development available around the world? The trivial answer is because countries differ 
in many “things”. Then why don’t they just change those things to apply the successful 
models for the prosperity of their peoples? It may be because some things are too 
persistent and cannot be changed easily, and the connection among things is too 
complicated to change one without affecting the others. My dissertation attacks only 
one of those things, the role of economic and political institutions in the short-term 
and long-term impact of government spending on the economy. Certainly, many other 
things explaining the differences in economic growth and development across 
countries are still waiting to be uncovered.    
Overcoming limitations of this dissertation, future studies can extend the current 
literature in different directions. First, although the Solow growth model employed in 
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this study is simple and powerful for making prediction and interpretation, it is not 
able to capture the complicated behavior of different economic agents in the economy. 
Hence, future research can construct more comprehensive ones to incorporate the role 
of different types of institution and take into account interactions among economic 
agents in a general equilibrium. Not only public investment but also various 
subcategories of government spending can also be considered in the constructed 
model. Especially, property rights are not completely exogenous but evolve over time 
and determined by other economic and political forces. A dynamic analysis framework 
would be very much interesting to uncover the interaction among those factors in 
affecting economic growth and development. The theoretical result in this study can 
serve as a benchmark for that extension.  
Second, the empirical study in chapter 3 reveals interesting results on the determining 
role of economic freedom in the growth impact of fiscal policy but lacks a thoroughly 
analysis on the how economic freedom can change that impact. Some explanations and 
predictions are attempted to reason the findings but no supporting data exists. Future 
studies may empirically explore different mechanisms illustrated in this study, such as 
comparing the number of oppositions and protests between high and low economically 
free countries to government investment projects, or contrasting the role of private 
sector and public sector in enhancing growth between high and low economically free 
countries. Moreover, the time span of 25 years used in chapter 3 is quite short and the 
number of sampling countries can be extended to provide more satisfactory results.    
Third, how to identify a fiscal spending shock in estimating fiscal multiplier is still 
controversial in empirical macroeconomics. Chapter 4 in this dissertation employs a 
simple method to extract the part of fiscal policy not related to concurrent business 
cycle or economic condition to estimate the impact multiplier for each country. There 
are, however, other methods to be considered, such as conducting a structural VAR 
model or applying a narrative method to identify fiscal shock for each country. 
Collecting data to identify fiscal policy shocks for a cross-country study is extremely 
challenging but worth being explored to produce a better result.  
Fourth, the content in Chapter 4 is limited to giving empirical evidence on the 
relationship between fiscal multipliers and institutions. It still lacks a comprehensive 
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analysis on how this link works. As discussed in Section 4.1, government spending 
efficiency and expectation channel could be potential mechanisms explaining how 
institutions can make public spending more or less effective. Investigating the nature 
link between institutions and fiscal multipliers is certainly in the agenda of my future 
research.                          
Last but not least, this dissertation takes into account only formal institutions while 
informal institutions (e.g. culture, social structure, family tradition, trust) also play a 
crucial role in economic growth and development. Fiscal policy in this study targets 
economic growth in terms of output and output per capita whereas other dimensions 
of economic development are also important targets of government policy such as 
income equality, happiness of citizen, and environmental sustainability. The 
combination of those different aspects is promising for future research and contributes 
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